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Abstract
Although modern computer systems process increasing amounts of sensitive, private, and
valuable information, most of today’s operating systems (OSs) fail to protect confidential data
against unauthorized disclosure over covert channels. Securing the large code bases of these
OSs and checking the secured code for the absence of covert channels would come at enormous
costs. Microkernels significantly reduce the necessarily trusted code. However, cost-efficient,
provable confidential-data protection in microkernel-based ystems is still challenging.
This thesis makes two central contributions to the provableprotection of confidential data
against disclosure over covert channels:
• A budget-enforcing, fixed-priority scheduler that provably eliminates covert timing chan-
nels in open microkernel-based systems; and
• A sound control-flow-sensitive security type system for low-level operating-system code.
To prevent scheduling-related timing channels, the proposed scheduler treats possibly leaking,
blocked threads as if they were runnable. When it selects such a thread, it runs a higher classified
budget consumer.
A characterization of budget-consumer time as a blocking term makes it possible to reuse a
large class of existing admission tests to determine whether the proposed scheduler can meet the
real-time guarantees of all threads we envisage to run. Compared to contemporary information-
flow-secure schedulers, significantly more real-time threads can be admitted for the proposed
scheduler.
The role of the proposed security type system is to prove those sy tem components free of
security policy violating information flows that simultaneously operate on behalf of differently
classified clients. In an open microkernel-based system, these are the microkernel and the
necessarily trusted multilevel servers.
To reduce the complexity of the security type system, C++ operating-system code is trans-
lated into a correspondingToyprogram, which in turn is complemented with calls toT ypro-
cedures describing the side effects of interactions with the underlying hardware.Toy is a non-
deterministic intermediate programming language, which Ihave designed specifically for this
purpose. A universal lattice for shared-memory programs enabl s the type system to check the
resultingToycode for potentially harmful information flows, even if the scurity policy of the
system is not known at the time of the analysis.
I demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed analysis in three case studies: a virtual-memory
access, L4 inter-process communication and a secure buffercache. In addition, I prove Osvik’s
countermeasure effective against AES cache side-channel attacks. To my best knowledge, this
is the first security-type-system-based proof of such a countermeasure. The ability of a security
type system to tolerate temporary breaches of confidentiality n lock-protected shared-memory
regions turned out to be fundamental for this proof.
iii
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orginären Forschung ist. Diese Arbeit ist ohne die Zuhilfenahme unzulässiger Hilfe endstanden.
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1. Introduction
Today’s mobile, desktop, and server systems are widely usedto process data of high per-
sonal, commercial, or industrial value. Bank credentials,private email, content protected
audio and video files, health care, and financial data are onlya few examples of data
whose confidentiality is worth protecting. Yet, despite many years of research on identi-
fying [Kem83, KT96, KP91, TGC87, GM82], analyzing [Tro93, AB03, Mil89a], and miti-
gating [Hu91, Gra93, PN92] covert channels [Lam73], and despite an equally long history of
academic and industrial efforts to build small, secure, andreliable operating-system kernels1
[SCS77, Fra83, Inc95, Kar88, Har85, FN79, SGLS77, KZB+91, SVJ+05, Inc09, LEA07],
covert channels remain a serious security concern.
A covert channelis a communication channel that allows threads to transfer in o mation in a
manner that violates the system’s security policy [TGC87, Gal93]. In the presence of poten-
tially harmful covert channels, no guarantees can be given as to whether attackers may learn
information about the sensitive data a system processes, or, in ther words, whether the confi-
dentiality of sensitive data is preserved. On the other hand, system can be secure even though
covert channels exists. Covert channels are benign if they cannot be utilized or if the security
policy has already authorized information flows between thecommunicating threads. To prov-
ably protect confidential data against leakage, we must therefore either demonstrate the absence
of utilizable covert channels, or we must show that no threadwith legitimate access to confi-
dential data transfers information about this data over such a hannel. Threads that do transfer
information over a covert channel are said toleak this information.
Various covert channels have been identified in modern computer systems. In Section2.1,
I elaborate on the nature of these channels in greater detail. For now, let us only distinguish
software-centric covert channels( uch as locks on shared files, unintentionally shared regions
of memory, or, more generally, software-implemented resources that reveal how other threads
use them) fromhardware-centric covert channels( uch as disk-arm movement [KC91], elec-
tromagnetic radiation [Age72], or power consumption [KJJ99]).
There are two outstanding reasons why covert channels and illegal information flows remain
an issue in today’s systems: the high costs of traditional formal and semi-formal methods
to assure the absence of potentially harmful covert channels; and, the size and complexity
of operating systems (OSs) in modern computer systems. Covert channel analysis costs are
significant, both in terms of highly skilled personnel and interms of labor hours, even if the
analysis is carried out only on relatively small amounts of code [Smi01, HKMY87]. Yet, most
of today’s computer systems run large and complex legacy OSs. The kernel of these OSs
often exceeds 200,000 lines of code (LOC) [SPHH06] and contains presumably between 400
and 1200 bugs [CYC+01]. It is therefore little surprising that even security-enha ced legacy
OSs [LS01] fail to protect confidential data against covert channels [GHRS05] and that only a
small fraction of today’s OSs address covert channels at all[KS02].
1The kernel of an operating system is the code that runs in the most privileged processor mode.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, I strive for the provably perfect protection of confidential data against
software-centric covert channels in low-level operating-system code. Perfect means that even
the leakage of a single bit of information is considered harmful.
To provably protect confidential data in operating systems,I propose to combine the com-
plementary strength of two technologies: microkernels andsecurity type systems, a static
language-based information-flow analysis. Hence, this theis is about provable confidential-
data protection in microkernel-based systems.
In this combined approach, the role of the microkernel is to avoid covert channels by isolating
differently classified applications, legacy OS instances and operating-system servers2. The role
of security type systems is to prove the absence of those security policy violating information
flows that isolation cannot sensibly avoid. These are the illegal information flows that follow
from invocations of the microkernel or from invocations of operating-system servers that si-
multaneously operate on behalf of differently classified clients and that cannot be reinstantiated
for each such client. In the following, I shall call these servers themultilevel serversof the
analyzed microkernel-based system. The microkernel and the multilevel servers I shall call
collectively themultilevel componentsof such a system.
The remainder of this introduction is organized as follows:next, I give a more detailed in-
troduction on microkernels, on security type systems, and on the roles they play in the prov-
able protection of confidential data in microkernel-based systems. Section1.3summarizes the
contributions that this thesis makes and highlights the challenges that must be addressed. Sec-
tion1.4discusses the scope of this thesis and the limitations of theresults it presents, Section1.5
concludes this introduction by giving an outline of the remainder of this thesis.
1.1. Microkernels
The design philosophy of microkernel-based systems [WCC+74] is to implement a universally
applicable and absolutely reliable kernel — the microkernel. This kernel should implement
only those mechanisms that allow for a convenient, flexible,and efficient implementation of OS
facilities and policies outside the kernel. The determining criteria for tolerating a mechanism in
the kernel is whether a required system functionality cannot be implemented if this mechanism
would reside outside the kernel [Lie95].
Although first-generation microkernels [ABB+86, ZPS99, BCE+94, SESS96, ADH89] were
rather large, inflexible, and slow, second-generation microke nels [Lie95, Hil92, HK93, Sha99,
KV05, DdEE, SK08, PSLW09, Han99] have been able to demonstrate that these characteristics
are not inherent. Second-generation microkernels achievetheir goals with only three abstrac-
tions and two mechanisms:
• Address Spaces:mappings of address-space local identifiers to resources;
• Threads:activities that execute inside address spaces; and
• Kernel Memory:memory that the kernel can use to create threads, address spaces, user
memory and other kernel-implemented objects.
2Servers are application-level programs, which provide some OS functionality to other application-level pro-
grams.
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Inter-process communication(IPC) and anaccess-control mechanismfor kernel objects are the
two mechanisms, which complement these abstractions. IPC implements a controlled exchange
of messages between threads executing in different addressspaces. The in-kernel access-control
mechanism enforces the part of the security policy that seeks to control which operations threads
can execute on a kernel-implemented object. Thereby, the unit of protection enforcement is the
address space (i.e., all threads of an address space can exercis the same privileges). Examples
of access-control mechanisms are access-control lists, capabilities [DH66, Sha99, SA07, DdEE,
KV05, LW09, WL10, Ste09a], reference monitors [Lie92, SVJ+05] and access controls based
on static [Inc95] or dynamic secrecy levels [VEK+07, ZBWKM06].
The size of second-generation microkernels is in the order of 14,000 LOC [SPHH06].
This is about a quarter the size of the kernel of the Vax VMM operating system [KZB+91].
Second-generation microkernels host a variety of systems [Sha99, HBB+98, HHF+05, Hil92,
HERH93]. And, even paravirtualized [LUY+08, Hoh96, Lac04] and unmodified legacy
OSs [PSLW09, SK08] run on top of microkernels or microhypervisors. Amicrohypervisor
is a microkernel that supports unmodified guest OSs and deprivil ged virtual-machine moni-
tors [SGLS77].
A particularly interesting (and from an information-flow perspective also very challenging)
class of microkernel-based systems are open systems as described in Deng et al. [DL97] and in
Härtig et al. [HHF+05]. Open systems co-host not necessarily trustworthy legacyOSs and their
applications next to security-sensitive and real-time-critical applications on top of a microker-
nel. As a consequence, microkernels for open systems must not only encapsulate potentially
untrustworthy legacy OS instances; they must also meet the timing requirements of simultane-
ously executing real-time applications.
The co-hosting ability of open systems facilitates a construction principle, which signifi-
cantly reduces the trusted computing base of security-sensitive or real-time-critical application
scenarios: to split sensitive applications into critical and into non-critical parts and to reuse
potentially untrustworthy legacy code for the non-critical p rts [HBB+98, HPHS04]. In these
split-application scenarios, it is customary to cryptographically3 protect [WH08, SPHH06]
confidential data before the potentially untrustworthy legacy code can access it. However, in
some scenarios, it is also feasible to grant potentially untrustworthy applications and legacy OS
instances plaintext access to confidential data [HWS03]. Then, the primary responsibility of
the microkernel and of the multilevel servers is to isolate the parts of split applications in such
a way that confidential data cannot be leaked.
To avoid leakage, applications must be isolated both in a temporal and in a spacial manner.
The enforcement of temporal isolation is the responsibility of the kernel-level scheduler. In
real-time systems, the term temporal isolation is merely used to express the requirement that
threads cannot violate the real-time guarantees (e.g., completion within a specified amount of
time) of unrelated threads. However, as we shall see in Section 3.2 on page57, the protection
of confidential data against leakage requires a stronger form of temporal isolation: timing must
not be a covert channel.
To isolate applications or parts of application-level programs in a spatial manner, all accesses
to kernel objects, server-implemented resources, and to other application-level programs must
have been authorized by the system’s security policy. To enfrce this isolation with the in-kernel
access-control mechanism, the to-be-isolated parts must be run in separate address spaces and
local identifiers must refer only to legitimately accessible objects. This way, leakage is limited
3See Section2.3.2for a discussion about the relation between cryptography and perfect information-flow security.
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to those objects to which the isolated threads in an address space have direct or indirect access.
However, because in-kernel access-control mechanisms canonly enforce restrictions on the
release of information through system calls, information flws between legitimately accessible
objects are beyond the control of these mechanisms [DD77]. Hence, in-kernel access-control
mechanisms cannot prevent the microkernel from leaking information from one kernel object to
another, nor can they prevent multilevel servers from leaking client information into the objects
that the server implements for a differently classified client. This is where security type systems
come into play.
1.2. Security Type Systems
Inspired by the early work of the Dennings [DD77], security type systems [VSI96] and related
language-based approaches to information-flow security have evolved into powerful tools to
statically check applications for the absence of security policy violating information flows. For
an excellent overview see Sabelfeld and Myers [SM03].
Essentially, security type systems work in the same way as the data type systems of modern
compilers: maintaining only the types of variables, both, security type systems and data type
systems, abstract from concrete values and from the concrete expressions that compute these
values; both infer the types of expression results from the typ s of the expression parameters;
and, both check whether the types of these results are compatible with the types of the variables
in which these results are stored.
The fundamental differences between security type systemsand data type systems are the
types on which they operate: data type systems operate on thecommon language data typesint ,
float , bool , etc.; security type systems, on the other hand, operate on the secrecy levels of stored
information respectively on the secrecy levels up to which eventual observers of a variable are
cleared.
Security type systems infer the secrecy level of an expression result as the least upper bound
of the secrecy levels of the expression parameters. Hence, they pessimistically assume that the
expression produces an encoding, which reveals information b ut any data in these parameters.
To also prevent leakages through the control flow of a program, security type systems also check
variable assignments for implicit information flows. Whenever information is assigned to an
observable variable, security type systems validate that the assignment happens in a context
whose secrecy level is also legitimately observable. Thecontextdenotes where in the program
the assignment is located. Its secrecy level is the least upper bound of the secrecy levels of the
conditionals (e.g., of if-statements) that have directed the control flow of the program to this
context. Hence, if legitimately observable data is writtenin a context that depends on a secret
conditional, the secrecy level of this conditional is checked together with the secrecy level of
the stored information by checking the least upper bound of both secrecy levels against the
clearance of eventual observers. A secrecy level of a resultis compatible with the clearance
of eventual observers of a variable if all observer clearances dominate the secrecy level of this
result. This is precisely the case if the greatest lower bound of observer clearances dominates
the result secrecy level. I will therefore call this lower bound theclearanceof this variable.
The lattice model[Den76] ensures that least upper bounds and greatest lower bounds always
exist. A set of secrecy levelsS and the partial orderdominates≤ form a lattice(S,≤) if and
only if any non-empty finite subsetS ′ ⊆ S of secrecy levels has a unique least upper and
greatest lower bound.
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Sound security type systems accept only those programs thatare free of security policy violat-
ing information flows. However, security type systems typically ignore the timing behavior of
programs, and hence also the information programs leak throug their timing behavior4. As a
consequence, security type systems are typically only sound with regards to a timing-insensitive
(and often also termination-insensitive) information-flow property: timing and termination-
insensitive non-interference [GM82]. Non-interference attests the complete absence of security
policy violating information flows by requiring the checkedprogram to produce the same output
as seen by an arbitraryl-classified observer despite variations in l classified inputs.
To also address security policy violating information flowsthrough the program’s timing be-
havior, Agat [Aga00a] suggests a class of program transformations for timing-insensitive non-
interference-secure programs calledtiming-leak transformations. Provided a timing-insensitive
security type system has already proven a program to be timing-insensitive non-interference
secure, a timing-leak transformation eliminates the illega information flows that encode secrets
in the timing of internal and external events. Essentially,such a transformation replaces all
secrecy-dependent operations of the to-be-transformed program with semantically equivalent
operations that exhibit a secrecy-independent timing behavior. As a result, the timing of
observable side effects of these operations can no longer depen on the timing of preceding
secrecy-dependent operations. The transformed program isti ing-sensitive non-interference
secure.
Still, security type systems have their limitations, whichjustify their combined application with
in-kernel access-control mechanisms:
Completeness Security type systems are notcomplete, that is, they cannot classify all
information-flow secure programs as secure.
For example, typical security type systems will reject the two secure programs5
l = h; l = l − h and l = h; l = 0 , although both evaluate tol == 0 irrespective of the se-
cret value inh. Typical security type systems reject the first because theyabstract from
the concrete values inl andh and from concrete arithmetic operations+ and−. Therefore,
they cannot detect that the subtraction removes the secret valueh from l . Control-flow-
insensitive security type systems cannot accept the secondexample because they require
all subprograms of a checked program to be secure on their own. Obviously,l = h is not
secure if the temporary breach of confidentiality is not repaired in a subsequent assign-
ment.
Size and Complexity Contemporary security type systems fail to accept some programs just
because they are too large or to complex. In the foreseeable future, legacy OSs will likely
remain in this class of uncheckable programs, even if one would undertake the challenge
to secure them. However, the possibility to reuse these legacy OSs in open microkernel-
based systems demonstrates the value of a suitable isolation mechanism besides program
analysis.
Unsafe Compiler Optimizations Aggressive and thus potentially unsafe compiler opti-
mizations can jeopardize the confidentiality guarantees ofuccessfully-checked pro-
grams. However, in our setting, a restriction to safe compiler optimizations is justified
4The security type system in Hedin et al. [HS05] is an exception.
5In these programs and in similar examples in the remainder ofthis thesis,l andh are two variables withlow
respectivelyhigh secrecy levels. The security policy authorizes information fl ws from low to high but not
vice versa.
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only for the microkernel and for the multilevel servers: If aserver can be re-instantiated
for differently classified clients, a single instance of this server needs to hold only those
information to which the clients of this instance are cleared anyway. Hence, if we assume
that the kernel-level scheduler prevents scheduling-related covert channels, and if we fur-
ther assume that neither the microkernel nor the multilevelservers can be used by their
clients to illegally pass confidential information to otherclients, an access-control mech-
anism, which allows clients to access only their respectiveserver instances, suffices to
prevent leakage. A central contribution of this thesis is toconstruct a static information-
flow analysis, which establishes the second assumption for the microkernel and for the
multilevel servers. However, the above reasons show that oter programs need not to be
subjected to such an analysis. Hence, they do not depend on safe compiler optimizations
to preserve their confidentiality guarantees.
Low-Level OS Code Finally, as we shall see in greater detail in Section4.2 on page119,
today’s security type systems cannot immediately be applied to the low-level operating-
system servers of a microkernel-based system, nor can they produce sound results for the
microkernel itself.
Taken together, a successfully checked microkernel with a temporally isolating scheduler and a
sound security type system for low level operating-system code compensate the limitations of
the respective other technology to provably protect confidetial data in open microkernel-based
systems.
1.3. Challenges and Contributions
This dissertation makes two central contributions:
1. A modified budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler that provably eliminates
scheduling-related covert timing channels in open microkernel-based systems; and
2. A sound, control-flow-sensitive security type system to check low-level operating-system
code for security policy violating information flows.
In the following, I give an extended introduction to these contributions.
1.3.1. A Secure Budget-Enforcing Fixed-Priority Schedule r
The abilities and limitations of access-control mechanisms to prevent illegal information flows
that do not exploit timing behavior are well understood [Den76, Rus92, VEK+07, ZBWKM06].
However, timing leaks are beyond the control of these mechanisms. The first central contri-
bution of this thesis is therefore a budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler that provably
eliminates scheduling-related timing leaks in open microke nel-based systems. A scheduler is
budget enforcingif it prevents threads with exhausted execution budget fromrunning.
Operating-systems typically take one of the following two approaches to avoid scheduling-
related covert channels: they add noise to all clocks and to all ther timing sources [Hu91],
or they partition the system in both a spatial and in a temporal manner [Gal93]. Security type
systems for programs that run on specific classes of schedulers [SV98, SS00, RS06] and security
type systems for programs that run on arbitrary schedulers [SS00] complement these OS-level
solutions.
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However, because open systems also run real-time-criticalapplications, neither the two OS-
level solutions nor the language-based approaches are perfctly suited for open microkernel-
based systems:
1. Fuzzy time [Hu91] reduces the bandwidth of scheduling-related covert channels at the
cost of precise timing. Real-time workloads, which requireexact timing information to
take time stamps of incoming events and to trigger external signals at precise points in
time, are thereby jeopardized [BCG+94].
Moreover, fuzzy time alone cannot effectively mitigate scheduling-related covert chan-
nels. Trostle [Tro93] substantiates this point in his model of fuzzy time systems. He
shows that a high-bandwidth covert channel (with data ratesin the order of 50 bits per
second) remains even if clock fluctuations are high (e.g., randomly distributed between 1
ms and 19 ms).
2. Time-partitioned systems [Kop98] temporally isolate threads in different partitions with-
out affecting clock precision. Hence, by assigning differently classified threads to dif-
ferent partitions, time-partitioned systems avoid scheduling-related covert timing chan-
nels. However, time-partitioning schedulers cannot run differently classified threads dur-
ing those times when all threads of the active partition block. A scheduler that can reap
benefit of these blocking times can therefore guarantee the in-time completion of signif-
icantly more real-time threads. The proposed fixed-priority scheduler reaps benefit of
these blocking times.
3. Only successfully checked programs can safely be run if security type systems are the
only means to avoid scheduling-related covert channels.
This thesis proposes two modifications to enable a budget-enforci g fixed-priority scheduler to
provably eliminate scheduling-related covert channels:
Countermeasure 1: The first modification causes the scheduler to treat possiblyleaking
blocked higher prioritized threads as is they were runnable.
Countermeasure 2: The second modification causes the scheduler to defer the points in time
when higher prioritized threads resume their execution.
As a result of the first countermeasure, other threads in the syst m can no longer distinguish
whether a threads did actually run or whether the scheduler has merely treated this thread as if
it were runnable. Consequently, alterations in a thread’s scheduling behavior no longer consti-
tute a covert channel. In situations where a non-preemptively-executing low-prioritized thread
attempts to leak information by delaying the resumption of ablocked higher prioritized thread,
the second countermeasure prevents this leakage by always delaying this resumption to a safe
point in time.
As we shall see in greater detail in Chapter3, a budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler
that implements these two countermeasures prevents all scheduling-related timing channels.
Thereby, it preserves precise timing and most of the real-time guarantees an unmodified fixed-
priority scheduler can give. Moreover, because the effect of the first countermeasure on lower
prioritized threads can be quantified as a blocking term, a large class of existing admission
tests can be reused. Anadmission testdetermines a-priori whether a scheduler will meet the
real-time guarantees of all threads that this scheduler should run.
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In the area of information-flow secure schedulers, the detailed contributions of this thesis are:
• ReThMo, a task model to describe real-time workloads for the purpose of proving budget-
enforcing fixed-priority schedulers non-interference secur ;
• An analysis of scheduling-related covert channels in fixed-priority schedulers;
• A non-interference-secure budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler;
• A formal model of this scheduler and a corresponding machine-checked non-interference
proof;
• An analysis of the real-time guarantees that this schedulerachieves;
• A discussion of practical mattersthat have to be resolved to apply this scheduler in real-
life systems; and
• A secure real-time resource access protocolto share resources in an information-flow-
secure manner.
1.3.2. A Sound Security Type System for Low-Level
Operating-System Code
The second central contribution of this thesis is a control-flow-sensitive security type system
for the low-level operating-system code of microkernel-based systems.
The principles for provable operating-system security go back to the mid 70th [FN79, BL73,
FLR77]. Recent approaches to formally verify the absence of security policy violating infor-
mation flows are typically instantiations of Rushby’s non-interference framework [Rus92]. A
proof in this framework involves proving two unwinding properties for all atomic transitions
that a system can make.
However, although extensions of Rushby’s framework have successfully been applied to an
access-control mechanism [Rus92], to a multi-applicative smart card [SRS+02], to the Infineon
SLE66 smart card processor [vOWL03], and to an abstract Haskell model of an L4 micro-
kernel [LEA07, Les06], none of these approaches establish non-interference fora concrete
implementation. As experienced by Kemmerer and McHugh [HKMY87], the lack of automa-
tion, the difficulty of identifying covert channels from failed proofs, and the complexity of the
proofs themselves result in significant costs for verifyingnon-interference at the source-code
level. The seL4 verification [KEH+09] has shown that confidentiality-preserving refinement
proofs [HPS01], which connect properties of an abstract model to a concrete implementation,
are principally feasible for modern high-performance microkernels6. However, the costs of
such a proof are significant.
Security type systems are both easily automated and they avoid the costs of source-level non-
interference proofs. However, to apply these analyses to low-level operating-system code, sev-
eral challenges have to be mastered. As we shall see in greater detail in Section4.2, such an
analysis has to cope:
• with a combination of C++, C, and Assembler code;
6The refinement proof for seL4 is limited to Hoare properties [BT82, Jac89]. Non-interference is not preserved
under these refinements.
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• with interactions between the checked program, its clients, the kernel, and other servers;
• with peculiar execution environments and peculiar interactions with the underlying hard-
ware;
• with code that exhibits non-deterministic behavior in these nvironments; and,
• with code for which the security policy is typically not completely known at the time of
the analysis.
In part, these challenges have been addressed before [Sab01a, SM02, OCsC06, RS06]. How-
ever, as we shall see in greater detail in Section4.3, contemporary language-based information-
flow analyses for low-level operating-system code result inrather complex and unmaintainable
security type systems when these type systems should check tmicrokernel or a multilevel
server in its entirety. To avoid this complexity, the present work follows a different approach,
which was originally suggested by Furuse et al. [FDKHN07].
The approach followed in this thesis is to first translate theC++ operating-system code into
an intermediate programming language and to then check the translated program with a se-
curity type system for this intermediate language. Furuse et al. apply Gimple [SC08a], the
intermediate language of the Gnu Compiler Collection. However, Gimple depends on a specific
compiler and the translation from C++ to Gimple is not trivial. Hence, for an all-embracing
compiler-independent soundness result, the translation from C++ to Gimple must be shown to
preserve the semantics and information-flow properties of the checked C++ programs. To re-
main compiler independent and to avoid the costs of these refinement proofs, I introduce a new
intermediate language calledToy.
Toy stays as close as possible to the C++ standard while providing the language constructs
required to address the above challenges. For example, to formalize the non-deterministic eval-
uation order of C++ expressions [PC09, § 1.9 pt 13],Toy contains several non-deterministic
composition statements to explicitly state the interleaving of C++ side effects and value com-
putations.
After the to-be-checked C++ operating-system code is translated into a correspondingToy
program, thisToyprogram is complemented with subprograms, which describe the side effects
that interactions with the underlying hardware ensue. Because both, the C++ operating-system
code and these interleaved-executing side effects are formalized inToy, a security type system
for this intermediate language can check both for the absence of security policy violating
information flows.
The detailed contributions that this thesis makes in the area of static information-flow analyses
for low-level operating-system code are:
• The non-deterministic intermediate programming languageToy;
• A control-flow-sensitive security type system for the deterministic part of Toy;
• The notion oflearned secretsto track the secrecy level of information that concurrently
executing threads may learn from the checked program; and
• A machine-checked soundness proof of the proposed securitytype system.
Although,Toy is inherently non-deterministic, the proposed security type system focuses only
on the deterministic core ofToy.
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The reasons for that are twofold:
1. the standard typing rules for non-deterministic composition (see e.g., Sabelfeld [Sab01b,
pg. 45]) apply, although, as we shall see in Section4.7.1, at a loss of precision; and,
2. becauseToyclearly separates input non-determinism from control-flown n-determinism,
there is an alternative to applying the standard typing rules to all occurrences of the latter
type of non-determinism: the security type system can checkall possible ways in which
the control-flow non-determinism in selected parts of the program can be resolved.
The key benefit of the latter approach is that the checked program p must not automatically
be rejected as being potentially insecure if some resolutions of the non-determinism inp are
potentially insecure. Often, a failure to check all these parts merely limits the safe compiler
optimizations onp respectively the hardware platforms on whichp can safely be run.
I have demonstrated the applicability of the security type system forToy in three case studies:
• a memory access, which causes the hardware to walk through the page tables for the
accessed virtual address;
• an L4-IPC send operation; and
• a buffer-cache server, which multiplexes the memory pools of it clients to cache recently-
accessed file blocks.
A proof that Osvik’s countermeasure protects against AES cache-side channel attacks com-
plements these case studies. In this proof, I exploit an important property of the control-flow-
sensitive security type system forToy, which I shall introduce in Chapter4: the ability to tolerate
temporary breaches of confidentiality in lock-protected shared-memory regions. As long as all
threads adhere to the locking discipline, lock-protected shared-memory regions may temporar-
ily reveal information about confidential data (here the encryption key) as long as the checked
program repairs this breach of confidentiality (Osvik’s countermeasure) before it releases the
protecting lock. In Osvik’s countermeasure, the protecting lock is to disable processor inter-
rupts until both the encryption round and its accompanying countermeasure completes. The
disabling of interrupts automatically enforces adherenceto the locking discipline because it
prevents other threads from running on the same CPU and hencefrom deducing the AES key
from cache conflict misses before Osvik’s countermeasure has eliminated this possibility.
1.4. Scope and Limitations
Although the results of this thesis have a much broader scope, this thesis focuses on three main
research areas:
1. perfect information-flow security,
2. L4-family microkernels, and
3. security type systems.
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In the first part of this section, I discuss alternative direct ons and give reasons for my decision
to focus on the above areas. In the second part, I discuss the asumptions on which my solutions
are based and the limitations they have.
This thesis leaves the construction of an efficient type checking tool for low-level kernel code
as future work. In principle, it is well known how sound security type systems translate into
such tools [Mye99, Sim03], even for control-flow-sensitive analyses [FTA02, HL09].
1.4.1. Perfect Information-Flow Security
It is a common believe that realistic covert-channel-free systems cannot be built. Nevertheless,
I strive in this thesis for a complete absence of illegal information flows over software-centric
covert channels. The following five points motivate this decision.
1. Whether a system can tolerate low-bandwidth covert channels, and if so, how many bits
per second are tolerable, depends on the type of confidentialdat a system has to pro-
tect. Unfortunately, size and value of confidential data arenot always positively corre-
lated [DS09].
For example, in many systems, encryption keys are the most valuable data because they
inherit their value from the confidential data they have encrypted. Yet, recommended
key sizes for long-term (i.e., pre quantum computer) protection are only 128 bits for
symmetric cryptography and 3248 bits for asymmetric cryptography [II09]. Given these
numbers, I have to agree with J. Millen [Mil99] when he asks in his panel speech “20
years of covert channel analysis”: “how long is that [key] going to be kept secret even at
one bit per second?”. Approximately two minutes for symmetric keys respectively little
less than one hour for asymmetric keys are quite short periods, even if we neglect that
knowledge of only a few key bits significantly improves attacks on the cipher (see e.g.,
Nohl [Noh08]).
2. The continuing increase of processor speed results in an icrease of covert-channel band-
widths. As a result, capacity tradeoffs, which were justified for one processor generation,
may no longer be justified on newer processor generations. Constant costs arise for re-
evaluating channel bandwidths and for re-engineering those parts of the system where
bandwidth-reduction schemes fail to sufficiently mitigatecovert channel.
With the exception of the envisaged timing-leak transformations for low-level operating-
system code, none of the solutions, which I shall propose in this thesis, depends on the
speed of the underlying processor. For the timing-leak transformation, it suffices to update
the safe worst-case execution-time estimates of secrecy-dpendent operations. We shall
return to this point in Section2.4.6on page32.
3. Both, the machine-checked proof of the budget-enforcingfixed-priority scheduler and
the machine-checked soundness result of theToy security type system establish non-
influence [Ohe04], an extension of Meseguer’s and Goguen’s non-interference prop-
erty [GM82]. However, neither non-interference nor non-influence is prepared to tolerate
the leakage of even as few information as a single bit. Hence,these properties hold only
for perfectly secure systems.
Approximate non-interference [DPHW02] and quantitative non-interference proper-
ties [RD82, CHM02, Low02, BP03] tolerate low-bandwidth information flows. However,
they are much more difficult to establish.
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4. Perfectly secure systems nicely combine with systems that tolerate low-bandwidth covert
channels. That is, if our application scenario permits low-bandwidth covert channels, it
can still be run on top of a perfectly-secure microkernel-based system. And,
5. Finally, it is an interesting research question to see howfar one can get with perfect
security in open microkernel-based systems. And perhaps, it is even possible to build
covert-channel free systems [Mil99, PN92].
1.4.2. L4-Family Microkernels
Although the results of this thesis are also applicable to other microkernels and to other
microkernel-based systems, I focus in this thesis on systems based on L4-family microker-
nels [Lie95, Hoh02, KV05, DdEE, WL10, Ste09a]. My choice for this particular kernel family
is motivated as follows.
1. L4-family microkernels have demonstrated their abilityto co-host potentially untrustwor-
thy legacy operating systems and their applications next tosecurity-sensitive and real-
time-critical applications [HBB+98, HHF+05]. Hence, any modification must preserve
both this co-hosting capability and the real-time capabilities of the microkernel;
2. L4-family microkernels implement one of the fastest possible IPC paths and they are
highly optimized for performance. Kernel modifications must therefore preserve the per-
formance of these kernels to the best degree possible; and,
3. Having contributed to the design and implementation of one f these kernels my-
self [KV05], I am familiar with the microkernels of the L4-family and with most of the
peculiar programming patterns they contain.
I do not expect any difficulties in adapting the results of this t esis to other microkernels.
1.4.3. Security Type Systems and Static Analyses
Besides security type systems, there are several other static and dynamic approaches to
language-based information-flow security (see e.g., [AB04, AB07, LUV05, Zan02, FM06,
ML97]). The focus of this work is on static information-flow analysis and, more precisely, on
security type systems for low-level operating-system code. In Section2.4, I relate my approach
to abstract-interpretation-based, data-flow-based, and logic-based information-flow analyses.
Dynamic approaches observe the information flows in a system[VEK+07, ZBWKM06,
KYB+07] or in an application [ML97] and stop the system if information is about to be leaked.
There are two reasons why dynamic information-flow securitycannot be applied to all applica-
tions of open microkernel-based systems:
1. Without hardware support [TWM+09], the overhead of tracking secrecy levels of pro-
cessed information can be significant. In particular, in theperformance-critical IPC path
such an overhead may be fatal. On the other hand, only a small fraction of the code of
an open microkernel-based system needs to be constrained bysuch an analysis. Static
analyses have no such overhead.
2. Real-time systems have to guarantee at admission time that real-time-critical applications
will meet their deadlines. To give such a guarantee with a dynamic information-flow anal-
ysis, the potential occurrence of illegal information flowsmust be excluded at admission
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time. However, because admission tests are typically run off-line, the analysis, which
determines whether such an information flow occurs, must be satic.
1.4.4. Assumptions
With the exception of cache side-channels in the proof of Osvik’s countermeasure in Sec-
tion 5.4, this thesis does not address hardware-centric covert channels. As we shall see in
Section2.1.3, hardware-based solutions are often more effective and more efficient in avoiding
leakage over these channels. I will therefore assume that the envisaged open microkernel-based
systems apply these hardware-based solutions.
In this thesis, I present various proofs that have been machine checked with the help of the
interactive theorem prover PVS [ORS92]. The correctness of these proofs depends on the
validity of the usual assumptions on the correctness of the und rlying system. This includes the
correctness of the theorem prover, of the operating system,of the programming environment,
and of the underlying hardware platform. The PVS sources arepublished [Völ10].
In Section3.3, I state further assumptions about the budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler.
These assumptions are in part lifted in later sections in Chapter3. Section4.4summarizes my
assumptions about low-level operating-system code.
1.5. Synopsis
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: in thenext chapter, I introduce the foun-
dations of this work and relate my results to the works of others. Chapter3 presents the
budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler, theR ThMotask model, and the machine-checked
non-interference proof for this scheduler. Chapter4 introduces theToy intermediate program-
ming language, the security type system for low-level operating-system code in microkernel-
based systems and its soundness proof. In Chapter5, I apply the information-flow analysis of
Chapter4 in three case studies and in the correctness proof of Osvik’scountermeasure against
AES cache side-channel attacks. Chapter6 concludes this thesis.
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2. Foundations and Related Work
To my best knowledge, this is the first attempt towards a security-type-system-based
information-flow analyses for the low-level operating-system code of microkernel-based
systems. Still, there a large body of work that relates to thetopic of this thesis.
This chapter presents a survey of related work and introduces th foundations on which
this thesis is based. It is organized as follows: Section2.1 gives a brief overview on covert
channels following a classification by Sabelfeld and Myers [SS99, SM03]. Section2.2 sur-
veys security policies and the lattice-based notation of these policies. Section2.3 introduces
non-influence[Ohe04], the confidentiality property, which I shall use in Section3.4, in the
machine-checked soundness proof of the security type system for Toy, and in Section4.7.3.3, in
the machine-checked proof that the budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler protects against
scheduling-related covert channels. In Section2.4, I introduce security type systems and dis-
cuss related static analyses. In Section2.5, I give a brief overview on L4-family microker-
nels and sketch how servers of L4-based systems look like. Section 2.6 discusses related non-
interference-secure schedulers. Section2.7 concludes this chapter with a brief introduction to
the theorem prover PVS [ORS92], which I have used for the machine-checked proofs of this
thesis.
2.1. Covert Channels
Lampson [Lam73] was first to identify covert channels as a security concern.Following the
Trusted Computer Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [Gal93], I introduced in Section1
covert channels as “communication channels that allow threads to transfer information in a
manner that violates the system’s security policy.” In thissection, I refine this definition for
specific types of covert channels and give examples of source-level illegal information flows.
2.1.1. Storage and Timing Channels
Kemmerer [Kem83] classifies covert channels intoc vert storage channelsand intocovert tim-
ing channels. Storage channels are sender modifiable attributes of explicitly or implicitly shared
resources (e.g., the free space on a shared disk). Receiverscan directly or indirectly read the
changed attribute (e.g., in the form of a ’disk full’ error message). Timing channels reveal an at-
tribute change or a resource usage indirectly through variations in the response times of receiver
initiated operations.
Scheduling-related covert channels [SGLS77] are covert timing channels, where the sender
varies its scheduling behavior with the intention that the scheduler reflects this variation in the
points in time when it runs the receiver. They are also calledexternal timing channelsbecause
the receiver is typically not cleared for sanitized sender outputs. Hence, it can observe only the
externally visible runtime behavior of the sender.
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In contrast to external timing channels,internal timing channelsreveal the points in time when
legitimately observable outputs of the sender occur. Provided a program has been successfully
checked for the absence covert storage channels, a sound timi g-leak transformation [Aga00a]
eliminates both external and internal timing channels. Thebudget-enforcing fixed-priority
scheduler, which I shall introduce in Chapter3, prevents also unchecked and thus potentially
malicious programs from leaking confidential information over external timing channels.
2.1.2. Noise
If only the leaking program can write to a covert channel, this channel is said to benoiseless.
Otherwise, if other programs can also write to this channel,it is said to benoisy. Striving for
perfect information-flow security, I have to regard also noisy channels as potentially harmful.
2.1.3. Hardware- and Software-Centric Covert Channels
In Section1, I have distinguishedhardware-centric covert channelsfrom software-centric
covert channels. Examples of hardware-centric covert channels include cache side channels
(see e.g., [Ber04]), timing channels from disk-arm movement [KC91] and covert channels
that signal information through the processor’s power consumption [KJJ99], emitted radia-
tion [Age72, LU02], or heat. These channels have in common that secrets are encoded in
certain hardware attributes that are not necessarily visible at the architectural level. In contrast
to hardware-centric channels, software-centric covert channels encode secrets in architecturally
visible attributes.
Hardware-centric covert channels are, to a large degree, beyond the control of software-based
solutions. Cache coloring [LHH97] forms an exception. However, even if software-based coun-
termeasures mitigate these channels, hardware-based countermeasures [WL07, Age94, Gra93]
are often more effective and more efficient.
With the exception of cache side channels in the proof of Osvik’s countermeasure for
AES [OST05] in Section5.4, I do not address hardware-centric channels in the present work. I
shall assume instead that hardware-based countermeasuresre applied to mitigate the effects of
these channels.
2.1.4. Illegal Information Flows in Source Code
All widely used methods for identifying covert channels in source code [Gal93] (security type
systems included) are based on identifying illegal information flows. For that, the security pol-
icy of the system is broken down to program variables (e.g., based on the clearance of observers
to which such a variable may eventually become visible or based on initially stored secrets).
The secrecy levels of assigned-to variables are required todominate the secrecy levels of all
those variables that cause information to flow into such a variable.
Sabelfeld and Myers [SS99, SM03] give the following informal classification of source-level
illegal information flows.
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Explicit information flows arise when programs store and keep secrets in variables that
eventually become visible to an observer that is not clearedfor this information.
An example of an explicit flow is the assignment1:
l = h;
Implicit flows arise when programs leak secrets through their control flow.
An example of such a flow is
if (h % 2) { l = 1 } else { l = 0 }
It leaks the least-significant bit ofh by assigning different values tol .
Internal timing leaks arise when programs encode secrets in the timing information of
legitimately-observable events.
For example, the following program leaks the least-significant bit ofh in the time when it
setsl to one. The statementidle(n) stands for a no-op that lastsn µs.
l = 0;
if (h % 2) {
idle (100);
}
l = 1;
External timing leaks arise when programs encode secrets in their execution and blocking
behavior.
For example, the following program leaks the least-significant bit ofh because it blocks if
h % 2 == 1 holds (sleep ) and executes (idle ) otherwise. In contrast toidle , sleep releases
the CPU and permits the scheduler to run other threads in the meantime.
if (h % 2) {
sleep(50);
} else {
idle (50);
}
l = 1;
The time after which the above program setsl o one is50µs regardless of the branch it
takes. Hence, it contains an external timing leak but no internal timing leaks.
External timing leaks can be used to send confidential information over scheduler-related
covert timing channels.
Termination leaks arise when programs encode secrets in the time when they terminate.
Because non-termination and very long execution can typically not be distinguished by
an external observer, termination leaks can be viewed as a form of external timing leaks.
An example of such a leak is
if (h % 2) {
while (true ) {}
}
1Like before,h is a variable that storeshigh-classified information. Thelow -classified observer of the variablel
is not cleared for this information.
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Probabilistic leaks arise when programs encode secrets in the probability distribution of
observable outputs.
For example, the following program leaks the least-significant bit ofh because the prob-
ability that l == 1 is 100 % if h == 1 and 50 % ifh == 0. The expressionrandom(0...1)
returns each of the two values zero and one with the same likelihood.
if (h % 2) {
l = 1;
} else {
l = random(0...1)
}
Lowe [Low04] addresses a further class of information flows:
Refinement leaks arise when a concrete implementation of the checked programresolves
the same non-deterministic choice in different ways. For example, the following pro-
gram leaks the least-significant bit ofh if a concrete implementation resolves the non-
deterministic choice1 [] 0 in the if-branch in favor of1 and in the else-branch in favor of
0.
if (h % 2) {
l = 1 [] 0;
} else {
l = 1 [] 0;
}
The timing- and termination-insensitive security type system for the deterministic core of
Toy, which I shall introduce in Chapter4, checks the low-level operating-system code of
microkernel-based systems for the absence of explicit and implicit information flows. A subse-
quent timing-leak transformation [Aga00a] eliminates harmful internal timing leaks. External
timing leaks are addressed with the help of the budget-enforci g fixed-priority scheduler, which
I shall introduce in Chapter3. Because I assume that the individual invocations of the microker-
nel and of the multilevel servers terminate, termination leaks are a non-issue. Next, I introduce
information-flow policies, the security policies of interest for this thesis, and their lattice-based
notation.
2.2. Information-Flow Policies
An end-to-end protection of confidential data must not only be concerned about the release
of confidential information but also about its propagation.However, the primary concern of
access-control policies is to prevent only the release of inf rmation to unauthorized subjects.
Information-flow policies seek to control also where released information propagates. The se-
curity policies of interest for this thesis are therefore information-flow policies.
Since the pioneering works of Bell and La Padula [BL73] and of Denning [Den76],
information-flow policies are typically characterized by the lattice model. In this model,
information-flow policies are described by triples(L,≤, dom), which consist of a finite set
of secrecy levelsL, a dominates relation≤ and a domaindom. Intuitively, if ls ≤ lr holds for
two secrecy levels, a subjecter that is cleared tolr (i.e.,dom(er) = lr) can see more sensitive
(i.e., higher classified) information than a subjects hat is cleared tols. In particular,er may
receive any information fromes but not necessarily vice versa.
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Subjects are typically users or, more precisely, the programs that execute on their behalf. Ob-
jects are typically files. However, it is also possible to consider more fine grained subjects and
objects such as server threads or program variables. Objects and subjects are collectively called
entities.
The functiondom assigns a secrecy level to each entity. This secrecy level isusually called
the domainof this entity. The domain of a subject is typically the leastupper bound of the
secrecy levels of information that this subject may know. Itis called theclearanceof this
subject. For objects, the domain is typically the least upper bound of the secrecy levels of
information the object may store. It is called theclassificationof the object.
The dominates relation≤ relates secrecy levels to characterize between which entities in-
formation may flow. Information flows fromes to er are authorized if and only ifdom(es) ≤
dom(er). Information must not flow fromes to er if dom(es)  dom(er). Two secrecy levels
areincomparableif neitherdom(es) ≤ dom(er) nor dom(er) ≤ dom(es) holds. In this case,
information flow in any direction between the respective entities is forbidden.
2.2.1. Lattice and Non-lattice Models
In many information-flow policies, the setL and the relation≤ form a lattice. The tuple(L,≤)
is a lattice if≤ is a partial order (i.e., reflexive2, transitive3 and antisymmetric4) and if all
non-empty finite subsetsS ⊆ L have a least upper bound⊔S and a greatest lower bound⊓S.
However, in practice, these restrictions are often relaxed. For example, Almeida Matos et
al. [MB05] assume≤ to be a preorder (i.e., reflexive and transitive but not necessarily an-
tisymmetric); in Section3.4.5, I shall require≤ to be reflexive and(≤, L) to be uniquely
bounded from above⊤ and from below⊥. That is,∃ ⊤ ∈ L. ∀l ∈ L. l ≤ ⊤ ∨ l = ⊤
and∃ ⊥ ∈ L. ∀l ∈ L. ⊥ ≤ l ∨ l = ⊥. In particular,≤ needs not to be transitive.
2.2.2. Intransitive Information-Flow Policies
If ≤ is not transitive, the information-flow policy is said to beintransitive. The intuition be-
hind intransitive information-flow policies [Rus92] is to authorize information to flow from
ls-classified entities tolr-classified entities only if this information passes anlm-classified sub-
ject, that is,ls  lr but ls ≤ lm andlm ≤ lr. The role of thelm-classified subject is to monitor
and sanitize the information it forwards.
Let me introduce two further terms to reason about intransitive nformation-flow policies. I
say the triple of secrecy levels(ls, lm, lr) ∈ L × L × L is an intransitive passif it holds that
ls ≤ lm ∧ lm ≤ lr ∧ ls  lr. I call the secrecy levellm in the middle of an intransitive pass
the intransitive pointof this pass.
2.2.3. Downgrading and Dynamic Policies
In general, information-flow policies are not entirely static. That is, both the dominates relation
≤ and the domaindom may change5.
2∀x. x ≤ x
3∀x, y, z. x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ z ⇒ x ≤ z
4∀x, y. x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x ⇒ x = y
5I assumeL has been chosen sufficiently large to avoid later changes. Note, this does not prevent concrete
systems from storing only the used subset ofL.
19
CHAPTER 2. FOUNDATIONS AND RELATED WORK
In the context of open microkernel-based systems, we have todistinguish two forms of dynamic
policies:
1. Those that change the accessibility of kernel or server obj cts; and
2. Those that declassify information that is derived from anaccessible object [MSZ06,
SS05].
Examples of the first class include the immediate revocationof access rights by the system
administrator (see for example [Age99, Section 5.4.7 - Revocation of User Attributes (FMT-
REV.1)]) and thepower box[Sti00]. The powerbox is a mechanism through which users can
specify the authority a program should assume. In Section2.5of this introduction, we shall see
that a reconfiguration of L4’s access-control mechanism suffices to change the accessibility of
kernel or server objects in L4-based systems.
Two examples of the second class of dynamic policies are the automatic disclosure of military
documents after the passage of a certain amount of time and after these documents have been
sanitized [otAH88], and a password checker. The latter validates a given password against a
secret password file. To reject invalid logins, it has to reveal the boolean result to potentially
unauthorized users that the password is not contained in thepassword file. The password file
remains inaccessible to the requesting client.
Although sufficiently-strong encryption protects the confidentiality of encrypted data, the
release of the ciphertext is in many aspects similar to the declassification of secret data. The
ciphertext is derived from the secret key and from the secretplaintext. Once the encryption
completes, it is safe to reveal the ciphertext (e.g., to lower classified network- or storage servers).
Almeida Matos and Boudol [MB05] propose an elegant way to describe when to declassify in-
formation and which part of the checked program is authorized to do so. If a partc of a program
p requires a temporarily-relaxed information-flow policy(L,≤′, dom) to release confidential
information, Matos annotates this subprogram with the flow directive:
flow (≤′){c}
A subsequent static analysis then checks this subprogram aginst this adjusted information-flow
policy (L,≤′, dom). Oncec completes, the original information-flow policy(L,≤, dom) is
restored. The remainder ofp must therefore obey the more restrictive original policy. Aprogram
that is secure with regards to these changing policies is said to benon-disclosuresecure.
The following pseudo code exemplifies the use of flow directivs to authorize the release of
the password check.
bool h;
bool l ;
h = check password file(user, passwd);
flow (high ≤ low ){ l = h; }
In this example, the booleanh stores thehigh-classified information whether the pairuser ,
passwd is stored in the password file. It is assigned to thelow -classified variablel . The flow
directive authorizes the information flow fromhigh to low only for this assignment.
The security type system forToycannot directly be used to check operating-system code that
declassifies confidential information. However, Matos and Boudol [MB05] have been able to
show that non-disclosure generalizes non-interference (se below) for programs that contain
no declassification. To check declassifying operating-system code, we can therefore use the
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security type system forToy to establish non-interference of the individual parts for which
the information-flow policy stays constant and Matos’ analysis to check whether these parts
combine to a non-disclosure-secure program.
2.3. Non-interference
Non-interference [GM82] is the prevailing formalization to assert the complete absence of se-
curity policy violating information flows in deterministicsystems.
A deterministic system is non-interference secure with rega d to anl-classified observer if
this observer cannot distinguish any two runs of the system that start from observationally-
indistinguishable initial states. Two states areobservationally indistinguishablefor an l-
classified observer if all actionsa, whose effect this observer may see (i.e.,dom(a) ≤ l),
produce the same observable outputs. An actiona can thereby be “inputs”, “commands”, or
“instructions” to be performed by the observed system.
For non-deterministic settings there are two predominant wys to formalize non-interference:
non-interference-properties based on state automata [Rus92, Ohe04], and non-interference-
properties based on process algebras [Low04, FG01] (such as Hoare’s communicating sequen-
tial processes (CSP) [Hoa78] and Millner’s CCS [Mil89b]).
In this work, I shall use instantiations ofnon-influence[Ohe04], a state-automaton-based non-
interference property by David von Oheimb.
The marker scheme [Low04] by Gawin Lowe and the corresponding typing rule for non-
deterministic composition is one way to address the non-determinism in low-level operating-
system code. Lowe’s marker scheme ensures that the same non-deterministic choice is always
resolved in the same way. We shall return to this point in Section 4.5.3.3. In the next section, I
introduce non-influence in greater detail and illustrate its relation to non-interference.
2.3.1. Non-influence
Non-interference is concerned with the secrets that actions (e.g., client invocations) introduce
in the system (e.g., a server) and that are possibly observedvia outputs. However, there are
also scenarios (most notably language-based information-flow security) where the system must
not leak initially present secrets. Although these initially present secrets can be encoded as
action sequences which place these secrets into the initialstate, such a formalization is quite
unnatural. I therefore follow von Oheimb [Ohe04] and distinguish the leakage of initially
present secrets and the leakage of secrets introduced by later occurring actions. The respec-
tive properties, which assert the absence of leakage, arenon-leakageand non-interference.
Non-influence[Ohe04] asserts both the absence of leakage of initial secrets and the absence of
leakage as a side effect of interactions (e.g., of clients wih a checked operating-system server).
Hence, non-influence is non-leakage plus non-interference. I the following, I formally define
non-influence for state-transition systems.
2.3.1.1. State-Transition System
State-transition systems are a natural way to formalize stat -oriented systems. A state-transition
system(S,A,⇁) is defined by a set of statesS, a set of actionsA that the system should
perform, and a possibly partial and non-functional transition relation⇁. I write si
a
⇁ si+1
(si, si+1 ∈ S, a ∈ A) to denote that the atomic actiona yields the result statesi+1 when executed
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on the statesi. The actiona may not be enabled in the statesi. In this case,si may not appear
on the left-hand side of
a
⇁. Moreover, if the execution ofa is non-deterministic, more than one
result state may appear on the right-hand side ofsi
a
⇁, one result state for each way in which
the non-determinism ina can be resolved.
The relation
a
⇁ executes a single (atomic) step of the system. System runs are described by
lifting steps over action tracesα ∈ A∗. They are defined by straightforward primitive recursion:
Definition 1. System Run
Given an initial states0 ∈ S, a run of the state-transition system(S,A,⇁) that starts from
this initial states0 is defined as
si
ǫ
⇁ si
for the empty traceǫ, and as
si
a ◦ α
⇁ sj := ∃ si+1.si a⇁ si+1 ∧ si+1 α⇁ sj
for the tracea ◦ α, which starts with the actiona and which continues with the action trace
α.
Two actionsa and b are atomic [Lip75] 6 with regard to each other if whenever a parallel
execution of these actions on a states produces a result state, this result state can also be
produced by one of the sequential compositions of these actions. That is,s
a‖b
⇁ t ⇒ s a;b⇁
t ∨ s b;a⇁ t must hold for alls andt, where‖ describes parallel execution and; is the sequential
composition operator.
2.3.1.2. Formalization of Non-influence
A state-transition system is non-influence secure with regard to an l-classified observer if
the outputs of any two runs of the system, which start froml-similar initial states and which
executel-similar action traces, are observationally indistinguishable for this observer. Two
initial statess0 andt0 arel-similar if they agree on the values of≤ l-classified variables. Two
action traces arel-similar if they agree on their≤ l-classified actions and on the order of these
actions. Intuitively, if thel-observable results are identical despite variations in the higher or
incomparably classified actions and despite variations in the values of higher or incomparably
classified variables, none of these results can depend on thesecr t of these actions or variables.
To formalize non-influence, we first have to formalize the parts of the actions and of the states
that anl-classified observer may see. Letsources(α, l) be defined as follows.
Definition 2. Sources
Given an action traceα and an observer secrecy levell, sources(α, l) is recursively defined
as
sources(ǫ, l) := {l}
for the empty traceǫ, and as
sources(a ◦ α, l) :=
sources(α, l) ∪ {w | ∃v. dom(a) = w ∧ w ≤ v ∧ v ∈ sources(α, l) }
for the tracea ◦ α, wheredom(a) is the classification of the actiona.
6Lipton calls this property linearizable.
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Intuitively, sources(α, l) collects all the secrecy levels of all those actions that areautho-
rized to pass information directly tol-classified entities or indirectly via servers that are
trusted to properly sanitize the passed information. In thetraceα, the actions of sanitiz-
ing servers are represented as subsequences ofα that follow a possibly leaking actiona.
For example, assumedom(a) ≤ dom(sanitizea) ≤ l, dom(a)  l for two actionsa and
sanitizea, then sources(a) = {l} becausesources(ǫ) = {l} and becausea must not di-
rectly send information tol-classified entities. However, becausedom(sanitizea) ≤ l holds,
sources(sanitizea) = {dom(sanitizea), l}. Therefore, ifa precedes the sanitizing action
sanitizea in the action traceα, sources(a ◦ sanitizea) = {dom(a), dom(sanitizea), l} holds.
Becausea is sanitized inα, it may indirectly pass information tol-classified entities.
Based on the definition of sources, we can now define the subseqences of action traces that an
l-classified observer can directly or indirectly (after theyave been sanitized) see:
Definition 3. IPurge
Given an observer secrecy levell and an action trace, the subsequences of this action trace
that l-classified observers may directly or indirectly see is recusively defined as
ipurge(ǫ, l) := ǫ
for the empty traceǫ, and as
ipurge(a ◦ α, l) :=
{
a ◦ ipurge(α, l) if dom(a) ∈ sources(a ◦ α, l)
ipurge(α, l) otherwise
for the tracea ◦ α.
Intuitively, an actiona is observable by anl-classified observer if eithera is cleared to send to
this observer (i.e., ifdom(a) ≤ l holds) or if the information flows froma have been sanitized
by subsequent actions in the traceα. This is the case ifdom(a) ∈ sources(α, l) holds.
Definition 4. l-similar Traces
Two tracesα andβ are observationally indistinguishable for anl-classified observer, that
is, they arel-similar if they agree on the subsequences that this observer may see:
ipurge(α, l) = ipurge(β, l)
Two statess and t are l-similar if they agree on those parts that anl-classified observer may
legitimately see. Letoutput(l, s) extract the observations anl-classified observer can make on
the states. Let further
l∼ be a relation over states — theunwinding relation— such that if
s
l∼ t holds for two states andt, thenoutput(l, s) = output(l, t). We say:
Definition 5. l-similar States
Two statess andt are observationally indistinguishable for anl-classified observer, that is,
they arel-similar if it holds that:
s
l∼ t
For the definition of non-influence, we have to lift the unwinding relation
l∼ to sets of secrecy
levels:s
L≈ t := ∀l ∈ L. s l∼ t.
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We can now define non-influence as the observational indistinguishability of two executions
with l-similar action traces andl-similar initial states:
Definition 6. Non-influence
Given an information-flow policy(L,≤, dom), a state-transition system(S,A,⇁) is non-
interference secure with regard to this policy and with regard to anl-classified observer if it
holds that:
∀α, β ∈ A∗, s0, si, t0 ∈ S. ipurge(α, l) = ipurge(β, l) ∧ s0 sources(α,l)≈ t0 ∧ s0 α⇁ si
⇒ ∃tj ∈ S. t0 β⇁ tj ∧ output(l, si) = output(l, tj)
(2.1)
A state transition system(S,A,⇁) is non-interference secure for all observers if Equa-
tion 2.1holds for alll ∈ L.
Non-influence is timing insensitive because it contains no model of the timing of actions inα
andβ. However, it is termination sensitive because if the execution of α on s0 terminates in
si, this termination must be paralleled by the execution ofβ n t0. In Chapter4, I shall use a
termination-insensitive security property. In this property, the existence of a terminating state
tj appears as a precondition.
As demonstrated by von Oheimb [Ohe04], non-influence combines two further properties: By
removing the first precondition (ipurge(α, l) = ipurge(β, l)) from Equation2.1, we obtain
a security property that is merely concerned about the leakage of secrets that are present in
the initial statess0 and t0. Von Oheimb calls this propertynon-leakage. By removing the
second precondition (s0
sources(α,l)≈ t0), we obtainstrong non-interferenceas introduced by Mc
Cullough [McC90] and Ryan [Rya90].
To remain consistent with other published works, I will not fllow von Oheimb’s terminology
in this thesis. Instead, I show in Section3.4.5and in Section4.7.3how the proven security
properties relate to non-influence.
2.3.2. Cryptography and Non-interference
Non-interference [GM82] and likewise non-influence [Ohe04] assume adversaries with unlim-
ited computing power. Hence, they cannot tolerate the releas of encrypted secrets7 as in:
l = encrypt(h, k );
Clearly, in order to decryptl , an encryption of two different values inh must result in two
different ciphertexts. The program is not non-interference secure because variations of values
of thehigh variableh cause variations of thelow variablel . However, unless adversaries break
the encryption, the confidentiality of the secret inh is protected. Given a sufficiently strong
encryption algorithm, breaking the cipher is computationally hard.
A common approach to tolerate encryption in secure programsis to relax non-interference
by limiting the computational power of observers [DPHW02, RD82, Low02, CHM02, BP03,
AHS08]. For instance, Askarov et al. [AHS08] argues for a possibilistic computational non-
interference property (CNI). According to CNI, a program isnon-interference secure if the set
of possiblel-observable outputs remains the same despite variations ofhigh inputs. Applied
7Intransitive non-interference and non-influence can only be used to enforce that secrets pass an encryption unit
before they are released.
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to cryptography this means that identity of ciphertexts is relaxed in favor of alow -equivalence
relation between ciphertexts, which is required to fulfil the following two properties:
1. Any ciphertext produced by each plaintext-key pair must have alow -equivalent ciphertext
for any other choice of plaintext and key, and
2. For any two plaintext-key pairs there exists ciphertextsthat are notlow equivalent.
The first property ensures the safe use of encryption, the second prevents occlusion.Occlusion
is the problem of hiding information flows towards the analysis by treating all encrypted values
aslow equivalent. The following example demonstrates this point.
l1 = encrypt(h, k);
if (h % 2) {
l2 = encrypt(h, k );
} else {
l2 = l1 ;
}
If all encrypted values would be consideredlow equivalent, an information-flow analysis cannot
detect the leakage of the least significant bit ofh. In the above example, this bit is leaked in the
equality / inequality ofl1 andl2. If the least significant bit ofh is set,l1 andl2 compare unequal
because typically encryption algorithms add a random valueto the encryption to protect against
chosen plaintext attacks.
In this work, encryption will play a less central role because the microkernel and many multi-
level servers do not rely on encryption to protect secret information. For those that do, I envisage
to handle encryption in a similar way as Matos et al. [MB05] handles declassification. For
example, as in
tmp = encrypt(h, k );
flow CNI{l = tmp;}
to emphasize that only for the assignment of the encryption result in tmp to l , a relaxed non-
interference property (e.g., CNI) should hold. Other low output variables have to fulfil a stronger
non-interference property. An elaborative discussion of this point is out of the scope of this
thesis.
2.3.3. Unwinding
Contemporary approaches to prove the absence of security polic violating information flows
in operating-system kernels typically instantiate non-interference frameworks. In these frame-
works, non-interference follows from a proof that two unwinding properties hold for all atomic
steps of the kernel model. For non-influence, these unwinding properties are:
Definition 7. (uniform) Step Consistency
Given an information-flow policy(L,≤, dom), an atomic stepa ∈ A of the state transition
system(S,A,⇁) is uniform step consistent for this policy if it holds that:
∀U ⊆ L, si, si+1, tj ∈ S.
∃u ∈ U. dom(a) ≤ l ∧ si a⇁ si+1 ∧ si U∪dom(a)≈ tj ⇒
∃ tj+1 ∈ S. tj a⇁ tj+1 ∧ si+1 U≈ tj+1
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Definition 8. (uniform) Local Respect
An atomic stepa ∈ A of the state transition system(S,A,⇁) locally respects the unwinding
relation for the information-flow policy(L,≤, dom) if it holds that:
∀U ⊆ L, si, si+1, tj ∈ S.
(∀u ∈ U. dom(a)  u) ∧ U 6= ∅ ∧ si U≈ ti ⇒
(si
a
⇁ si+1 ⇒ si+1 U≈ tj) ∧ (∃tj+1. tj a⇁ tj+1 ⇒ si U≈ tj+1)
Step consistency says that if the atomic stepa is directly or indirectly (through sanitizing
servers) visible to anl-classified observer, then executinga on l-similar states (si
L∪dom(a)≈ tj)
produces states that arel-similar as well (si+1
L≈ tj+1). The first clause of thegoodnessprop-
erty (Definition32on page164), which I use in the soundness proof of the security type system
for Toy, is similar to step consistency.
Local respect says that ifa is not directly or indirectly visible to anl-classified observer, then
the execution ofa must not have any side effects that this observer can detect.Tha is, the result
of executinga on si is l-similar tot and vice versa the result of executinga on tj is l-similar to
s. The second clause ofgoodness(Definition33) is similar to local respect.
In this thesis, I make no use of the two unwinding properties in Definition7 and in Definition8.
Although I could have applied these properties for the non-interference proof of the budget-
enforcing fixed-priority scheduler, I found the relationsame high state (see Section3.4.6on
page95) to be a more intuitive invariant result for fixed-priority schedulers. Equivalence of
l-observable outputs follows directly from this relation.
In Section1.3.2, we have already seen four examples where unwinding properties have been
used to prove non-interference of abstract models of an access-control mechanism [Rus92],
of a multiapplicative smart card [SRS+02], of a smart-card processor [vOWL03], and of the
IPC path of an L4-family microkernel [LEA07]. However, because these properties have to be
established for all atomic steps, unwinding-based source-level verifications come at significant
costs [HKMY87]. Security type systems and related static analyses avoid these costs. For
example, the soundness proof of the security type system forToy(in Section4.7.3on page163)
automatically establishes non-interference for all successfully checkedToyprograms.
2.4. Security Type Systems and Related Static
Information-Flow Analyses
Contemporary source-level security type systems typically check high-level languages such as
Java [ML98, Str03], Caml [PS03] or Haskell [LZ06]. OS developers, however, require memory-
management and data-structure controls that these languages do not provide [Sha06]. As a
result, most operating systems are still written in a combination of C++, C and Assembler.
In this thesis, I focus on the low-level language features ofC and C++, that is, on the rep-
resentation of data types in memory and on memory accesses. Kernel programmers typically
use high-level language features such as classes, inheritance, exceptions, and dynamic casts
only very reluctantly because some of these features have considerable overheads and because
others require non-trivial run-time support. The fundamentals for checking information flows
that arise from these high-level features are well known.
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[E1-2] M ⊢ e : high v ∈ Vars(e) ⇒ M(v) = low
M ⊢ e : low
[C1-2]
lip ≤ M(v) M ⊢ e : M(v)
[lip],M ⊢ v := e
[lip],M ⊢ c1 [lip],M ⊢ c2
[lip],M ⊢ c1; c2
[C3]
M ⊢ e : lip [lip],M ⊢ c1 [lip],M ⊢ c2
[lip],M ⊢ if e then c1 else c2
[C4, S]
M ⊢ e : lip [lip],M ⊢ c
[lip],M ⊢ while e do c
[high],M ⊢ c
[low ],M ⊢ c
Figure 2.1.: Control-flow insensitive security type systemfor a simple imperative language.
An alternative to source-level analyses are assembly-level s curity type systems [SA98, AR05,
ABR04]. Because they check the compiled binary respectively the byt code for harmful infor-
mation flows, they check also security-policy violations introduced by the compiler. However,
unless all optimizations are disabled, a presumably non-interference-secure program does not
necessarily result in a non-interference-secure binary [ABR04].
To remain independent from a specific compiler and, to a certain degree, also from a spe-
cific hardware architecture, I focus on source-level information-flow analyses. However, be-
cause checks are for non-deterministicToy programs that origin from a translation of C++
programs, the analysis will check also those compiler optimizations that are described by the
compiler-resolved non-determinism in theseToyprograms. That is, the produced binary is non-
interference secure if the compiler-resolved non-determinis in the successfully checkedToy
programs can be resolved in such a way that both programs exhibit the same behavior.
2.4.1. Control-Flow-Insensitive Security Type Systems
The simplicity of the check and hence the performance of the analysis is the reason why most
of today’s security type systems are control-flow insensitive. A control-flow-insensitive type
system seeks to infer the type of a program from the types of its subprograms. The type of a
program is a security level, which summarizes the effects its tatements and expressions have
on the system state.
Figure2.1 presents the typing rules of a control-flow-insensitive security type system for a
simple imperative programming language and for the two-level lattice with low ≤ high and
high  low . The type system is similar to the one Volpano and Smith present in [SV98].
A typing judgement has the form[lip],M ⊢ p. It reads: the programp is typed in the typing
environmentM and in the context secrecy levellip. Soundness of this type system asserts
non-interference for all typeable programs.
The typing environmentM maps each variablev of p to the secrecy level of the information
that is stored inv respectively to the clearance of observers ofv. If the secrecy level of the
context ofp is lip, p cannot be typed if it writes any secret information to variables that are
lower classified thanlip (Rule C1). In other words, side effects ofp are limited to higher or
equally classified variablesv (i.e., lip ≤ M(v)). The Rules C3 and C4 check for implicit
information flows by requiringM ⊢ e : lip for the conditione of the if-statement and of the
while-statement. That is, in order to apply these rules, thecontext secrecy levellip must first be
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[E]
lres = ⊔
vi
M(vi) vi ∈ V ars(e)
M ⊢ e : lres
[C1]
M ⊢ e : lres
[lip] ⊢ M {v := e} M [v 7→ lres ⊔ lip]
[C2]
[lip] ⊢ M {c1} M ′′ [lip] ⊢ M ′′ {c2} M ′
[lip] ⊢ M {c1; c2}M ′
[C3]
M ⊢ e : lip [lip] ⊢ M {ci}M ′i i ∈ {1, 2} M ′ = M ′1 ⊔M ′2
lip ⊢ M {if e then c1 else c2} M ′
[C4]
M ⊢ e : lip lip ⊢ M {c}M
lip ⊢ M {while e do c} M
[S]
l1 ⊢ M1 {c} M ′1
l2 ⊢ M2 {c} M ′2
l2 ≤ l1, M2 ≤ M1, M ′1 ≤ M ′2
[C4’]
M ′i ⊢ e : ti [lip ⊔ ti] ⊢ M ′i {c} M ′′i 0 ≤ i ≤ n
[lip] ⊢ M {while e do c} M ′n
M ′0 = M, M
′
i+1 = M
′′
i ⊔M,
M ′n+1 = M
′
n
Figure 2.2.: Flow sensitive security type system.
raised to the secrecy level of this expression. The subsumption rule (Rule S) fulfils this task.
The preconditions in the antecedent (above the line) of the typing rules of security type sys-
tems are typically limited to typing judgements for subexpressions or substatements and subtyp-
ing judgements8 such aslip ≤ M(v). Constraint-based type systems [PS03] and type systems
with existential types [MP85] allow also variables, constraints, and existential quantifiers as pre-
conditions. However, as long as the security type system is control-flow insensitive, it cannot
tolerate temporary breaches of confidentiality.
2.4.2. Control-Flow-Sensitive Security Type Systems
Figure2.2shows a control-flow sensitive security type system for the same imperative program-
ming language. The typing rules origin from Hunt et al. [HS06].
Typing judgements of control-flow-sensitive security typesystems have the form:
[lip] ⊢ M { p } M ′. In addition to the context secrecy levellip, the typing judgements
take two typing environmentsM andM ′. The typing environmentM denotes the variable-
to-secrecy-level mapping beforep executes. That is, it holds the secrecy levels of information
that is initially stored in the variables thatp access.M ′ denotes these secrecy levels afterp
terminates. Hence,[lip] ⊢ M { p } M ′ describes howp evolves the secrecy levels inM when
executed in anlip-classified context.
In the typing judgements of control-flow-sensitive type systems, bothM andM ′ appear on
the right-hand side of⊢. This is to reflect their changing when the typing rules decomp se
8Note Rule E2 abbreviates a set of typing rules for the subexpressions from whiche is composed. Hence,
the preconditionv ∈ Vars(e) ⇒ M(v) = low translates into a subtyping judgementM(v) ≤ low for
M ⊢ read(v) : low and into typing judgements for the subexpressions ofe. An example of the latter is the
rule: M⊢e1 :low M⊢e2 :low
M⊢e1+e2:low
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p into its substatements and subexpressions. For example, ifp is sequentially composed of
c1 and c2, Rule C2 requiresc1 and c2 to be types as[lip] ⊢ M { c1 } M ′′ respectively as
[lip] ⊢ M ′′ { c2 } M ′ whereM ′′ denotes the variable-to-secrecy-level mapping afterc1 ter-
minates and beforec2 starts. In contrast to control-flow-insensitive security type systems, the
typing results of a previous occurrence of these substatements cannot be reused unless the typing
environments have been identical. Therefore, because recurring substatements and subexpres-
sions have to be reevaluated more often, the costs of flow-sensitive analyses are typically much
higher [FTA02].
Initially, M maps each variable to an upper bound of the secrecy levels of the information
that this variable holds in the initial states.M ′ initially denotes the observer clearances of the
variables ofp. In the course of typingp, the typing rule for the assignments inp (Rule C1) and
the subsumption rule (Rule S) change these environments. Ifv := e is an assignment that occurs
in p, Rule C1 sets the secrecy levelM ′(v) to the least upper bound oflres andlip. Thereby,lres is
the secrecy level of the expression resulte andlip is the secrecy level of the context in which the
assignment appears. If this least upper bound is not dominated by the clearance ofv, a control-
flow-insensitive security type system would immediately reject the programp containing this
assignment. A control-flow-sensitive type system can however tolerate this imminent breach of
confidentiality as long as the actual breach is repaired before p terminates respectively before
v becomes visible to lower or incomparably classified observers. In the above type system, the
latter is assumed to occur only afterp terminates. In the security type system forT y, I shall lift
this restriction.
Like before, the result of the conditions of if- and while-statements must be typed atlip in
order to apply the typing rules for if (Rule C3) and for while (Rule C4). The subsumption rule
allows to adjust both of the typing environments and the context secrecy level. More precisely,
the secrecy levels inM and lip may increase but not decrease to assume higher classified in-
formation in the stored variables respectively a higher classified context. The secrecy levels in
M ′ may only decrease to assume lower classified observers. A program that is secure in the
presence of a lower classified observer remains secure if only higher classified observers can
see the respective variables.
Rule C4’ is an alternative typing rule forwhile [HS06]. It evaluatese andc until afixed point
M ′n+1 = M
′
n is reached. Such a fixed point exists because the abstract-interpretation part of
the typing rules is monotone (see [HS06, Theorem 4.1]). The abstract-interpretation part of the
typing rules denotes howM ′ evolves fromlip andM (see below).
2.4.3. Related Information-Flow Analyses
Although they origin from different theoretical backgrounds, control-flow-sensitive type sys-
tems [HS06], abstract-interpretation-based information-flow analyses [JPW05, Zan02] and
Amtoft’s and Banerjee’s Hoare-like logic-based approach [AB04] show many similarities.
For example, the Rules E, C1, C2, C3 and C4’ of the security type s stem in Figure2.2can also
be found in abstract-interpretation-based information-flw analyses [JPW05, Zan02]. However,
their interpretation is slightly different. Abstract interpretation (AI) symbolically executes a
program on an abstract state [Cou96]. In the case of information-flow analyses, this state is the
typing environmentM enriched with the secrecy level of the “instruction-pointer”, that is the
context secrecy levellip and enriched with the secrecy level of expression resultslres.
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The state(M, lip, lres) is abstract because it keeps only the secrecy levels but not the concrete
values of variables. The kept secrecy levels are upper bounds because the abstract-interpretation
rules cannot detect whether a concrete expression cancels iformation in a variable. For ex-
ample,a = l + h − h; clearly assigns only thelow -classified information inl to a. However,
because Rule E abstracts from the concrete values and from the concrete arithmetic operations
in e, M(a) is set toM(a) = M(l) ⊔M(h) = high.
To reduce the complexity of the analysis, abstract-interpretation rules (and the Rules C3 and
C4’ of the above type system) typically recombine the results of alternative execution paths
at so calledjoin points. A join point exists after the branches of if-statements andfter each
iteration of while-statements. At the join point of an if-statement, control-flow-sensitive type
systems and AI-based analyses combine the abstract states of the two branchesM1 andM2
into the result stateM ′ by taking the point-wise least upper bounds of their secrecyl vels (i.e.,
M ′ = M1 ⊔ptw M2, whereM1 ⊔ptw M2 := λv.M1(v) ⊔M2(v) 9).
The fundamental difference between control-flow-sensitive analyses and abstract-
interpretation-based analyses is the absence of a subsumption rule in the latter. Hence,
abstract-interpretation rules alone cannot check whetherprograms contain security-policy-
violating information flows. Instead, abstract interpretation produces an abstract result state,
whose secrecy levels must be checked against the observer clearances. Warnier [JPW05] calls
this checkdecreasing(M,M ′). It is defined as∀a.M(a) ≤ M ′(a).
The above type system by Hunt and Sands instantiated with theuniv rsal lattice(℘(V ar),⊆) is
equivalent to Amtoft and Banerjee’s independence analysis[AB04]. This leads to information-
flow analyses of information-flow policies that are not complete y known at the time of the
analysis.
2.4.4. A-Priori Unknown Information-Flow Policies
To check programs for security-policy-violating information flows, security type systems and
related analyses typically require precise a-priori knowledge of the information-flow policy.
However, because security policies are in general dynamic and because the microkernel and its
multi-level servers can be reused in a variety of different sys ems, information-flow policies are
to a large degree unknown at the time of the analysis. Consequently, it is not always possible to
decide immediately whether information flows are harmful orbenign. Still, it is interesting to
identify all information flows and to record them for a later che k once the precise information-
flow policy is known.
In [AB04], Amtoft and Banerjee describe an information-flow analysis, which is based on
a Hoare-like logic. In this analysis, non-interference is described through independence as-
sertions of variables:x ♯ y. These assertions are the negation of Cohen’s notion of depen-
dency [Coh78]. A variablex is independent ofy (writtenx ♯ y) if any two runs of the checked
program, which agree in their initial states on the values ofall variables excepty, produce result
states that agree at least on the value ofx.
Given an information-flow policy(L,≤, dom) and an observer secrecy levell, a program
with a set of independence assertionsI i non-interference secure if for all (high) input variables
x with dom(x)  l and for all (low ) output variablesy with dom(y) ≤ l it holds thatx ♯ y ∈ I.
9Where it is clear from the context, I shall writeM1 ⊔M2 instead ofM1 ⊔ptw M2
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Hunt and Sands [HS06] construct a control-flow-sensitive security type system based on
Amtoft’s and Banerjee’s analysis. Independence assertions are thereby replaced by a univer-
sal lattice. This lattice consists of all subsets of variable identifiers℘(V ar) and the partial order
⊆. For example, the universal lattice for a two variable program is({{}, {l}, {h}, {l, h}},⊆).
To check data confidentiality, once the information-flow policy is known, the variable identifiers
in the universal lattice are instantiated with the concretes crecy levels of input variables.
For example, Hunt’s control-flow-sensitive information-flow analysis of l := l + h re-
turnsM ′(l) = {l, h}. A later instantiation withdom(l) = low anddom(h) = high gives
M ′(l) = low ⊔ high = high if we assume the two level lattice withhigh  low , which reveals
the leakage.
Laud et al. [LUV05] further substantiates the similarities between independence analyses and
security type systems, which are based on universal lattices. H shows that certain type systems
for sequential programs are equivalent to data-flow analyses. Laud instantiates two of these
analyses to check information-flow security.
In this thesis, I extend the abstract-interpretation-based pproach by Warnier et al. [JPW05] with
a notion of shared memory and locks. However, I will formalize this approach as a control-flow-
sensitive security type system.
To check low-level operating-system code whose information-fl w policy is not entirely
known at the time of the analysis, I follow Hunt and Sands’ universal-lattice based approach.
However, because interactions with operating-system codeare not limited to the program start
and termination, I have to extend this lattice to reflect whena shared-memory variable is read.
2.4.5. Operating-System Functionality
Security type systems typically abstract from the target underlying operating system.
Sabelfeld [Sab01a], Mantel et al. [SM02], O Neill et al. [OCsC06], and Russo et al. [RS06] are
exceptions to this rule. These works consider semaphores, blocking inter-process communi-
cation, communication channels and an interface to signal the underlying scheduler when it is
safe to runlow -classified threads.
However, as we shall see in greater detail in Section4.3, the principle approaches of these
works will not scale to the size and complexity of a microkernel or of a multi-level server. To
prove data confidentiality of programs that invoke a certainoperating-system mechanism, these
works construct formal models of the respective OS functionality and specific typing rules to
check the involved information flows. Finally, they prove the typing rules sound against the
respective formal model of the checked OS functionality.
On the basis of a size-aligned virtual-memory read operation, we shall see that the typing
rules of such a security type system tend to become rather complex and unmanageable. For
this reason, I follow Furuse et al. [FDKHN07] and construct the non-deterministic intermediate
programming languageToy. In Toy, interactions with the operating system and interactions with
the underlying hardware appear as subprograms, which execute in an interleaved fashion with
the translated C++ operating-system code. Both are subjected to the same information-flow
analysis: the security type system forToy.
31
CHAPTER 2. FOUNDATIONS AND RELATED WORK
2.4.6. Timing-Leak Transformations
Timing- and termination-insensitive security type systems, such as the two in Figure2.1 and
in Figure 2.2, risk overlooking internal and external timing leaks and leakages that encode
information in the termination of the checked program. Nevertheless, the security type system
for Toy is timing and termination insensitive.
Unexpectedly long lasting system calls or server invocations are typically quickly detected
(though not as easily fixed). I will therefore not address termination leaks. Instead, I shall
assume that the microkernel completes system calls in a bounded amount of time and that
multi-level servers respond in a similar way to client requests.
To address internal timing leaks, I assume that the successfully checked operating-system
code is subjected to a suitable timing-leak transformation. The budget-enforcing fixed-priority
scheduler addresses external timing leaks.
Timing-leak transformations [Aga00b] are program transformations that produce timing-
sensitive non-interference-secure programs from timing-insensitive non-interference-secure
programs. To do so, they replace statements and expressionswith ecrecy-dependent timing
behavior with semantically-equivalent statements and expressions that have no such secrecy-
dependent timing behavior. Several such transformations have been proposed:
• Cross copying[Aga00a] copies the statements of both branches of an if-statement with se-
cret conditional into the respective other branch. To preserve the semantics of the original
code, it replaces assignments with equally-long lasting skip- tatements.
• Transactional branching[BRW06] transforms the branches of if-statements with secret
conditionals into transactions. The transformed program then executes the transactions
of both branches. However, to preserve the semantics of the original code, only the trans-
action of the taken branch is committed.
• Unification [KM07] seeks to optimize the performance ofcross copyingby removing
unnecessaryskip statements. For that, unification identifieslow -observable events in
both branches and seeks to align identical events to occur inthe same order and at the
same point in time relative to the beginning of the branch.
In [BRW06], Warnier sketches a further, completely different approach, which is based on
Engblom’s worst-case execution-time (WCET) analysis [EES+03]. Given a safe upper bound
on the latest possible time when alow -observable event may occur, the transformation inserts a
busy-waiting loop that defers this event to its safe upper bound.
With Engblom’s method, timing-leak transformation is essentially reduced to a worst-case
execution-time problem. The tighter the estimated worst-ca e bounds, the better the perfor-
mance of the transformed program. Even unsafe bounds can be used if a concrete application
scenario tolerates low-bandwidth covert channels. Moreover, besides having to access the
system clock, the inserted code (though not the WCET bounds)is architecture and compiler
independent. As a result, when binaries are shipped rather than source code, only the data
section, which contains these WCET bounds, has to be patchedo adjust the transformation to
a new platform.
In a sense, the countermeasure to eliminate scheduling-related timing channels due to non-
preemptive execution (see Section3.3.5on page69) is such a timing-leak transformation.
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2.4.7. Points-To Analysis
Static analyses for C and C++ programs immediately benefit from the results of two further
types of static analyses:points-to analysisandloop-bound analyses.
Given a programp, a points-to analysis seeks to statically derive as precisely as possibly the
addresses to which pointer variables may refer in a certain program states of p. Examples of
points-to analyses are [Wu, Ryd03, HL09, SWM00, WL02].
In this thesis, I will not integrate a specific points-to analysis into the security type system
for Toy. Instead, I will assume that any correct points-to analysisis used to produce the pointer
information the security type system requires. Letpta(p) be a points-to analysis forp, which
returns for each states of p and for each pointer inp the setS of possible addresses to which this
pointer may point to. The points-to analysispta(p) is correct if the returned setsS contain at
least the actual address to which the respective pointer refrs.S may however also contain other
addresses if the precise pointer destination cannot be determin d. There are two fundamental
ways to react to imprecise points-to information:
1. In the analysis, we may pick one address at a time and check tremainder of the program
under the assumption that this picked address is the actual address; or
2. If S contains more than one address, we can apply weak updates, asexpl ined below, on
all addresses inS.
Tlili and Debbabi [TD08] follow the first approach in their memory-safety analysis for C pro-
grams. In this check, they verify for the checked C program the absence of null-pointer deref-
erences, or accesses to deallocated objects, and the absence of reads to uninitialized objects.
To not risk overlooking information flows that involve reading or writing the actual pointer
destination, we have to investigate all possible pointer targets. Hence, if we would follow the
first approach in all situations, the analysis performance would deteriorate significantly. An
efficient type checking tool must therefore select carefully when it follows the more precise
first approach and where it reverts to weak updates.
Weak update [GMF79] is a safe approximation of writing through pointers whose destinations
are not precisely known. The update is called weak because itwould be unsafe to replace
the information that a potentially targeted variable stores. In a control-flow-sensitive security
type system, a weak update of a variablev in the set of pointer destinationsS would therefore
not only consider the secrecy level of the assigned expression but also the secrecy level of the
informationv holds before the assignment is evaluated. Hence,M ′(v) := lres ⊔ lip ⊔M(v).
The counterpart for a weak update is atrong update. Strong updates replace the previously-
stored information completely. Therefore, they can only beapplied to pointers whose destina-
tion is known precisely, that is, if the setS contains precisely one element. Such a set with
precisely one element is called asingleton set.
Reads through pointers with imprecise pointer destinations work by returning the least upper
bound of the secrecy levels of all possible destinations. That is,lres := ⊔
v∈S
M(v).
Static points-to analyses typically work with abstract addresses such as full-scope field or vari-
able identifiers. However, because the virtual-to-physical address translation may ensue security
policy violating information flows, these analyses are not immediately applicable to low-level
operating-system code. A points-to analysis, which is applicab e for an information-flow anal-
ysis of low-level OS code, must therefore return virtual addresses in the set of potential pointer
destinationsS. Wilson et al. [WL95] describe such an analysis for C / C++ pointer programs.
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It reaps benefit of additional link-time information to deduce the potential virtual addresses of
the referred objects.
2.4.8. Loop-Bound Analysis
A second type of static analyses, from which advanced staticanalyses for C / C++ programs
benefit immediately, are loop-bound analyses (see e.g., [MAWF98, dMBCS08]). A correct loop
bound analysis returns for each loop of the checked programp n upper bound on the number
of iterations after which the loop is guaranteed to terminate.
Although the fixed-point iteration in Rule C4’ of the control-flow-sensitive security type sys-
tem in Figure2.2 does not depend on such a bound to produce a safe approximation of the
involved information flows, knowledge of such a bound can sigificantly improve the precision
of the analysis. For example, the followingfor -loop sums up the first 5 elements of the smart
arraya.
smart array<int> a[20];
int sum = 0;
a[6] = h;
for ( int i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
sum += a[i];
}
l = sum;
However, if we do not consider this bound, the analysis must pe simistically assume that all
fields of the array are read. Hence,sum becomeshigh because we cannot exclude an access to
a[6] . For an ordinary array, which, unlike the smart array, does not limit accesses to the cells of
the array, the results of a loop-bound analysis becomes evenmore important. This is because
many C / C++ implementations translate out-of-bounds accesses into valid memory references
to addresses beyond the array.
In this work, I shall assume that all system calls and server invocations terminate. Hence, there
cannot be non-terminating loops in the checked pieces of operating-system code.
2.5. L4-Family Microkernels
Originating from Jochen Liedtke’s initial design [Lie95], L4 has evolved into a family of
microkernels [Lie96, Lie99, DLSU04, EHL98, Sch96, Hoh02, KV05, DdEE, Ste09a, WL10].
As second-generation microkernels, these kernels implement only two mechanism: IPC, and,
in recent versions [KV05, WL10, DdEE], capabilities as the sole access-control mechanism. In
addition, they implement only three abstractions: threads, dress spaces, and kernel memory.
L4-IPC is synchronous and reliable. That is, a communication partner is blocked until the
respective other partner becomes ready to communicate, until an error occurs, or until a timeout
expires; and, both communication partners are informed about errors respectively about the
successful transmission of the message. Interrupts, page faults and exceptions are translated
into IPC messages to a respective handler thread10. Upon a successful rendezvous, L4 copies
the specified thread-local registers and the specified capabilities from the sender to the receiver.
10Fiasco-OC [WL10] and seL4 [DdEE] support also asynchronous interrupt notifications.
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In old L4 versions [Lie96, Lie99, Sch96, EHL98], these registers are limited by the general-
purpose registers of the processor that are not used for otheparameters. Since L4 Version
X.2 [DLSU04], L4 microkernels implement thread-local message registers. These message
registers and other virtual registers can be implemented with a thread-local data structure called
user-level thread control block(UTCB).
A capability is a kernel-protected tuple, which consists ofa set of access rights and a ref-
erence to an object on which these rights can be executed. In L4, capabilities are transferred
in IPC messages (L4-map IPC). L4-map grants the sender the implic t authority to revoke the
transferred access rights. Revocation is by means of the L4-unmap system call. L4-unmap re-
vokes transferred access rights recursively from all address spaces whose threads have directly
or indirectly received the unmapped capability from a thread in the unmapping thread’s address
space.
To send messages (and to transfer capabilities), the sending thread must hold a capability
in its address space that conveys send authority to a communication-channel kernel object. In
L4.Sec [KV05] and in seL4 [DdEE], these channel objects are called endpoints. They allow
multiple threads to receive simultaneously. When a sender sends a message to an endpoint,
the kernel selects one of these threads to receive the message. In Nova [Ste09a] and in Fiasco-
OC [WL10], channel objects are called portals and IPC-gates, respectively. They are bound to
precisely one receiver thread. Together with the message, athre d receives a kernel protected
token: thelabel. The creator of the invoked communication-channel object store this token in
the kernel object. The intended use of labels is to identify server-implemented objects. In seL4,
Nova and Fiasco-OC, calls to a server implicitly create a reply capability, which conveys the
authority to send a reply to the calling client.
In recent kernel versions, a thread must provide kernel memory to create threads, address
spaces, communication channels, and other kernel objects.However, the kernel interface for
user-controlled kernel-memory management [Hae03] differs. L4.Sec and seL4 implement
kernel-memory capabilities that, like user-memory capabilities, refer to a region of physical
memory. The kernel is supposed to allocate the data structures of the to-be-created kernel
object in this region. Fiasco-OC Factories currently implement a quota scheme on a shared
pool of kernel memory. However, a refinement of the Fiasco-OCFactory interface allows for
L4.Sec and seL4-like placement controls. In L4.Sec, user memory can be transformed into
kernel memory, seL4 implements the reverse transformation. In seL4, user memory is created
in kernel memory like all other kernel objects.
Although implementing a specific scheduling policy inside th kernel contradicts the design
principle that microkernels should only implement mechanisms and no policies, all L4-family
microkernels except the version of L4-Pistachio by Jan Stoess [Sto07] implement a scheduler in
the kernel. This scheduler is typically a fixed-priority scheduler. However, Fiasco-OC and L4-
CX [Pet09] also experiment with an additional proportional-share scheduler. To avoid malicious
or erroneous threads form monopolizing a priority level, the fixed-priority schedulers of L4
enforce a periodically-refilled execution budget. Once a thread has exhausted its budget, the
scheduler will not select this thread for execution until the budget of this thread is refilled at
the beginning of this thread’s next period. Hence, L4 schedulers are typicallybudget-enforcing
fixed-priority schedulers.
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Figure 2.3.: A typical L4 server and its execution environmet.
To avoid costly scheduling decisions during the performance critical IPC path, L4-family micro-
kernels implement hand-off scheduling [ABB+86, BALL90, Lie93, LES+97]. With the delivery
of the message, the sender of an IPC implicitly donates the remainder of its current timeslice
to the receiver. The scheduler is not invoked for this transfer. Often, the invoked server replies
well before the next regular scheduling decision. In Fiasco, W lter et al. [HLR+01] extends
hand-off scheduling to a contiguous timeslice donation scheme.
2.5.1. A Typical L4 Server
Application-level servers in L4-family microkernels typically follow a common design. First,
these servers run through an initialization phase in which they setup their fault and exception
handlers, create the worker threads of this server, and the communication-channel objects for
the server objects they implement. Then, they enter a serverloop in which they contiguously
await requests from clients that they process before they await the next client’s request. For the
following discussion, it is interesting to investigate these two phases more closely.
2.5.1.1. Server Initialization
When a server starts, its address space contains only the first server thread and a communication-
channel capability to this thread’s pager. In L4, apager is the thread that receives page-fault
messages. The responsibility of the pager is to transfer theappropriate user-memory capabilities
to this server. Initially, this is typically a thread in theloader that bootstraps this server. Later,
it is typically a region-mapper thread [Reu03].
The purpose of theregion mapperis to translate page faults in valid memory regions into
appropriate requests to the server that backs this region. Valid memory regions are for example
the server’s code and data segments, and regions containingmemory-mapped files. The backing
servers are the loader, a server for anonymous memory and various file servers.
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Memory servers typically implement the data-space interfac [ADE+01]. A data spaceis an
abstract memory object, aview is a section of a data space that can be mapped into the address
space of a client. The role of a data-space manager is to back the client region that contains
such a view with memory. To do so, a data-space manager may mapits own memory or it can
rely on the service of other data-space managers. Figure2.3 illustrates this setup graphically.
After creating additional worker threads and the corresponding communication-channel objects
for the server-implemented objects, servers typically start executing a server loop.
The representation of user-level server objects with kernel-lev l communication channels11
fulfills two purposes:
1. The label of the kernel-level communication channel immediat ly identifies the data
structure of the requested server object; and
2. The transfer and revocation of channel capabilities allows security-policy servers to con-
trol whether a thread is able to access the referred server obj ct.
Hence, if the invoked server function can be shown to only access the server object to which
the label refers or server objects that are related to this object, access control on server objects
can be enforced with the help of the access-control mechanism of the microkernel. In this case,
information can flow from a client to such a server object onlyif the client holds a capability
that conveys write access to these objects (e.g., by authorizing a respective server function that
writes these objects). Information flows in the reverse direction can happen only to clients that
hold a capability which conveys read access.
The purpose of the proposed information-flow analysis is to identify the precise nature of
these information flows and to show the server function to access only the expected objects.
In the case of the buffer-cache server (see Section5.3), communication-channel labels refer
to the legitimately-accessible open files. The buffers of the memory pool of the invoking client
and the memory-pool meta data are related objects. When a client opens a new file, a new
capability is returned for the open file, which establishes thi relation.
2.5.1.2. The Server Loop
The C++ pseudo code in Figure2.4 shows a server loop of a typical server in an L4-based
system. Given a message buffermessage , the server loop invokes the C wrapper function
l4 ipc wait until no further IPC errors are reported. IPC errors can report a message ’cut’ if a
client sends a string message that exceeds the size of the receive window, or a timeout by the
client. Servers typically await requests with timeout infinity and send replies with timeout zero.
On a reply, IPC errors can indicate that the client has died before the reply could be sent or that
the client is not receiving. In these cases, the server typically drops the request and awaits a new
one.
The C wrapper functionsl4 ipc wait and l4 ipc reply and wait are the system-call bindings
for two variants of L4-IPC. The first causes the invoker to enter an open receive state in which
it awaits messages from all its communication channels, thesecond invokes the reply capabil-
ity to send a response to a client and then causes the invoker tenter this open receive state.
Both contain assembler code, which loads the system-call parameters into the general-purpose
registers of the CPU and causes a kernel entry.
11L4.Sec stores the label with the capability, hence, multiple server objects can be represented with a single
endpoint.
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1 Server Object ∗ label ;
2 Message message;
3 [...]
4
5 error = l4 ipc wait( label , message);
6
7 do {
8
9 while (error ) {
10 // handle IPC error
11 [...]
12
13 error = l4 ipc wait( label , message);
14 }
15
16 opcode = message.extract opcode();
17
18 switch (opcode) {
19
20 case f opcode:
21 label−>f(unmarshal f(message));
22 break ;
23
24 case g opcode:
25 label−>g(unmarshal g(message));
26 break ;
27
28 default :
29 message = invalid opcode;
30 }
31
32 error = l4 ipc reply and wait(label, message);
33
34 } while (true );
Figure 2.4.: Server Loop
Per convention, all messages contain the opcode of the invoked peration at a fixed position.
The code in Line 16 extracts this opcode. The switch statement in Line 18 checks whether this
opcode is valid for the referenced object. If it is not valid,the default case returns an error
message to indicate to the client that it has invoked the server with an invalid opcode.
The statements in Line 21 and in Line 25 unmarshal the messageparameters for the invoked
server functionality. After that, they call a C++ function,which implements the invoked func-
tionality on the server object that is referenced to bylabel . An implicit assumption is here that
all communication channels store labels that refer to validserver objects. Thelabel is of a
derived type ofclass Server Object .
When the C++ function, which implements the invoked functionality, returns, the server
replies to the invoking client and awaits the next request with l4 ipc reply and wait .
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2.5.1.3. Similarities between Server Loops and L4 System Ca lls
The implementation of system calls in L4-family microkernels show many similarities to the
above server loop: capabilities store the kernel-protected pointer that refers to a kernel object;
system-call parameters are passed in the general-purpose regi te s of the CPU respectively in
the invoking thread’s UTCB and, in recent kernel versions, an opcode identifies the invoked
system call. The two primary differences are:
• The absence of worker threads, and
• The retrieval of information that is stored in the capabilities.
When a thread invokes a system call, the kernel executes thissystem call on behalf of the
invoking thread. For that, it can use the resources (kernel stack, thread control block, etc.) of
the invoking thread. A separate kernel thread is not required.
To access the information that is stored in a capability, thekernel has to lookup the capability
tables, a data structure that, like the processor page tables, maps address-space local identifies
to capabilities. Parameters are either located in the general-pu pose registers or in the special-
purpose registers of the processor or in the UTCB of the invoki g thread. For example, if
an IA32 kernel receives a page-fault exception, the page-fault address is passed in the special
purpose register CR2 [Cor09, § 2.5 - Vol. 3a].
For the access-control mechanism to control information flows through system calls, the
kernel must guarantee that it will only access the kernel object to which the invoked capability
refers or an object that is related to this object. An exampleof a related object is the thread
that receives messages that are sent to one of its IPC gates. Th role of the information flow
analysis of system calls is to establish precisely this guarantee for the system calls of L4-family
microkernels.
2.5.2. Confinement
In systems such as L4, where every application-level threadcan propagate access rights, it is
interesting to know where access rights can propagate and what de-facto access a thread may
obtain with the help of other threads [BS79]. The corresponding property is calledconfinement.
A compartmentis a subsystem that is treated as a single subject by the security policy. A
compartment isconfined[Lam73] if no thread of this compartment can leak information to
entities outside this compartment. That is, the information-fl w policy must have explicitly
authorized all information flows to outside entities such asmultilevel servers or the microkernel.
Shapiro [Sha00], Elkaduwe [EKE08] and Boyton [Boy09] show a weaker property: no thread
of an access-confinedcompartment can obtain a permission that authorizes a writeto an en-
tity outside this compartment unless this permission is receiv d over an explicitly authorized
channel.
The information flows of permitted operations and hence the operations through which en-
tities can write to compartment-external entities are assumed axiomatically. For example in
Shapiro et al. [Sha00], the functionsreads from andwrites to formalize the assumed informa-
tion flows of the system calls of the EROS capability system [Sha99]. When instantiated with
the universal lattice for shared-memory programs, the security type system forToy identifies
these information flows for the checked system calls and for the checked server invocations.
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For a compartment to be access confined in both L4 and in EROS, it must have been started
by a trusted loader — theconstructor[Sha00]. The purpose of this loader is to start compart-
ments and to define the initially authorized channels. It is tru ted not to propagate additional
(unauthorized) capabilities to the compartments it starts.
2.6. Non-interference-Secure Scheduling
Since their first identification by Schaefer et al. in the context of the KVM/370 security ker-
nel [SGLS77], several solutions have been proposed to eliminate scheduling-related covert
channels. Besides fuzzy time [Hu91] and time-partitioning schedulers [Kop98], which I have
already discussed in Section1.3.2, there are two principal approaches to avoid these channels:
1. Information-flow secure schedulers; and
2. Language-based information-flow analyses for applications that run on top of specific
classes of schedulers.
To further reduce the remaining covert-channel bandwidth of fuzzy-time systems, Tros-
tle [Tro93] proposes a combination of fuzzy time with channel-bandwidth reducing schedulers.
Hu’s lattice scheduler [Hu92] is one such scheduler. Whenever a thread blocks, the lattice
scheduler selects the quantum of a ready thread with dominating secrecy level. It then runs
this thread unless the quantum is exhausted. Only if the scheduler finds no more ready threads
with dominating secrecy level, it resumes the execution of lower-classified threads. In [Tro93],
Trostle proposes to further delay this point by idling for a randomly-chosen amount of time.
Both scheduler versions do not eliminate scheduling-related covert channels entirely. They
merely reduce their bandwidth. Moreover, many real-time threads (e.g., real-time device
drivers) run periodically for short amounts of time and without requiring plain-text access to
confidential data. For these threads, the minimal period length, which is achievable with these
scheduler versions, is as large as the sum of all quanta. Evenif we would modify the lattice
scheduler to select the highest-prioritized thread in situations when no more higher-classified
threads are ready, period lengths are still at least as largeas the sum of the quanta of higher-
classified threads. As a consequence, they cannot be used forreal-time systems such as our
envisaged open microkernel-based system.
In the context of Secure Alpha, Boucher et al. [BCG+94] propose a scheduler that trades real-
time performance against covert-channel bandwidth. For that, e scheduler dynamically mon-
itors the bandwidth of covert channels. If the accumulated bandwidth exceeds a certain thresh-
old, the scheduler switches from a real-time scheduling scheme to a scheduling scheme similar
to that of the lattice scheduler.
To obtain this threshold, the scheduler considers the time-value functions [Jen92] of its
threads. These functions indicate the importance of running the corresponding threads at a
certain point in time. In other words, the time-value function of a thread say whether it is still
feasible to delay the execution of this thread to reduce covert-channel bandwidth.
In contrast to our scheduler, Boucher requires a completelyn wadmission testto determine
whether a given real-time workload will meet its timing requirements. In particular, to guar-
antee both the in-time completion of all threads and an upperbound on the amount of leaked
information, covert-channel bandwidths must be predicteda the time of the admission test. For
the budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler, which I shall introduce in Chapter3, a large class
of existing admission tests can be reused to determine whether all threads will meet their timing
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requirements. Like Hu and Trostle, Boucher’s scheduler cannot completely avoid leakage over
scheduling-related timing channels.
Security-type-system-based approaches complement the discussed OS-level solutions. Volpano
and Smith [SV98] and Sabelfeld et al. [SS00] propose static information-flow analyses for pro-
grams that execute on top of a uniform, a probabilistic, or anarbitrary scheduler. However, for
most practical purposes, these analyses are too restrictive.
Russo et al. [RS06] lifts some of these restrictions by allowing threads to inform the under-
lying scheduler when only equally-classified threads should r n. However, Russo’s scheduler
cannot prevent external timing leaks.
In the envisaged open microkernel-based system, we seek to run also those programs that
cannot be checked by contemporary static information-flow analyses. Therefore, we have to
reject solutions that are solely based on static information-fl w analyses to prevent leakage.
Such a solution may however complement OS-level solutions.
2.7. Prototype Verification System (PVS)
I have machine checked the non-interference proof for the budget-enforcing fixed-priority
scheduler in Chapter3 and the soundness proof for the security type system forToy with the
help of an interactive theorem prover: the Prototype Verification System (PVS) [ORS92]. In the
following, I introduce the syntax and semantics of the specificat on language of this theorem
prover to the degree it is required for this thesis. I assume the reader is familiar with simple set
theory12.
The specification language of PVS is based on a simply-typed higher-order logic enriched
with predicate subtypes, dependent record types, abstractdata ypes, inductive and co-inductive
types, and various other features.
PVS provides predefined types for the common data types of programming languages. These
include, for example, the natural number typenat , the integer typeint and the boolean typebool
with the valuestrue andfalse .
In addition, PVS allows for the creation of record types and it supports (recursive) abstract
datatypes. The following code snippet defines the record typePair , a constantp of this type and
a variableq of this type. The typePair contains two members of typenat : x andy.
Pair : Type = [#
x : nat,
y : nat
#]
p : Pair
q : Var Pair
The member accessp‘x returns the value of the memberx of the record constantp. A partial
update of the membery of p is written asp With [(y) := n] . This update returns a new instance
of the recordp whose membery equals ton and whose memberx equals top‘x .
12A brief summary of simple set theory can be found in [Wik].
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Abstract data types define disjoint unions of tagged variants. PVS allows abstract data types to
be simple recursive. The following example defines the recursive abstract data typeList .
List [T : Type ] : Datatype
Begin
null : null ?
cons(car : T, cdr : List ) : cons?
End List
The typeT is a parameter of this abstract data type. It denotes the typeof list elements. PVS
allows abstract data types and theories to be parametric.
The typeList contains two variants: the constructornull for the empty list and the construc-
tor cons for the list that starts with the head-elementcar and whose tail is the listcdr . The
constructorcons is recursive because it takes a list as its second parameter.
The identifierscar andcdr are accessors, that is, partial functions from List to the types of
the respective parameter.car(l ) returns the head element of the listl , cdr(l ) returns the tail of
l . For examplecar(cons(e, null)) = e . The type checker preventscar(null) andcdr(null) because
both are only defined for the non-empty list.
The predicatesnull? andcons? are recognizer predicates for the corresponding variants.For
example,null?(l ) returns true if and only ifl is the empty listnull . PVS uses the same syntax to
denote partial updates of abstract data types and of record types.
Abstract data types come with an induction scheme called:structural induction. According
to this scheme, a predicateP holds for all members of an abstract data typeA if
1. P holds for all members produced by non-recursive constructos ( he base case), and
2. P can be concluded for all recursive constructors from the precondition thatP holds for
the parameters of these constructors that have typeA.
The keywordType defines a new type. For example, the following code snippet defines two
new typesX andY.
X : Type
Y : Type = (pred?[T])
The typeX is not further specified.Y contains all elements of the typeT for which the predicate
pred? holds. Hence,Y is a predicate subtype ofT. The notation(pred?[T]) is syntactic sugar for
{y : T | pred?(y) }.
In addition to structures (i.e., records) and tagged unions(i.e., abstract datatypes), PVS also
supports functions as first class types. The notation
fn( x : X )( y : Y ) : Recursive bool = ...
Measure ... By ...
defines a recursive functionf of typebool with two parameters of typeX andY, respectively.
Actually, this notation stands also for a function from elements of typeX to functions of type
[Y → bool] . The keywordRecursive denotes a recursive specification offn . To ensure that the
function is total (i.e., defined for every value of its domain), PVS requires a well-founded order
on the parameters of this function. The parameters for this order have to be provided after
the keywordMeasure , the order after the keywordBy . Lambda notation allows for an inline
definition of functions. For example,λ (x : X)(y : Y) : true is a function of the same type asfn .
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PVS collects specifications and lemmas in theories. The proofs f these lemmas are kept in
separate files. Like abstract data types, aTheory can be parametric. To use the definitions
and lemmas of one theory in another theory, the former must beimported with the keyword
Importing .
Lemmas have the formname : Lemma spec where name is a theory-local name for this
lemma and spec is the specification. In PVS, the common mathemtical constructs are available
for specifications:=⇒, ∧ , ∨ , ⇐⇒, Exists (t : T) : ... andForall ( t : T) : ... . In addition, PVS
provides a conditional statement:If ... Then ... Else ... Endif with the expected semantics and
a selection statement for the variants of abstract data types. For example,
Cases list var Of
cons(h, t ) : ...
null : ...
EndCases
evaluates to the expression on the respective right-hand side of the line matching the variant of
list var . The variablelist var is of typeList[T] .
PVS allows the construction of predicate subtypes from arbitrary predicates. Hence, typecheck-
ing in PVS is undecidable. Whenever PVS cannot automatically deduce the correct type of a
statement, it generates a proof obligation calledtype correctness constraint(TCC). To avoid
vacuous results, all TCCs have to be proven in the prover component of PVS.
Proofs in PVS are developed interactively by applying proofcommands to the individual goals
of a proof. There are proof commands for the standard simplificat on and verification techniques
such as induction, if-lifting and the simplification of binary decision diagrams (BDDs). In
addition, PVS provides proof commands for the application of previously shown lemmas.
The prover component of PVS maintains for each proof aproof tree. The nodes of this tree
denote theproof goals. Leaf nodes stand for open proof goals. Each proof goal is repres nted
as a sequence ofantecedents(A1, ..., An) andconsequents(B1, ..., Bm). With the help of the
proof commands, the user is expected to show thatA1 ∧ . . . ∧ An ⇒ B1 ∨ . . . ∨ Bm holds.
In the interactive proof mode, PVS uses⊢ instead of⇒ and presents antecedents in the lines
above⊢ and consequents in the lines below this mark (see the proof ofappend null below).
To give an idea how a PVS proof looks like, let me repeat the proof of append null from the
PVS prelude. It shows that appending the empty list to a listl results in precisely this list. The
functionappend is recursively defined as:
append(l, tail ) : Recursive List[T] =
Cases l Of
null : tail ,
cons(h,t) : cons(h,append(t, tail ))
EndCases
Measure length(l)
The specification ofappend null is:
append null : Lemma
Forall ( l : List [T]) : append(l, null ) = l
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The proof of this lemma uses four proof commands:
• (induct l) invokes the structural induction scheme of the list l,
• (skolem *) replaces all universally-quantified variables with arbitrary but fixed values of
this type,
• (expand “append”) replaces the functionappend with its definition, and
• (replace -1 1)replaces in the consequent{1} all occurrences of the left-hand side of the
equation in the antecedent{−1} with the right-hand side of this equation.
The proof ofappend null proceeds as follows. Initially, the proof tree contains onegoal at the
root node, which contains the specification of the lemma to beshown:
|−−−−−−−
{1} Forall ( l : List [T]) : append(l, null )
Structural induction overl and skolemization(skolem *) of the universally-quantified variables
spawns two new proof goals as children of this root node:
|−−−−−−−
{1} append(null, null )
and
{−1} append(cons2 var!1, null) = cons2 var!1
|−−−−−−−
{1} append(cons(cons1 var!1, cons2 var!1), null) =
cons(cons1 var!1, cons2 var!1)
The proof command(expand “append”) solves the first goal because|− null = null holds triv-
ially. The same command applied to the consequent{1} simplifies the second goal to
{−1} append(cons2 var!1, null) = cons2 var!1
|−−−−−−−
{1} cons(cons1 var!1, append(cons2 var!1, null)) =
cons(cons1 var!1, cons2 var!1)
This goal holds trivially after(replace −1 1) replacesappend(cons2 var!1, null) in the conse-
quent of this goal withcons2 var!1 , the right-hand side of the antecedent{−1}.
In practice, PVS proofs tend to become rather large. Also, little insight can be obtained from
the commands and from the order in which they are applied. This is in particular the case if
proof commands such asgrind are used, which combine several simplification steps in one cm-
mand. In this thesis, I will therefore refrain from presenting the detailed PVS proofs. Instead, I
give an informal direction how the proofs work and refer the interested reader to the published
sources [Völ10, Völ08b, VHH08a].
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in Fixed-Priority Schedulers
This chapter identifies scheduling-related timing channels in fixed-priority schedulers and
presents a budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler thatprovably eliminates these channels.
Fixed-priority schedulers always execute one of the highest prioritized ready threads. If more
than one such thread exists, a second scheduling policy determines which of these highest prior-
itized ready threads should run. FIFO and Round Robin are thetwo most prominent examples
of policies for equally prioritized threads.
Budget-enforcing fixed-priority schedulers further constrain the threads they run with a pe-
riodically refilled execution budget. Budget-enforcing schedulers execute only threads with
positive execution budgets. Running threads consume theirbudgets.
Essentially, the secure scheduler, which I shall introducein this chapter, works in the same
way as a standard budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler. The two fundamental differences
are the countermeasures it implements to avoid leakage oversch duling-related timing chan-
nels. These countermeasures are:
• Countermeasure 1:treat possibly leaking threads as if they where ready, and
• Countermeasure 2: defer the points in time when possibly leaked-to threads resum
their execution.
In Section3.3, we shall see in greater detail that the first countermeasureprevents leakage due
to alterations in the execution and blocking behavior of higher prioritized threads. The sec-
ond countermeasure prevents leakage caused by non-preemptiv ly executing lower prioritized
threads.
Structure of this Chapter
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 introducesReThMo, a non-
standard task model to characterize a large class of classicreal-time workloads for the purpose
of proving non-interference for fixed-priority schedulers. Task models are typically designed
to describe the parameters of real-time workloads foradmission tests, that is, for tests that seek
to determine whether all threads will complete in time (i.e., before their deadline) respectively
whether they will meet their timing requirements. Section3.1.1discusses the issues that arise
when constructing task models for the purpose of describingscheduler workloads for non-
interference proofs. Section3.1.2introduces the thread scheduling parameters ofReThMo, and
Section3.1.3demonstrates the expressiveness of the proposed task modelby scribing how
classic real-time workloads map toReThMo.
In Section3.2, I investigate possibilities to leak information through fixed-priority schedulers.
Besides the more obvious channels from higher prioritized threads to lower prioritized threads,
we shall see how lower prioritized threads altering their non-preemptive execution behavior can
leak to higher prioritized threads.
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Section3.3 introduces the budget-enforcing fixed-priority schedulerand the countermeasures
it applies. I discuss variations of this scheduler for transitive and intransitive information-flow
policies, for FIFO and Round Robin, and alternatives for budget-consumer threads to deal with
treated-as-ready blocked threads.
In Section3.4, I present the formalization of this scheduler in PVS and itsmachine-checked
non-interference proof.
A discussion of the preserved real-time guarantees (Section 3.5) and of practical matters
(Section3.6) concludes this chapter.
The results, which I present in this chapter, are in part based on joint work with Claude-Joachim
Hamann and Hermann Härtig. They are documented in a publication [VHH08b] at the ACM
Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS’08).
Notational Conventions
The following notational conventions apply to the remainder of this chapter. I writeτh andτl to
denote thatτh is a thread with a higher or equal priority than the threadτl.
Given a setT of threads to schedule, I denote with the setTlow (τ) the subset ofT that contains
all threads with a lower or the same priority thanτ . Thigh(τ) is defined accordingly as the set of
higher or equally prioritized threads.
As introduced in Section2.3, I denote information-flow policies as triples:(L,≤, dom). Such
a triple consists of a set of secrecy levelsL, the dominates relation≤ and the domaindom.
Here,dom assigns each thread its secrecy level. I writeτH andτL to denote thatτH is higher or
equally classified (i.e.,dom(τL) ≤ dom(τH)).
In the non-interference proof in Section3.4, I shall not require(L,≤) to be a lattice. Instead,
it suffices that≤ is reflexive and uniquely bounded from above and from below. In particular,≤
needs not to be transitive. For the arguments about intransiive information-flow policies, recall
the definition of anintransitive passas the triple of secrecy levels( , m, r) with s ≤ m ∧ m ≤
r ∧ s  r and the definition of anintransitive pointas the secrecy levelm in the middle of
such a pass (see Section2.2.2).
3.1. The ReThMo Task Model
This section introducesReThMo, a task model to characterize the workloads of budget-
enforcing fixed-priority schedulers for the purpose of proving these schedulers non-interference
secure.
3.1.1. Task Models for Non-interference Proofs
Task models define the parameters that characterize the behavior of real-time and best-effort
workloads and of the individual threads1 of these workloads.
Standard task models, such as the periodic task model [Liu00, Chapter 3.3], are primarily
designed to characterize threads for offline admission tests. For these tests to work, the val-
ues of thread parameters must already be known while the systm i still offline. Therefore,
1In the literature, the termtask is used both for the set of jobs that jointly provide some functionality and for
the set of threads that share the same address space. In this thesis, I will call the set of jobs athreadto avoid
confusions, which arise from this ambiguity.
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task models often describe threads with a-priori known parameters that approximate their real
behavior in a way that is safe for the admission.
An approximation of thread behaviors is safe for the admission if the real-time guarantees
of admitted threads are preserved. Two prominent examples of such approximated parameters
are the worst-case execution time (WCET) of a thread and thecritical instant as an approxi-
mation for arbitrary release times. The WCET is an upper bound on the actual time a thread
executes. Thecritical instantis the combination of job release times that leads to the worst-ca e
response times of the jobs [Liu00, Chapter 6.5.1] of a thread. Ther sponse timeof a job is the
time between its release and the instant when it completes. WCET and critical instant are safe
approximations because threads that are admitted with these parameters will complete in time
even if they execute shorter than their WCET and even if the jobs of this thread are released at
different points in time.
However, for proving a scheduler non-interference secure,task models that are based on
approximated parameters risk overlooking information flows due to variations in the actual
behavior of a thread. For an information-flow analysis, critical-instant analyses are not sufficient
because an analysis of the critical instant for a thread saysnothing about the information flows
of threads with earlier or later released jobs. The same argument holds for execution time
approximations with WCETs.
Fortunately, for non-interference proofs, the precise values of thread scheduling parameters
need not to be known a-priori. InReThMo, I shall therefore use parameters, which describe the
behavior of threads precisely but whose values are typically not known until the thread reacts
in the described way. In the non-interference proof one can easily deal with such unspecified
parameters by assuming them to be arbitrary but fixed. However, when modelling a scheduler,
one must take care not to rely on the values of parameters at a time when these cannot be known.
For example,ReThModenotes the execution and blocking behavior of a thread as anction
trace, which describes the intention of the corresponding thread to do some work or to yield the
CPU to other threads if the scheduler would select it at a certain point in time. Obviously, the
scheduling decision for such a point in time must not depend on the future actions of a thread
because these cannot yet be known. I shall therefore requireReThMo-based schedulers to be
well formed:
Definition 9. Well-formed scheduler
A scheduler, which is based on theR ThMotask model (see below) iswell formedif and
only if any scheduling decision that it makes for some point in timet depends only on pa-
rameters that are already known at this point in time. For explicitly timed parameters (such
as time-to-value mappings) the scheduler may only rely on values whose timet′ is earlier or
equal tot.
Release points are an exception. BecauseReThMoabstracts from thread-releasing events,
scheduler models have to check whether the next release point of a inactive thread has yet
occurred. To do so, the scheduler model must read the next relase point value, whose precise
value may not yet be known. The only information that is knownis that the value must denote
some future time if the release point has not yet occurred. For this reason it is safe to com-
pare release points against the point in time for which the current scheduling decision should
be made and to use the result of this comparison to denote thatthe release point has not yet
occurred. AReThMo-based scheduler model in which future release points are used in some
other way is not well formed.
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It is easy to see that the scheduler model for the budget-enforci g fixed-priority scheduler, which
I shall introduce in Section3.4, is well formed: it only accesses theReThMo-parameters in the
above described way.
3.1.2. Thread Scheduling Parameters
TheReThMotask model is characterized by the following parameters, with hich it describes
the behavior of threads. InReThMo, a threadτi of the set of threadsT is characterized by a
possibly infinite sequence of jobs. A job is a unit of work thatthe system executes [Liu00,
Chapter 2.1]. Sequences of jobs are not necessarily periodic. I shall writeτi,k to denote the
kth job of the threadτi. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, I assume that the scheduler runs all
threads inT on the same CPU. The following parameters characterize the job τi,k of a threadτi
(k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}):
release point ri,k: the absolute point in time at whichτi,k becomes eligible for execution;
relative deadline di,k: the amount of time afterri,k by whichτi,k must have finished;
execution budget ebi,k: an upper bound on the timeτi,k is allowed to execute; and
total budget tbi,k: an upper bound on the timeτi,k is allowed to either execute or to block.
The scheduler keeps track of the remaining budgets of a job. Idenote the remaining execution
budget byeb rem i,k and the remaining total budget bytb rem i,k. The following four parameters
are common to all jobs of a thread:
priority prioi : the fixed priority2. From all ready jobs, a fixed-priority scheduler chooses
between the ones with the highest priority. The precise choice depends on the scheduling
policy for equally prioritized jobs (e.g., FIFO or Round Robin);
maximum delay max delayi : an upper bound on the contiguous time jobs of the threadτi
may execute non-preemptively; and
action trace actionsi : a not further specified trace of the actions that the jobs of the threadτi
will perform.
A released job may perform one of the followingactions: it may sleep for some while, it may
wait for some resource, it may wait for the arrival of a message from another thread or for the
occurrence of an external event. In all these cases, I say thejob blocks. In addition, a job may
choose toexecute preemptivelyor toexecute non-preemptively. A job that has finished its work
canstop. In this case, the thread of this job will continue with the next job at the release point
of this next job.
Depending on these actions, on the actions of the jobs of other thr ads, and on the decisions
of the scheduler, a job is in one of the following states.
Running: the job is released and holds all resources it requires, the processor included. The
scheduler has selected this job for execution and the job executes preemptively.
2I shall also writeprio(τi) for the priorityprioi of the threadτi.
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Figure 3.1.: Thread states and their transitions.
Delaying: this state is identical to running except that the job executs non-preemptively.
Thereby, it delays the points in time when higher prioritized threads are able to preempt
this thread. The scheduler bounds the time bymax delayi that a jobτi,k can continue to
stay in this state after a preemption has occurred. After this time, the scheduler forcibly
preemptsτi,k.
Ready: the job is released and holds all resources with the exception of the processor. For the
job to become running or delaying, the scheduler must selectit.
Blocked: the job is released but blocks (e.g., because it waits for some resource or for some
external event). A job releases the processor when it blocksto allow other ready jobs to
run. ReThModoes not require a job to run prior to blocking. For example, if a job has
requested a resource that is not available until the next jobof this thread is released, this
next job is released as blocked. Hence, the transition from inact ve to blocked.
Stopped: a job that has finished its work can stop. In this case, the thread awaits the release
of its next job. A job that has exhausted its execution budget(though not necessarily its
total budget) stops automatically. Blocked and stopped jobs continue to consume their
remaining total budget. After that, they become inactive.
Inactive: jobs that have exhausted their total budgets (though not necessarily their execution
budgets) and jobs whose deadlines have passed are inactive.The thread of an inactive
job awaits the release of its next job. Without loss of generality, I assume that a job of a
thread becomes inactive before the next job of this thread isreleased.
In addition, I say:
Active: a job is active if it is not inactive.
An active job can be running, delaying, ready, blocked or stopped. Figure3.1 presents the
transition diagram for these states. The total budget of an active job is not depleted and its
49
CHAPTER 3. AVOIDING EXTERNAL TIMING CHANNELS IN FIXED-PRIORITY
SCHEDULERS
Figure 3.2.: Illustration of theReThMothread-scheduling parameters.τh runs at a higher pri-
ority thanτl.
deadline has not passed yet. In the following, I shall say a thread is in a certain thread state if
its current job is in this state. I say a thread runs if its current job either executes preemptively
or non-preemptively.
At a first glance,stoppedand inactiveseem to express the same state. This is not the case:
a job that has stopped still possesses a positive remaining total budget and its deadline has not
yet passed. I introduce the distinction between stopped andinactive jobs here because later
in Section3.3, I have to distinguish jobs that stopped voluntarily from jobs that were forcibly
deactivated by a passing deadline or as a result of a depletedtotal budget3.
Figure3.2 illustrates theReThMothread scheduling parameters in an example schedule with
two threads:τh andτl. It shows the execution of two jobs of the threadτh and of one job of the
lower prioritized threadτl. Release points are denoted by upward arrows. Absolute deadlin s
(i.e.,d abs i,k = ri,k+di,k) are denoted by downward arrows. The first job ofτh starts executing
and then blocks. At this point in time, the scheduler selectsthe current job of the next lower
prioritized ready thread: the first and only jobτl,0 of τl. At first, τl,0 executes preemptively
(white bar). Then, it starts executing non-preemptively (filled bar). Although the first jobτh,0
of τh unblocks (end of thin line), the scheduler continues to runτl,0 until eitherτl,0 resumes
executing preemptively or untilτl,0 has executed non-preemptively longer thanmax delayl . In
both cases,τh,0 resumes its execution until the scheduler deactivates thisjob at its deadline. The
second jobτh,1 of τh executes and blocks longer thantbh,1. Once it has consumed this total
budget, the scheduler deactivatesτh,1. At this time, the absolute deadlined absh,1 = rh,1+ dh,1
is still in the future.
Note that the total budget ofτh,0 is larger than the total budget ofτh,1. ReThMoexplicitly
allows differing parameter values for the individual jobs of the same thread. This way and
3 Note that transitioning a blocked (or stopped) thread to inval d does not necessarily induce scheduling overhead.
For example, if a concrete implementation of aReThMo-based scheduler stores the absolute point in time
when such a thread has released the CPU, this timestamp reveals whether the thread is still blocked or whether
it is already inactive. The latter is the case if the absolutedeadline of this thread (i.e.,ri,k + di,k) is in the past
or if t is longer thantb remi,k(t) in the past. Here,tb remi,k(t) is the remaining total budget at the timet
when the thread has released the CPU.
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Figure 3.3.: The unconstrained blocking of the higher prioritized threadτh causes a deadline
miss of the lower prioritized threadτl (denoted by the shaded part ofτl). Schedulers
that enforce either blocking budgets or total budgets can avoid these misses.
because the values of most scheduling parameters are taken as arbitrary but fixed,ReThMo
is able to characterize a large class of existing real-time workloads. In Section3.1.3, I shall
elaborate on the expressiveness ofReThMoby giving several examples of common real-time
workloads and how they map to theReThMothread-scheduling parameters.
3.1.2.1. Budget Enforcement
In ReThMo, a job is characterized by two budgets: an execution budget and a total budget.
In the following section, I motivate this choice and discussan alternative where jobs are
constrained by an additional blocking budget instead of a total budget.
Obviously, for lower prioritized threadsτl to meet their admitted real-time guarantees, a
scheduler must enforce the execution budgets of the jobs of equally and higher prioritized
threadsτh. Otherwise, if such a threadτh is malicious or erroneous,τl risks missing its deadline.
In addition to unconstrained execution, also unconstrained blocking can cause lower prioritized
threads to miss their deadlines. Figure3.3 depicts such a scenario: the first jobτh,0 of the
higher prioritized threadτh blocks such that a significant part of its work remains whenτl’s job
τl,0 is released. The time that remains in betweenτh,0 finishing its executing andτh,1 starting
its execution does not allowτl,0 to finish before its deadline. I assume here thatτl was success-
fully admitted under the assumption thatτh,0 blocks no longer than the point in time marked
as (1) and that some error or malpractice has causedτh,0 to exceeded its admitted blocking time.
To enforce limited blocking times, two principle approaches are imaginable:
• limit the blocking of a job, or
• limit the total time that a job can either execute or block.
In the first case, the scheduler enforces a blocking budgetbbi,k. In the second case, it enforces a
total (blocking and execution) budget.
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In case a scheduler enforces blocking budgetsbbi,k, it deactivates the corresponding jobsτi,k
once their accumulated blocking time exceeds their blocking budgets. In the scenario in Fig-
ure3.3, such a scheduler would deactivateτh,0 at the point in time marked by (1). The remaining
execution ofτh,0 is dropped.
In case a scheduler enforces total budgetstbi,k, jobsτi,k may continue to execute after they
have exceededbbi,k. However, the time that they can execute after this excess itreduced
accordingly. In total, after their execution or blocking exc edstbi,k, the scheduler deactivates
these jobs. In Figure3.3, the point in time when such a scheduler would deactivateτh,0 is
marked by (2). At this time,τl receives sufficient time to complete before the release ofτh,1
and hence before its deadline.
In the following, I shall assume an enforcement of executionand total budgets. Adjusting
the presented results for a scheduler that enforces blocking budgets instead of total budgets is
straightforward: countermeasure 1 has to last until both the execution budget and the blocking
budget of a possibly leaking thread are depleted. That is, the sc eduler must treat a possible
leaking blocked thread as ready until its remaining blocking budget is depleted and, after that,
it must defer the deactivation of this thread until its remaining execution budget is depleted as
well. In Section3.3, we shall return to this point in greater detail.
3.1.3. Expressiveness
ReThMois sufficiently expressive to describe the real-time workloads of many standard task
models. In this section, I demonstrate how strictly periodic threads, sporadic threads and aperi-
odic threads map toReThMo. In addition, I show howReThMocan describe deferrable servers
and the real-time workloads of time-partitioning schedulers. Deferrable servers are a means to
schedule aperiodic and sporadic threads together with periodic threads.
ReThMocan also be used to describe the workloads of proportional share schedulers. How-
ever, the absolute and relative errors between allocated and received shares increase when
threads of these workload are scheduled on budget-enforcing fixed-priority schedulers. Sec-
tion 3.1.3.5substantiates this point.
3.1.3.1. Strictly Periodic Threads
A strictly periodic threadτi is characterized as usual by a phaseΦi and by the triple(Πi, ei, di).
The phase determines the release pointri,0 = Φi of the first job ofτi. Subsequent jobs of this
thread are released at equidistant points in time (i.e.,ri,k+1 − ri,k = Πi). Hence, the release
point of thekth job of τi is ri,k = Φi + kΠi. The parameterei stands for the execution time of
τi. In admission tests,ei is often approximated by the maximum of worst case executiontimes
of the jobs of this thread. In case blocking of strictly periodic threads is taken into account, a
further parameterxi bounds the blocking time of the jobs ofτi from above. The parameterdi
is the relative deadline of the jobs of this thread. That is, each job must have finished latest at
d absi,k = ri,k + di. Because the release of the next job usually deactivates thecurr nt job, I
will assume thatdi ≤ Πi.
The mapping of strictly periodic threads toReThMois straightforward. A strictly periodic
threadτi can be described as an infinite sequence of jobsτi,k with ri,k = Φi+kΠi anddi,k = di.
The execution budgets for all these jobs are set tobi,k = ei. The total budgets of these jobs are
set totbi,k = ei + xi. The action trace ofτi is set to contain the actions that the jobs ofτi will
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execute. Its value remains arbitrary but fixed in the sense that τi first decides how to proceed at
time t before the scheduler evaluates this decision to determine which thread should run att.
3.1.3.2. Aperiodic and Sporadic Threads
Unlike for strictly periodic threads, the release points ofaperiodic and sporadic threads are not
known at the time of the admission. In particular, they need not necessarily recur at equidistant
points in time. The period of sporadic threads is the minimaldistance between the release
points of adjacent jobs (i.e.,ri,k+1 − ri,k ≥ Πi holds for alli, k). Aperiodic threads can have
arbitrary release points.
The description of threads as infinite sequences of jobs withpossibly differing parameter values
and the way in which well-formed schedulers evaluate releaspoints4 allows for a mapping
of the precise behavior of aperiodic and sporadic threads toReThMo. In ReThMo, the release
points of these threads remain arbitrary but fixed values. The intuition is that these release
points denote the time when the corresponding job releasingevent occurs. For sporadic threads,
minimal interrelease times translate into constraints of the formri,k+1−ri,k ≥ Πi with otherwise
arbitrary release points. To argue about non-interference, I shall later require that lower or
equally prioritized threads can legitimately observe the rel asing events of a threadτi. The
mapping for the remaining thread-scheduling parameters isa described in the previous section
for strictly periodic threads.
3.1.3.3. Bandwidth Preserving Servers
Background execution and bandwidth-preserving servers artwo principle approaches to inte-
grate sporadic and aperiodic threads into a schedule of otherwise strictly periodic threads.
Background Execution The easiest way to integrate sporadic and aperiodic threadsinto
a schedule with strictly periodic threads is to execute themin the background (i.e., whenever
no strictly periodic thread runs). This way, sporadic and aperiodic threads cannot affect the
real-time guarantees of strictly periodic threads. However, the response times of these threads
is not optimal.
In ReThMo, background execution of sporadic and aperiodic threads can be described by as-
signing these threads priorities that are lower than the priorities of strictly periodic threads. The
other parameters of sporadic and aperiodic threads are thereby set as described in Section3.1.3.2
above.
Alternatively, sporadic and aperiodic threads can be scheduled hierarchically on top of a
strictly periodic background thread. Whenever the scheduler chooses to run the background
thread, it selects a ready sporadic or aperiodic thread fromits aperiodic-thread queue to run. By
setting its deadlines and budgets toΠi (i.e., di,k = ebi,k = tbi,k = Πi), the background thread
will be active at any point in time. It may therefore run sporadic and aperiodic threads each time
the scheduler runs no higher prioritized strictly periodicthread. To obtain the action trace of the
background thread, we have to combine the action traces of the sporadic and aperiodic threads
it runs. Because the action trace is an arbitrary but fixed parameter, the combination rule can
be as simple as: if at timet, the background threadτb decides to run the sporadic or aperiodic
threadτi, τb’s action fort is set to the action ofτi at timet.
4See Definition9 and the discussion that follows this definition on page47.
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Bandwidth-Preserving Servers In contrast to background execution, bandwidth-
preserving servers seek to optimize the response times of sporadic and aperiodic threads
without deteriorating the real-time performance of strictly periodic threads.
Much like the background thread, a bandwidth-preserving server runs sporadic or aperiodic
threads whenever the scheduler selects this server. However, unlike background thread, the
execution of sporadic and aperiodic threads is further constrai ed by a budget. To not confuse
it with the execution and total budgets ofReThMo, let us call this budget theaperiodic-thread
budget. Bandwidth-preserving servers are described by two rules:
• A consumption rulespecifies how running a sporadic or aperiodic thread consumethe
aperiodic-thread budget.
• A replenishment ruledefines when this budget is refilled.
Polling Server Although it is not bandwidth preserving, let us take a look atthe polling
server as a first example of a server with consumption and replenishment rules for aperiodic-
thread budgets. Whenever the scheduler runs the polling server, the server checks the aperiodic-
thread queue to determine whether a sporadic or aperiodic thread is ready. If such a thread
is present, the server checks whether the remaining aperiodic-thread budget is positive and, if
so, it runs the selected thread until this thread finishes or until the remaining aperiodic-thread
budget is depleted. In situations where no ready thread is present in the aperiodic-thread queue,
the server discards its remaining aperiodic-thread budgetand stops to await its next release
point.
With the exception of the execution budgets, theR ThMomapping of a polling serverτp is
identical to that of the background thread. The execution budgetsebp,i are set to the aperiodic-
thread budgetabp (i.e.,ebp,i = abp). Because the jobs of the polling server stop whenever they
find no ready threads in the aperiodic-thread queue, the total budgetstbp,i can as well be reduced
to abp. As we shall see in Section3.3, this reduction allows us to admit threadsτl at a lower
priority thanprio(τp) that are not cleared to receive information from the sporadic or aperiodic
threadsτp.
Deferrable Server A deferrable server is identical to a polling server except that it pre-
serves its aperiodic-thread budget until the end of its period. That is, in situations where no
aperiodic or sporadic job is ready, it blocks until the next aperiodic or sporadic thread becomes
ready. Consequently, we cannot reduce the total budgetstbd,i of the deferrable serverτd to
the aperiodic-thread budgetabd. Otherwise, theReThMomapping of polling servers and of
deferrable servers are identical.
An immediate consequence of the setting oftbd,i to Πd is that the non-interference-secure
scheduler allows only lower or equally classified threads tobe admitted at priorities lower than
that of deferrable servers. We shall return to this point in greater detail in Section3.3.
3.1.3.4. Time-Partitioning Schedulers
A time-partitioning scheduler [ARI, Section 2.3.1] schedules threads in fractions of a period-
ically recurring major frame of sizeΠ. These non-overlapping fractions are called partition
windows. A partition windowwi is characterized by an offsetoi relative to the beginning of the
major frame and by a sizesi. In thekth major frame, the scheduler will activate theith partition
window atkΠ + oi for the timesi. If more than one thread is assigned to such a window, a
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second scheduling policy is required to select one of these threads. The system idles when all
threads of a partition window block or when they have stopped.
In principle, it is possible to map time-partitioning schedules toReThMo. Although, from a
scheduling-overhead point of view, it is not advisable to doso. Letτi be a thread that executes
in the ith partition window. Then the parameters of thekth job τi,k of τi are set to allow this
job to run only during theith partition window of thekth major time frame. To do so, we set
ri,k = kΠ + oi, and both, the budgetsebi,k, tbi,k and the relative deadlinedi,k to the size of
the partition windowsi. The priority of such a thread is a free parameter, which can be chosen
arbitrarily.
3.1.3.5. Proportional-Share Schedulers
Proportional-share schedulers [Wal95] seek to minimize the absolute and relative errors be-
tween the time a threadτi runs in a sliding window of sizet and the proportionpropi of this
window sizet thatτi should receive. Often, tickets are used to characterize this proportion. If
a thread holdsni out of N tickets, it should receive the proportionpropi =
ni
N
. It holds that
∑
i
propi = 1.
The two most prominent proportional-share schedulers — therandomized lottery
scheduler[WW94] and the deterministicstride scheduler[WW95] — execute the follow-
ing basic algorithms. Let theunit of timeu be a small fixed amount of time.
Lottery Scheduler: Every unit of timeu, the lottery scheduler randomly picks a ticket and
schedules for one unit of time the thread that holds this select d ticket. Assuming that the
individual tickets are picked with equal likelihood, a threadτi with ni tickets receives
ni
N
of the CPU time on the average.
Stride Scheduler: The stride scheduler computes for each threadτi astridesi as the inverse
fraction of held tickets and total tickets (i.e.,si = Nni ). Thepassof τi is a virtual time
index used to determine which thread to run next. Everyu milliseconds, the scheduler
selects the thread with the smallest pass to run for one unit of time. Initially the passpi
of τi is set to the stridesi. Whenever the scheduler runsτi, it advances its pass bysi.
Both, the lottery scheduler and the stride scheduler wasteson unit of time if the selected
thread blocks. As a consequence, blocked threads consume only a fractionf of their allocated
time. To accommodate for these reduced shares, Waldspurgerproposes to extend the lottery
scheduler and the stride scheduler with transient compensatio tickets [Wal95]. Whenever one
of these schedulers selects a blocked thread, it repeats theselection procedure until it finds a
thread that is ready. At the time when a blocked thread resumeits execution, it temporarily
increases the tickets of this thread toni
f
.
Although an elaborative discussion of non-interference-secure proportional-share schedulers is
out of the scope of this thesis, I will briefly return to proporti nal share schedulers in Sec-
tion 3.3.10to investigate the information-flow properties of these schedulers for a mapping of
proportional-share workloads to theReThMo-based budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler.
In the following, I shall introduce this mapping.
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absolute error relative error
lottery (expected errors) O(
√
t) O(
√
t)
stride O(|T |) ≤ 1
fixed priority ≤ Πpi(1− pi) O( ninjni+nj )
Table 3.1.: Absolute and relative errors of the proposed mapping of proportional-share work-
loads to a budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler.|T | denotes the cardinality of
the set of threadsT , i.e., the number of threads.
Mapping Proportional-Share Workloads to ReThMo Let the setTprop contain the
threads of a proportional share workload. Each threadτi of this workload should receive a
proportionpropi of the CPU time. InReThMo, a mapping ofri,k = kΠ, di,k = Π, and
ebi,k = propi Π for each job of a threadτi, allows τi to execute forebi,k everyΠ. There-
fore, on the average, it receives the proportionpropi =
ebi,k
Π
. The priority ofτi remains a free
parameter. For the time being, let us assume thattbi,k = Π holds for all jobs of all threads.
This way, lower prioritized threads can consume any time that higher prioritized threads block.
I shall refine this choice in Section3.3.10.
Errors How good is this mapping? Waldspurger [Wal95] defines theabsolute errorbe-
tween the allocated and received CPU share a threadτi receives in a sliding window of size
t as the difference betweentni
N
and the timeei that τi did run during this window. The
relative error between the allocated and received shares of a pair of threads (τi and τj) is
the absolute error in a system that contains only these two threads. This is a system with
t = ei + ej andN = ni + nj. Table3.1 shows these errors for the lottery scheduler, for
the stride scheduler and for the above mapping to a budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler.
The error formulas for the first two are taken from [Wal95]. The latter can be derived as follows.
If proportional-share workloads are mapped toReThMoas described above, the longest con-
secutive time during which a threadτi does not receive any CPU time is2Π− 2 propiΠ. This
situation occurs ifτi has a priority, which is lower than the priority of all other threads, and if
all these other threads block forebi,k units of time during the first period of lengthΠ and not
at all in the second of the two consecutive periods. In this situation, the absolute error ofτi
is maximal for a sliding window of sizet = 2Π − propiΠ. During this time,τi executed for
ei = Πpropi units of time. Hence,τi’s absolute error is:
t propi − ei =
(2Π− propi Π) propi − propi Π =
Π propi (1− propi)
(3.1)
The maximal relative error ofτi andτj is:
(2ej + ei)
ni
ni + nj
− ei (3.2)
because for a system with two threads, the absolute error is maximal if t = 2ej + ei and if
τi executed forei = Π
ni
N
. Hence, becausei is proportional toni and likewise becausej is
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proportional tonj , Equation3.2is proportional to:
(2nj + ni)
ni
ni + nj
− ni =
ninj
ni + nj
(3.3)
In comparison with the errors of the lottery scheduler and ofthe stride scheduler, errors of the
above mapping of proportional-share workloads to aReThMo-based fixed-priority scheduler are
much larger. For example, the absolute error of the latter isΣ ebi
|Tprop |
times the absolute error of
the stride scheduler. This difference occurs because the fixed-priority scheduler runs a thread
until it has depleted its execution budget. The stride scheduler runs a thread only for one unit
of time. In the case of the fixed-priority scheduler, lower orequally prioritized threads must
therefore wait significantly longer than in a system with a stride scheduler.
3.2. External Timing Channels in Fixed-Priority
Schedulers
The following section investigates external timing channels in fixed-priority schedulers. For the
time being, let us assume that threads have distinct priorities. We shall return to equally prior-
itized threads in Section3.3.8. Let us further assume that threads have access to precise clocks5.
The deliberate choice of a high-priority threadτh to run, to block, or to stop influences when a
lower prioritized threadτl can run. The scheduler will not selectτl during those times whenτh
executes preemptively or non-preemptively. Ifτh blocks or stops, the scheduler may selectτl to
run. I call this form of influence:direct influencebecauseτh’s actions directly affectτl.
Direct influence constitutes an external covert timing channel. For example, if a high-priority
threadτh encodes secrets by running at a certain point in timet to send a0 respectively by
blocking att to send a1, a lower-prioritized threadτl can read this secret by sampling the
precise clock to obtain the points in time it did run and by evaluating these points to determine
whether it did run at. More generally, direct influence reveals information about the execution
and blocking behavior of the sending high-priority thread if the lower-prioritized receiverτl
detects a derivation between the points in time when it wouldr n if no higher prioritized thread
would block and the points in time it actually did run.
Obviously, if more than one thread has a higher priority thanthe receiverτl or if other
threads shareτl’s priority (see Section3.3.8), external timing channels due to direct influence
are noisy. However, Foss et al. [SAF06] show that direct-influence based channels exist — e.g.,
the “channel−ΓRM ” for RMS — that are positively deducible. That is, irrespective of the noise
of higher or intermediary prioritized threads, there are observable influences that reveal the ex-
act message of the sender. RMS stands for the rate-monotonicscheduling algorithm [LL73],
which assigns thread priorities inverse proportionally tothread period length.
3.2.1. Indirect Influence
In addition to direct influence, inter-process communication allows threads to also influence
other threads indirectly by directly influencing the senderof such a message. If a threadτh
directly influences a threadτs, it affects the points in time whenτs is able to run and thereby
the points in time whenτs can send messages to a legitimate receiverτr. Therefore, by directly
5In Section1.3.1, we have seen that fuzzy clocks deteriorate the real-time capabilities of our envisaged system,
which motivates the above assumption.
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Figure 3.4.: The execution order ofτs0 andτs1 and thus the order of their messages depends
on the behavior ofτh. If τh executes (left picture) whileτs0 blocks,τs0’s messages
arrive atτr (not shown) beforeτs1’s messages. Ifτh blocks during this time (right
picture),τs0’s andτs1’s messages arrive atτr in the reversed order.
influencingτs, a threadτh with a higher priority thanτs is able to convey information toτr. I
call this form of influenceindirect influencebecauseτh can in general not influenceτr directly.
Instead, it needs to directly influence the senderτs. In particular, ifτr has a higher priority
thanτh, τh can influenceτr only indirectly but not directly. Clearly, a scheduler thatavoids all
direct influences would also avoid all indirect influences. However, such a scheduler would
be overly restrictive. The non-interference-secure scheduler, which I will introduce in greater
detail in Section3.3, will therefore avoid only those direct influences that could cause illegal
information flows to directly or indirectly influenced threads. In Section3.3.4, we shall see
that in the case of intransitive information-flow policies the scheduler must avoid also some
direct influences where information-flows to the directly influenced thread are legitimate. This
is because the directly influenced thread may be cleared to legitimately send messages to other
threads to which the influencing thread is not cleared to sendinformation.
Surprisingly, trusted servers cannot avoid covert channels due to indirect influences if their
threads are directly influenced. Let us assume that all server thr ads are trusted not to encode
timing information in the messages they send. Then there arestill scenarios in which a thread
τh is able to indirectly influence a threadτr that receives messages from these trusted server
threads.
Figure 3.4 illustrates such a scenario. The threadτh directly influences an intermediate
prioritized senderτs0 and a lower prioritized senderτs1 to indirectly influence the receiverτr.
Assume that all threads are released simultaneously and that τs0 first blocks and then runs for
some while. Ifτh runs for the time thatτs0 blocks,τs0 runs beforeτs1. If τh blocks,τs0 runs
afterτs1. The order in which the messages of these two threads arrive at τr is reversed. As long
as communication channels reveal the order in which messagearrive at a thread, the directly
influenced threadsτs0 andτs1 cannot prevent this external timing channel.
The inability of directly influenced servers to completely eliminate covert channels due to indi-
rect influences has an immediate impact on systems with intransi ive information-flow policies:
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Figure 3.5.: A threadτh can influence a lower prioritized threadτl by executing non-
preemptively when its deadline passes (left) or when one of its budgets depletes
(right).
the priorities of server threads that are classified at intransitive points must be sufficiently high
to prevent their direct influences. Otherwise, if a sender isable to directly influence a server
thread, messages, which the server forwards after sanitizing the transmitted information, could
still reveal un-sanitized secrets encoded in the order in which they arrive at the receiver. To
prevent a direct influence of a server, all potentially untrustworthy clients, which send to this
server, must be lower prioritized than the server threads.
3.2.2. Influence due to Non-preemptive Execution
A third class of external timing channels arises from the non-preemptive execution of lower
prioritized threads. In contrast to external timing channels due to direct influence, information
flows due to non-preemptive execution are typically directed from lower prioritized to higher
prioritized threads.
To turn non-preemptive execution into a covert channel, a low-priority threadτl encodes secrets
by deliberately choosing between preemptive and non-preemptive execution. In the first case,
a higher prioritized threadτh is able to preemptτl immediately. In the second case, the pre-
emption and therefore the point in time whenτh resumes its execution is deferred to the point
in time whenτl stops executing non-preemptively. Equally prioritized threads can be influ-
enced in the same way if they can preemptτl’s execution (see Section3.3.8). Lower prioritized
threads are typically not affected. However, there are two corner-case situations in which a
non-preemptively executing thread can also leak information to lower prioritized threads:
1. when a thread executes non-preemptively to exceed a depleted execution budget; and
2. when a thread executes non-preemptively to exceed a passing deadline.
Figure3.5illustrates these two corner cases.
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Low-level operating-system code executes non-preemptively by disabling all processor inter-
rupts and hence the events that trigger scheduling decisions. Fully interruptible operating-
system kernels allow interrupts to preempt kernel code at any point in time. However, instead
of executing the triggered scheduling decision immediately, hey return to the preempted code
path if this path has signalled its intent to execute non-preemptively.
Application-level programs can execute non-preemptivelyby issuing system calls that the
kernel executes on their behalf and that contain non-preemptive code paths. Some operating-
system kernels even implement mechanisms [MDP96, KWS97] through which applications can
defer scheduling decisions. In recent L4-family microkernels [DLSU04, WL10, DdEE, KV05],
this mechanism is calledelayed preemption. A flag in the user-level thread control block of
the currently executing thread informs the kernel about itsintent to execute non-preemptively.
If the kernel interrupt handlers find this flag set, they deferthe handling of the interrupt and
return control to the preempted application code. However,b fore doing so, they inform the
application about the preemption and program a timer to bound the time that the application
program can execute non-preemptively. Once the kernel regains control, either because the
application program has voluntarily returned control or because the timer has fired, it processes
the pending preemption and executes the triggered scheduling decision.
3.3. A Non-Interference-Secure Scheduler
This section introduces the non-interference-secure budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler
and the countermeasures it implements to avoid illegal information flows over external timing
channels. At first, I give a general overview on the operationof this scheduler. Then, I present
the individual parts of this scheduler in greater detail anddiscuss several variants.
Given a fixed-priority scheduler that enforces total budgets, two practically feasible modifica-
tions suffice to eliminate external timing channels. I shallc these modificationscountermea-
suresbecause each of these two modifications addresses a different class of external timing
channels.
• Countermeasure I: To avoid illegal information flows due to direct and indirectinflu-
ences, the first countermeasure treats possibly leaking blocked or stopped threads as
if they were ready. Modulo preemptions by higher or equally prioritized threads, the
scheduler will always run treated-as-ready threads to completion. As a consequence,
lower prioritized threads (and some equally prioritized threads) that are not cleared to re-
ceive information from such a treated-as-ready thread willnot be selected while this first
countermeasure is active. Therefore, they cannot observe va iations in the execution and
blocking behavior of the treated-as-ready thread.
• Countermeasure II: To eliminate timing channels due to non-preemptive execution, all
scheduling decisions that are triggered by a preemption of ahigher or equally prioritized
thread are deferred by an amount of time that a possibly leaking non-preemptively exe-
cuting thread cannot influence. As a consequence, the preempting thread can no longer
distinguish between variations in the preemptive and non-preemptive execution behavior
of a thread and its deferred resumption due to this second countermeasure.
In Section3.3.1and in Section3.3.5, I discuss the above two countermeasures in greater detail.
The scheduler’s decision to activate these countermeasures depends on two static predicates,
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which differ for transitive and for intransitive information-flow policies. In Section3.3.2, I ar-
gue why, although imprecise, predicates have to be static. Section3.3.3investigates static pred-
icates for the first countermeasure assuming a transitive information-flow policy. Section3.3.4
discusses static predicates for intransitive information-fl w policies.
Because the first countermeasure treats possibly leaking blocked or stopped threads as ready,
a suitable thread must be found to consume the execution and total budget of treated-as-ready
threads. For the time being, let us assume that the idle thread plays this role. In Section3.3.7,
I discuss a variant of the scheduler, which allows also othert r ads to consume the budgets of
possibly leaking threads.
Two further assumptions to which we shall stick in the following discussion are that threads
have distinct priorities and that jobs have no precedence constraints or other temporal depen-
dencies. I shall lift these restrictions in Section3.3.8and in Section3.6.1, respectively. All
threads are assumed to run on the same CPU.
Clearly, if the existence of a thread must not be revealed to lower prioritized threads, the
former must not consume any time that would otherwise be available to the latter. At least, a
placeholder thread must be visible to this latter thread to reserve time for concealed threads.
As a fifth and last assumption I will therefore assume that allhreads are cleared to observe
the release points, the relative deadlines and the total budgets of higher prioritized threads. In
Section3.6.2, we shall return to the execution of concealed threads behind visible placeholder
threads. Section3.3.10concludes the discussion of non-interference-secure schedulers with a
slight detour to non-interference-secure proportional-sh re schedulers.
3.3.1. Avoiding Information Leakage due to Direct and Indir ect
Influences
There are two principle approaches to avoid information leakage due to direct and indirect
influence:
1. constrain the execution and blocking behavior of influencing threads, or
2. compensate variations in an influencing thread’s execution and blocking behavior to pre-
vent the influenced thread from observing encoded secrets.
Countermeasure Ifollows the second approach because, as we shall see in greater detail in
Section3.5, it preserves the real-time guarantees of the scheduled thrads.Countermeasure Iis
defined as follows:
Definition 10. Countermeasure I
Letpinfluence(τh, t) be a predicate, which denotes whetherτh can directly or indirectly in-
fluence another thread at the point in timet. The first countermeasure to avoid informa-
tion leakage due to direct and indirect influence is to treatτh as if it is ready whenever
pinfluence(τh, t) evaluates to true. That is, the scheduler selectsτh whenever no higher priori-
tized thread is ready or treated-as-ready. If the selected threadτh blocks of if it has stopped,
the scheduler runs a suitable budget-consumer thread to compensate forτh’s blocking be-
havior and to consumeτh’s total budget.
Clearly, forCountermeasure Ito work, the budget-consumer thread must be ready and it must
not send information aboutτh’s blocking behavior to lower prioritized threadsτl that are not
cleared to receive information from the influencing threadτh. In Section3.3.7, I will discuss
possible choices of suitable budget-consumer threads. Fornow, let us pick theidle thread.
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Figure 3.6.: To avoid information leakage due to direct and indirect influences, the modified
scheduler preventsτl from running whenτh blocks or when it has stopped. The idle
thread consumesτh’s total budget (shaded bars).
To avoid special-case handling in the scheduler, many operating systems implement a per
CPU idle threadthat is always ready. The idle thread performs no useful workbut to idle. In
particular, it sends no messages. Therefore, it can safely be classified at the highest secrecy
level ⊤ of the information-flow policy, which clears it to receive information from all other
threads. Because the idle thread does not send any messages,it will not reveal any information
about the points in time during which it runs. Therefore, andbecause the idle thread is always
ready, it can be selected to consume the budget of any other thread in the system. This means
the idle thread is a suitable budget-consumer thread for allther threads.
Figure3.6shows howCountermeasure Iavoids information leakage due to direct and indirect
influences. Recall from Section3.2.1 that we can rule out indirect influences by ruling out
direct influences of those legitimate receivers that are cleared to send messages to the indirectly
influenced threads.
Let us assume thatτh must not leak any information toτl (i.e., dom(τh)  dom(τl)) and
hence thatpinfluence(τh, t) holds at least for all points in timet when it is necessary to activate
Countermeasure I. Wheneverτh blocks or whenever it has stopped without exhausting the total
budgettbh,k of its current job, the scheduler switches to the idle threadto consume this budget.
As a consequence, the scheduler preventsτl from running until eitherτh’s total budget is de-
pleted or until its deadline has passed. Both situations areindependent of the actions ofτh and
we assumedτl to be cleared to the release and deactivation of the higher prioritized threadτh.
Therefore, becauseτl cannot distinguishτh’s execution from the execution of the idle thread to
consumeτh’s total budget,τh cannot influence the points in time whenτl runs and hence the
observationsτl can make aboutτh’s execution and blocking behavior.
The scheduler avoids information leakage due to indirect influe ces of a threadτr by avoiding
direct influences of threadsτs that are cleared to send toτr. Because a threadτh, which cannot
directly influenceτs, cannot influence the points in time whenτs runs, it can also not influence
the timing information in the messagesτs sends. Therefore, a suitable predicatepinfluence(τh, t),
which activatesCountermeasure Ialso when such a possible senderτs could be influenced
directly, avoids also information leakage due to indirect influences.
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Figure 3.7.: The time thatτm is able to influence lower prioritized threads depends on thetim
that higher prioritized threads (e.g.,τh) execute whileτm is released.
3.3.2. Suitable Predicates for Countermeasure I
In Definition 10, the decision to applyCountermeasure Ifor a threadτh at timet depends on
the as yet unspecified predicatepinfluence(τh, t). In the next section, I argue why, although im-
precise,pinfluence(τh, t) must be static. Section3.3.3and Section3.3.4introduce two candidates
— ptransitive andpintransitive — for transitive and for intransitive information-flow policies and
discuss why they are suitable to avoid information leakage due to direct and indirect influences.
3.3.2.1. Static Predicates are Imprecise
To minimize the scheduling overhead and to allow admission tests to be based on the predicates,
which denote when the scheduler has to activate the two countermeasures, these predicates
must be static. That is, the decision to treat a possibly leaking thread as ready must not depend
on information that is only available when the system is running. For the same reasons, a
static predicate is required for the second countermeasure( ee Section3.3.5). However, static
predicates are imprecise.
Precise predicates activate a countermeasure only when a thre dτm can actually leak infor-
mation by directly influencing another thread. Clearly, this is only the case if no other higher
prioritized thread runs and if the influencing threadτm is active. Unfortunately, both situations
depend on information that is in general only available whent system runs: Whether a higher
prioritized thread runs at a point in timet depends on the actions this thread executes and on
the execution and blocking behavior of other higher prioritized threads. However, the action a
thread will execute att is typically not known beforet (recall Definition9 on page47 about
well-formed schedulers and time-to-value mappings).
Figure3.7demonstrates that thread activation also depends on the release points and actions
of higher prioritized threads, that is, on information thatis in general not available at admission
time. Two threadsτh andτm are shown with two respectively one jobτh,0, τh,1, andτm,0. The
last jobτm,0 executes and blocks until its total budgettbm,0 is exhausted. If the first jobτh,0 of
τh runs (left picture),τm remains active until afterτh’s second job becomes inactive. Ifτh’s first
job blocks (right picture),τm is deactivated due to budget depletion before the second jobof τh
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is released.
To conclude, static countermeasure predicates cannot be precise. They cannot depend on the
actions of a thread nor can they depend on the points in time when a thread is active. Conserva-
tive predicates, which overestimate the points in time whent respective countermeasure has
to be applied are safe as long as the countermeasure is activated at least during all those points
in time when a precise predicate would activate this countermeasure.
3.3.3. Transitive Information-Flow Policies
Definition11introduces the predicateptransitive(τh, t) for transitive information-flow policies. It
overestimates the points in time when the scheduler has to activateCountermeasure Ito prevent
illegal information flows due to direct and indirect influenc.
Definition 11. Predicate for Transitive Policies.
The predicateptransitive(τh, t) is a conservative countermeasure predicate for transitive
information-flow policies. It is defined as follows:
ptransitive(τh, t) := ∃ τl ∈ Tlow (τh). dom(τh)  dom(τl)
In fact, the result ofptransitive(τh, t) does not depend on the parametert. In the following, I will
therefore writeptransitive(τh) instead ofptransitive(τh, t). The predicate holds for a threadτh if
and only if there is a lower or equally prioritized threadτl that the information-flow policy has
not cleared to receive information fromτh. Remember, the setTlow (τh) contains all threadsτ
with prio(τ) ≤ prio(τh).
The following observations give an intuition whyCountermeasure Iwith pinfluence = ptransitive
avoids information leakage due to direct and indirect influence in systems with a transitive
information-flow policy. In Section3.4, I substantiate this informal argument with a machine-
checked non-interference proof of the budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler.
Assumeτh is a high-priority thread that must not send to a lower prioritized threadτl. Then,
becausedom(τh)  dom(τl) and becauseτl ∈ Tlow (τh), ptransitive(τh) holds for all points in
time t. As a consequence, whenever no higher thanτh prioritized thread is ready or treated-as-
ready, the scheduler will selectτh as long asτh is active. During this time, the scheduler will
either runτh or the idle thread to consumeτh’s total budget; the lower prioritized threadτl is
not run. Therefore, variations inτh’s execution or blocking behavior have no effect onτl.
A first intuition why Countermeasure Iwith pinfluence = ptransitive avoids also leakage due to
indirect influence gives the following case analysis of the values ofptransitive :
Case ptransitive(τh): If ptransitive(τh) holds thenτh cannot directly influence lower prioritized
threadsτs ∈ Tlow (τh). Any timing information thatτs’s messages may carry to a thread
τr, whichτh intents to indirectly influence, must therefore be independent ofτh’s actions.
Case ¬ptransitive(τh): If the predicateptransitive(τh) does not hold, we have to assume pes-
simistically thatτh directly influences a lower prioritized threadτs. Through this di-
rect influence,τh can affect the timing information inτs’s messages. It may therefore
indirectly influence those threadsτr to which τs is authorized to send (i.e., for which
dom(τs) ≤ dom(τr) holds).
From¬ptransitive(τh), we know thatdom(τh) ≤ dom(τs). Becausedom(τs) ≤ dom(τr)
holds and because≤ is transitive, it follows thatdom(τh) ≤ dom(τr). Hence, if
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Figure 3.8.: The Mikro-SINA cryptographic gateway. A cryptographic gateway connects a po-
tentially untrustworthy subsystem over the Internet to another potentially untrust-
worthy subsystem. The shown implementation reuses not necessarily trustworthy
network protocol stacks.
¬ptransitive(τh), τh is authorized to send to all threadsτr to which lower prioritized threads
(e.g.,τs) are authorized to send. No leakage can occur.
This concludes the informal argument. For transitive information-flow policies, we have seen
that theCountermeasure Iwith pinfluence = ptransitive avoids leakage due to direct and indi-
rect influences. In the next section, we shall see thatptransitive is not sufficient for intransitive
information-flow policies. Therefore, a second predicatepintransitive is introduced and analyzed.
3.3.4. Intransitive Information-Flow Policies
The intuition behind intransitive information-flow policies is to authorize communication from
a threadτH to a lower or incomparably classified threadτL only if this communication is
relayed over a third threadτM . Thereby, the role of this third thread is to properly sanitize
and filter the information it forwards. In intransitive information-flow policies, this fact is
expressed by assigningτM a secrecy leveldom(τM) for which dom(τH) ≤ dom(τM) and
dom(τM ) ≤ dom(τL) holds and by requiringdom(τH)  dom(τL). That is,dom(τM ) is the
intransitive point of the pass(dom(τH), dom(τM), dom(τL)).
A cryptographic gateway [HWF05] (Figure 3.8) is an example scenario for intransitive
information-flow policies. To securely connect two potentially untrustworthy subsystems over
the Internet, each site runs an instance of the cryptographic gateway. This gateway is comprised
of two components, a trusted wrapper and a legacy OS instance, which contains a not neces-
sarily trustworthy network protocol stack. The purpose of the wrapper is to encrypt messages
from the local subsystem before it forwards the encrypted messages to the local protocol stack.
The protocol stack in turn transmits the encrypted messagesto the remote site. In the reverse
direction, the gateway decrypts the messages it receives from the local protocol stack. The
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gateway is trusted to properly sanitize and filter outgoing messages.
In the previous section, we have seen thatptransitive suffices for transitive information-flow
policies. However, the above argument, which supports thispredicate, no longer holds for
intransitive information-flow policies. More precisely, in the case¬ptransitive(τh), we as-
sumed thatdom(τh) ≤ dom(τs) and dom(τs) ≤ dom(τr) implies dom(τh) ≤ dom(τr).
This is no longer the case ifdom(τs) is the intransitive point of the intransitive pass
(dom(τh), dom(τs), dom(τr)). In this case,dom(τh)  dom(τr) holds.
The following example shows that, for intransitive information-flow policies,ptransitive cannot
prevent all covert channels due to direct and indirect influeces. Let three threadsτH , τM andτL
be classified as described above (i.e.,(dom(τH), dom(τM ), dom(τL)) is an intransitive pass). If
prio(τL) > prio(τH) andprio(τH) > prio(τM ), ¬ptransitive(τH) holds unless a further thread
causesptransitive(τH) to hold. Because{τH , τM} ⊆ Tlow (τH) and dom(τH) ≤ dom(τH) ∧
dom(τH) ≤ dom(τM ), the scheduler runsτH unconstrained. But thenτH is able to influence
whenτM ’s messages arrive atτL.
3.3.4.1. A Countermeasure Predicate for Intransitive Info rmation-Flow Policies
One possible approach to address intransitive information-flow policies is to applyCountermea-
sure Imore often. By removing the priority constraint inptransitive(τ), we obtain the predicate:
Definition 12. Predicate for Intransitive Policies.
For intransitive information-flow policies, the followingpredicate determines whether
Countermeasure I(see Definition10) has to be applied for the threadτ at the point in timet.
pintransitive(τ, t) := ∃τ ′ ∈ T. dom(τ)  dom(τ ′)
For intransitive information-flow policies,Countermeasure Iwith pinfluence = pintransitive avoids
information leakage due to direct and indirect influences. Acorresponding machine-checked
non-interference proof is described in Völp et al. [VHH08b]. The proof is for a simplified
version of the proposed budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler. The PVS sources of this
proof are published [VHH08a].
However, althoughpintransitive leads to a secure scheduler, the consequences of applying
Countermeasure Ibased on this predicate are severe.pintransitive evaluates to false only for
those threadsτ that are classified at the lowest secrecy level⊥ (i.e., for whichdom(τ) = ⊥
holds). All other threads are constrained by the countermeasur . That is, whenever a thread
that has access to some secret blocks or stops, the schedulerwill switch to the idle thread to
consume this thread’s total budget. Therefore, for threadsthat have access to some confidential
information, the system is as restrictive as a time-partition ng system. The higher scheduling
overhead of a fixed-priority scheduler is not justified.
3.3.4.2. Avoiding Intransitive Points
An alternative to applyingCountermeasure Imore often is the following restructuring of
servers at intransitive points. For scheduling these restructu ed servers in a non-interference
secure manner, a second information-flow policy can be extracted. Because this extracted
policy is transitive,Countermeasure Ipinfluence = ptransitive suffices to avoid leakage due to
direct and indirect influence.
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Figure 3.9.: The original, intransitive information-flow policy classifies the threadτM of the
cryptographic gateway at secrecy levelm. The clients of this gateway receive the
secrecy levels andr. Together,(s,m, r) is an intransitive pass (left picture).
After restructuring the gateway, it contains two threadsτS andτR. The extracted
transitive information-flow policy classifies these threads t incomparable secrecy
levelsms andmr (right picture).
To forward a sanitized message without leaking secrets thata sender encodes in the timing of a
server, the sender must not directly influence the forwarding thread or cause another thread to
do so. LetτH be the sending client thread,τL the receiver of the sanitized message andτR the
server thread that forwardsτH ’s message toτL. Then, eitherdom(τH)  dom(τR) must hold
or τR must run at a sufficiently high priority (see Section3.2.1) to not be influenced. Because
the latter negatively affects the response times of real-time hreads, let us in the following focus
on the first approach.
Clearly, dom(τH)  dom(τR) prevents the server from being single threaded becauseτR
must not receive the message fromτH . Let us therefore assume that the server provides at least
one thread for each differently classified client (e.g.,τS to receiveτH ’s messages andτR to
forward them toτL). Then, if the server guarantees to suppress illegal information flows, the
extracted information-flow policy can classify these threads such thatdom(τH) ≤ dom(τS) and
dom(τR) ≤ dom(τL) holds and that otherwise no information flows are allowed betwe n these
threads. This implies in particular thatdom(τS)  dom(τR).
A prerequisite for the guarantee to suppress illegal information flows is that server-internal
synchronization and communication primitives are safe in the sense that a server thread cannot
affect the externally observable timing behavior of another server threads if it invokes such a
primitive. We shall return to such safe synchronization primitives in Section3.7on page107.
More generally, the extraction of the second information-flw policy (L′,≤′, dom ′) works as
follows. For each intransitive pass( , m, r) in the original information-flow policy(L,≤, dom),
two new, incomparable secrecy levelsms andmr are added disjointly to the set of secrecy
levelsL (i.e.,L′ := L ⊎ {ms, mr} wherems ′ mr ∧mr ′ ms). Then, the pairs ≤ m and
m ≤ r are replaced bys ≤′ ms andmr ≤′ r in the dominates relation≤′ of the restructured
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information-flow policy. Moreover, ifs (respectivelyr) is not an intransitive point, any pair
s′ ≤ s is extended tos′ ≤′ ms and any pair ≤ r′ is extended tomr ≤′ r′. Because intransitive
points may also transitively be connected such as inx ≤ m ∧ m ≤ r ∧ x ≤ r, we also have
to swing all remaining connections to the newly introduced screcy levels. In the example, this
meansx ≤′ ms andx ≤′ mr is added to≤′. Finally, the threads of the restructured server
are classified to their new secrecy levels:dom ′(τS) = ms anddom
′(τR) = mr. Figure3.9
illustrates this transformation.
There are five important points to notice:
1. Because the set of secrecy levelsL i finite, the above extraction algorithm terminates;
2. All previously authorized information-flows remain authorized except those between the
newly introduced threads in the restructured servers;
3. A consequent application of this transformation for all intransitive points results in a
transitive information-flow policy;
4. Communication fromτS to τR is authorized outside this extracted information-flow pol-
icy; and hence,
5. Server-internal communication and synchronization must be safe despite influences from
other threads.
For the cryptographic gateway, a simple strategy to avoid a leakage of timing information to
the protocol stack is to produce an artificial message whenever the protocol stack expects such
a message and no sender has provided one. Because messages are encrypted, the protocol stack
cannot distinguish fake from real messages (provided of course, the encryption is sufficiently
strong). The stack cannot deduce any information about the ord r and timing of the real
messages.
The transitivity of the extracted information-flow policy follows from the following observa-
tion. If (s,m, r) is an intransitive pass in the original information-flow policy where neither
s nor r are intransitive points, the transformation extends any relation s′ ≤ s to s′ ≤ ms
such thats′ ≤ s ∧ s ≤ ms ⇒ s′ ≤ ms. Likewise,r ≤ r′ is extended tomr ≤ r′ such that
r ≤ r′ ∧mr ≤ r ⇒ mr ≤ r′. If s is an intransitive point (e.g., of the pass(x, s,m)) then the
transformation step ofm replaces this pass with the intransitive pass(x, s,ms) wherems is no
longer an intransitive point. Hence, a subsequent transformation ofs will split the pass into
x ≤ sx andsm ≤ ms, wheresx andsm are no longer intransitive points. Ifr is an intransitive
point, the transformation step ofr proceeds accordingly. Because each transformation step
removes one intransitive point and because the newly introduce secrecy levels are connected
in a transitive way, the resulting information-flow policy is transitive.
Assuming that our envisaged open microkernel-based systemhas been transformed as described
above, I will focus on transitive information-flow policiesin the remainder of this chapter.
3.3.4.3. Implementing Countermeasure I with Static Predicates
The two static predicatesptransitive and pintransitive allow for the following simple and well-
performing implementation ofCountermeasure I.
68
3.3. A NON-INTERFERENCE-SECURE SCHEDULER
For a threadτ , bothptransitive(τ) andpintransitive(τ) can be evaluated while the system is offline
and without considering the point in time whenCountermeasure Ishould be applied. Therefore,
the result of evaluating one of these predicates can be stored in a flag inτ ’s thread control block.
Whenever the scheduler determines whetherτ is ready, it can just read the countermeasure
flag fromτ ’s thread control block and treat this thread as ready if it isactive and if its counter-
measure flag is set. This implies that blocked or stopped threads or threads are not dequeued
from the ready queue, which means the scheduler may select a blocked or stopped thread to run.
To prevent this, the thread-switch procedure of the scheduler is modified to check whether the
selected thread is actually ready or whether it is blocked orst pped and only treated-as-ready.
In the latter case, the thread-switch procedure turns control to the idle thread after activating the
original thread’s total budget. As a consequence, the idle thr ad automatically consumes the
total budget of this originally selected threadτ . The execution budget ofτ is only activated if
the thread-switch procedure turns control toτ .
The scheduling overhead for checking an additional flag in the thread control block is neg-
ligible. The thread control block must be accessed anyway toex ract the state of the corre-
sponding thread. Because the search for the next highest prioritized ready thread terminates if a
treated-as-ready thread is found, the search takes no longer than on a system with an unmodified
scheduler. A further benefit of the above implementation is that he kernel needs no knowledge
about the information-flow policy.
3.3.5. Avoiding Information Leakage due to Non-preemptive
Execution
To eliminate timing channels due to non-preemptive execution, the scheduler cannot just
preempt possibly leaking threads. If threads execute non-preemptively to synchronize critical
sections, forcibly preempting these threads would result in incorrect synchronization.
The following observation leads to a countermeasure to avoid timing-channels due to non-
preemptive execution. In a real-time system, all non-preemptive code paths must have a
bounded execution time. Otherwise, interrupt latencies arunbounded and no guarantees could
be given for the response times of threads. Letmax delay l be the kernel-enforced upper bound
on the time that a threadτl can execute non-preemptively, which I have introduced in Sec-
tion 3.1.2. Then, because a thread must be running to execute non-preemtiv ly, only the
currently running thread can defer the preemptions of higher prioritized threads. As long as
the scheduler resumes the highest prioritized threadτh whose preemption is pending, only one
non-preemptively executing lower prioritized thread can defer whenτh resumes its execution:
the lower prioritized thread that did run whenτh’s preemption occurred. Hence, the maximum
time that a preemption ofτh can be deferred is:
Definition 13. Maximum Preemption Delay
The maximum time a preemption of a threadτh can be delayed is
max delay low(τh) := max
τl∈Tlow (τh)
(max delay l)
By delaying all preemptions of possibly leaked to higher prioritized threads by
max delay low(τh), we obtain a second countermeasure to avoid leakage due to non-
preemptive execution:
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Figure 3.10.: The scheduler delays the two points in time when τh resumes its execution after
the two preempting events attr and tu by max delay low(τh). The threadτh
can therefore no longer distinguish this countermeasure from the non-preemptive
execution ofτl.
Definition 14. Countermeasure II
Letpdelay(τh, t) be a predicate such that if¬pdelay(τh, t) holds a threadτh resumes its ex-
ecution immediately if a preempting event releases or unblocksτh at timet. If pdelay (τh, t)
holds at this time, the following countermeasure is applied. The second countermeasure to
avoid leakage due to non-preemptive execution is to delay any preemption of a threadτh,
which is triggered by a preempting event at timet, bymax delay low(τh) if pdelay (τh, t)
holds. As a result of delaying this preemption,τh cannot resume its execution before
t+max delay low(τh).
Figure3.10illustratesCountermeasure II. The release or the unblocking of a higher prioritized
threadτh preempts the lower prioritized threadτl at tr respectively attu. An unmodified
scheduler would runτh immediately afterτl stops executing non-preemptively (end of black
bar) respectively immediately attu. To avoid information leakage due to non-preemptive
execution ifτl is not cleared to send toτh, Countermeasure IIdelays both preemptions. As
a result,τh can resume its execution only aftertr + max delay low(τh) respectively after
tu +max delay low(τh).
The static predicatepdelay overestimates the points in time when the scheduler has to apply this
second countermeasure. It is defined as follows:
Definition 15. Predicate for Countermeasure II.
A preemption at timet, which is caused by a threadτh, must be delayed to avoid informa-
tion leakage due to non-preemptive execution if the following predicate holds:
pdelay (τh, t) := ∃ τl ∈ Tlow (τh). dom(τl)  dom(τh) ∧ max delay l > 0
Like ptransitive andpintransitive , pdelay is also time-independent. I emphasize this independence
because I will simply writepdelay (τ) to meanpdelay(τ, t). The predicatepdelay (τh) holds for
transitive information-flow policies (see Section3.3.4.2) whenever there exists a lower or
equally prioritized threadτl that is not cleared to send toτh but that is able to execute non-
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preemptively (i.e., for whichmax delay l > 0 holds).
The following observation gives an intuition whyCountermeasure IIwith pdelay avoids in-
formation leakage due to non-preemptive execution. There are three types of leakage due to
non-preemptive execution:
1. direct leakagefrom a non-preemptively executing threadτl to a higher prioritized thread
τh,
2. indirect leakagefrom τl to another threadτr by influencing the timing ofτs’s messages to
τr, and
3. leakage fromτl to lower or equally prioritized threads that exploit two corne case situa-
tions.
Let me defer the discussion of these corner case situations to the next section.
Case 1: direct leakage
If pdelay (τh) holds, the scheduler delays all preemptions bymax delay low(τh)
that would release or unblock the threadτh. Therefore, and because a lower or
equally prioritized threadτl can at most execute non-preemptively formax delay l ≤
max delay low(τh), τh cannot distinguish between a delay caused byCountermeasure
II or a delay caused byτl executing non-preemptively. No information can be leaked
directly fromτl to τh.
Case 2: indirect leakage
If pdelay(τh) holds,τh’s execution and hence the timing of its messages cannot be influ-
enced byτl.
If pdelay(τh) does not hold, we can conclude from the transitivity of≤ that for a receiver
τr of τh’s messages it holds that:
dom(τl) ≤ dom(τh) ∧ dom(τh) ≤ dom(τr) ⇒ dom(τl) ≤ dom(τr)
The indirect information flow betweenτl and τr is not in violation to the system’s
information-flow policy.dom(τd) ≤ dom(τx) already authorizesτl to send toτr.
3.3.5.1. Corner Cases
Leakage due to non-preemptive execution is typically directed from a low-priority thread to
a higher prioritized thread. However, there are two corner-case situations in which a non-
preemptively executing threadτi can leak information to lower prioritized threads:
• if τi executes non-preemptively while exceeding the execution or total budget of its cur-
rent job; or,
• if τi executes non-preemptively when the deadline of its currentjob has passed.
There are two principle approaches to prevent leakage at these end-of-release preemptions:
1. The scheduler can trigger the respective preemptions ahead of time; or,
2. It can forcibly preempt a thread at these points in time.
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In the latter case, the scheduler has to export enough information to allow well-behaving threads
to check whether it is safe to enter a critical section.
Because a threadτi can execute non-preemptively for at mostmax delay i, a scheduler can
avoid both corner cases if it triggers end-of-release preemptions already when one of the
remaining budgets falls belowmax delay i respectively when the adjusted relative deadline
di,k −max delay i passes.
A scheduler that informs a threadτi about outstanding end-of-release preemptions ahead
of time can forcibly preemptτi when one of these preemptions occur without risking the
correctness of well-behaving threads. Becauseτi knows about these preemptions in advance, it
can avoid entering a critical section in situations where insufficient time remains to complete
this critical section.
To inform the currently running thread about imminent end-of-release preemptions, the
scheduler can either setup a timer and signal the currently running thread when this timer ex-
pires or it can provide the thread with sufficient information t predict these preemptions itself.
To signal end-of-release preemptions ahead of time, the schduler must setup two timers
for all jobs τi,k that do not stop ahead of time: the firstmax delay i ahead of end-of-release
preemptions, the second to actually deactivate this job. However, the overhead of the involved
kernel entry would by far outweigh the benefit of a user-leveldelayed-preemption mechanism
to synchronize short critical sections.
Avoiding Critical Sections by Predicting End-Of-Release P reemptions To predict
when an end-of-release preemption occurs, the currently running jobτi,k has to know its release
point ri,k, the timete when the scheduler has last switched to this thread and the minimum
of its remaining execution and total budget at this time (i.e., the minimum ofebrem ,i(te) and
tbrem,i(te)). The following pseudo code verifies that the remaining timebefore an end-of-release
preemption is at least|cs|, where|cs| is the maximal time required to execute the critical section
cs.
retry :
disable preemptions();
t = read clock ();
if (ebrem,i(te) + t− te < |cs| or
tbrem,i(te) + t− te < |cs| or
ri,k + di,k − t < |cs| or
preemption occurred)
enable preemptions();
goto retry;
// enter critical section
To avoid a preemption after a successful check but before thethread enters the critical section,
preemptions must already be disabled during the check. Becaus the scheduler forcibly pre-
empts threads when they exhaust their budgets or when the deadlines of these threads pass, the
code must test for pending preemptions. If a preemption is pending,τi may have read an old
version ofebrem ,i(te) or tbrem ,i(te) and retries the operation to avoid inconsistencies.
The costs for executing the above code snippet are dominatedby the time required to read
the system clock. The time required to access the exported values in the thread’s UTCB and the
time required for the conditional jump are negligible because the part of the UTCB that stores
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these parameters will likely remain in the first level cache of the processor and the jump can
statically be predicted as not taken.
The total time required to execute the above code snippet is 9cycles on an AMD Dual-Core
(2.4 GHz) and 51 cycles on a Pentium M (1.6 GHz)6. For short critical sections such as an
enqueue operation to the head of a double-linked list, theseco ts can be significant. On the
AMD Dual-Core this list enqueue takes 4 cycles without and 13cycles with the above check.
On the Pentium M these are 6 cycles respectively 57 cycles.
As long as short critical sections are rare, the overhead of the check is tolerable although
it increases the time of a list enqueue operation by an order of magnitude. Otherwise, sched-
ulers that trigger preemptions ahead of time rather than sigall ng them are to be preferred. In
real-time systemsmax delay i is typically in the order of a few 1000 cycles on modern GHz
processors. In comparison to that, total budgets and relativ deadlines are typically set to sev-
eral hundred milliseconds. Hence, budget depletion and passing deadlines are rare events and
the idle time due to the earlier preemption of a threadτi is negligible.
3.3.5.2. Implementation
In fully interruptible kernels, pre-located trampoline code allows for a straightforward im-
plementation ofCountermeasure II. Recall from Section3.2.2 on page59, a kernel is fully
interruptible if it allows interrupts to preempt kernel code at any point in time. In such a
kernel, the interrupt handler is invoked immediately when an interrupt occurs. It can therefore
record the timetpreemption of this occurrence and return to the interrupted code if thiscode has
expressed its intent to execute non-preemptively. Withtpreemption , Countermeasure IIcan be
implemented by modifying the scheduler to switch to pre-located trampoline code instead of
switching directly to threadτh that has caused this preemption. If the trampoline code gets
activated (e.g., after the currently running thread has stopped executing non-preemptively) for
a threadτh with pdelay (τh), it computes the earliest absolute point in time whenτh can resume
its execution astpreemption + max delay low(τh). After that it idles until this point in time has
passed at which time it returns control toτh.
Although the point in time when a processor stops executing the currently running thread is
available at the architectural level, it is currently not exported to the operating-system kernel.
This point in time is precisely the time when the last instruction of the current thread retires
before the processor activates the in-kernel interrupt handler.
As long as the times for entering the kernel and for activating a in-kernel interrupt handler
are sufficiently constant, the interrupt handlers of fully interruptible kernels can approximate
tpreemption by reading the system clock immediately when they start executing. On processors
where these times vary significantly, low-bandwidth covertchannels can remain.
This completes the discussion of the budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler and of its variants
for transitive and intransitive information-flow policies. So far, we have assumed distinct thread
priorities and the idle thread to consume the total budgets of blocked or stopped treated-as-
ready threads. In the following, I shall lift these restrictions first by considering other budget-
consumer threads and then, in Section3.3.8, by extending the two countermeasures to equally
prioritized threads.
6AppendixA contains the C++ source code for this check and for the measurd list-enqueue operation.
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3.3.6. Accounting
For Countermeasure Ito work (see Definition10 on page61), the scheduler must accurately
account bothCountermeasure IandCountermeasure IIto the two budgets of a thread. Other-
wise, variations in the imprecise remaining total budget could be exploited to leak confidential
information. Obviously,Countermeasure Imust be accounted to the total budget of the treated-
as-ready thread.Countermeasure Itreats possibly leaking threads as if they were ready and
runs the idle thread as a budget consumer when the treated-as-ready thread blocks or when it
has stopped.
Less obvious is where to account the time of the second countermeasure. Intuitively, one would
account the time that a threadτl executes non-preemptively to this thread’s execution budget.
However, preemptions of a higher prioritized threadτh are also deferred in situations where no
lower prioritized thread executes non-preemptively or where no such thread runs at all.
A partial accounting to bothτl andτh (e.g., first toτl’s execution budget as long as it executes
non-preemptively and then toτh’s total budget) must be rejected as well because such an ac-
counting reveals information about the non-preemptive execution ofτl in the remaining budget
of τh. Partial accounting gives rise to a covert channel.
To avoid these channels, we have to accountCountermeasure IIentirely to τh’s budgets.
More precisely, as long asτh is the highest-prioritized ready or treated-as-ready thread, it con-
sumes its total budget even if a lower prioritized thread execut s non-preemptively and even if
Countermeasure IIdelays its preemptions. Whether the scheduler accounts thecountermeasure
only to τh’s total budget or whether it accounts this countermeasure to bo hτh’s execution and
total budget is irrelevant as far as information-flow security is concerned. An accounting to
τh’s execution budget is however the more natural choice because no lower prioritized thread
(except the current non-preemptively executing thread) can run while the scheduler applies this
countermeasure.
Notice, to correctly accountCountermeasure IIto τh’s execution budget, the kernel must inter-
rupt the non-preemptively executing threads to record the point in time when a preempting event
has occurred. Preempting events are therefore visible to non-preemptively executing threadsτl.
Still, the scheduler is non-interference secure:
1. The unblocking of a higher prioritized threadτh (though not its release) preempts a
lower prioritized threadτl only if the scheduler has selectedτl. This can only happen
if ¬ptransitive(τh). But thendom(τh) ≤ dom(τl) andτl is authorized to see the preempt-
ing events ofτh;
2. The release of a higher prioritized threadτh can preempt a lower prioritized threadτl.
However, lower prioritized threads are assumed to be cleared to these releases.
3.3.7. A Budget-Enforcing Fixed-Priority Lattice Schedul er
So far, the idle thread played the role of the budget-consumer thr ad to avoid leakage due to di-
rect and indirect influences. However, the idle thread performs no useful work. In the following,
I will therefore explore the possibility to use other threads s budget-consumer threads.
Clearly, such a threadτH (i.e., a thread for whichdom(τH) = H holds) must be ready and
its secrecy level must dominate the secrecy level of the selected threadτL (i.e., dom(τL) ≤
dom(τH)). Otherwise,τL could leak confidential information toτH by modulating when it
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blocks and thereby when the scheduler selectsτH to consumeτL’s total budget. IfτL must not
send to a lower prioritized threadτr, thenτH must also not send toτr. Otherwise, ifdom(τH) ≤
dom(τr), we could immediately conclude from the transitivity of theinformation-flow policy
thatdom(τL) ≤ dom(τr), which authorizesτL to send toτr in the first place.
If τH blocks while consumingτL’s total budget, the problem of finding a suitable budget-
consumer thread recurs. In this case, the scheduler must findanother ready threadτ ′H to
consumeτL’s budget. To avoid leakage bothdom(τL) ≤ dom(τ ′H) anddom(τH) ≤ dom(τ ′H)
must hold. Otherwise, eitherτL or τH could leak toτ ′H by modulating when they block.
Fortunately, for transitive information flow policies, thelatter conditiondom(τH) ≤ dom(τ ′H)
implies the former. Therefore, if a budget consumer blocks,the scheduler just needs to search
for another ready thread that is higher classified than the last budget consumer. Because
dom(τidle) = ⊤ and because the idle thread never blocks, the scheduler willal ays find a
budget consumer forτL. Following Hu [Hu92], I call a scheduler that implements this search
strategy abudget-enforcing fixed-priority lattice scheduler.
Notice that all threadsτ iH consumeτL’s total budget. Notice further that budget consumers have
a lower priority thanτL. Otherwise, they would have preemptedτL and the scheduler would
have selected these threads in the first place. Hence,pdelay(τL) already considers these threads.
Budget consumers cannot leak information toτL by executing non-preemptively.
Naturally, running a budget consumerτ iH can change how this thread behaves in the future.
However, to observe this change a threadτX must be cleared to seeτ iH . Because≤ is transitive,
τX is then also cleared to all previous budget consumersτ
j
H , j < i and toτL.
3.3.7.1. Implementation
The search for a budget-consumer thread can be implemented in various different ways:
• the scheduler can search the ready list for a lower prioritized thread with higher or equal
secrecy level;
• it can maintain an additional ready list, which is sorted by ascending secrecy levels; or,
• it can maintain for each thread a pointer to a potential budget consumer. If this thread is
ready, it becomes the new budget-consumer thread. If not, the search proceeds by chasing
these pointers until a potential budget consumer is found that is ready.
For microkernels, the last alternative is most attractive because the kernel needs no knowledge
about the information-flow policy. In particular, when thispolicy changes frequently, enforce-
ment mechanisms that require no knowledge about this policyare preferable.
3.3.8. Limited Number of Priorities
In real-life systems, the number of distinct priority levels are limited (typically to between 16
and 256 levels). So far, I have assumed that threads have distinct priorities (see Section3.3
on page60). However, if more threads run in a system than there are priority levels, multiple
threads have to share the same priority level. In this case, acond scheduling policy selects
the thread that should run next if no higher prioritized thread is ready (or treated-as-ready).
The two most prominent scheduling policies for threads sharing the same priority level are
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first-come-first-served(FIFO) and Round Robin.
In real-time systems literature [CDKM02, But05], FIFO is often defined only for threads that
do not block. In this case, threads of the same priority complete in the order in which they
are released. The POSIX System API Realtime Extension [IEE93] is an exception. It defines
FIFO in terms of a list of ready threads7. Threads are enqueued to this list in the order of their
release. However, blocked threads are removed from this list and re-enqueued at its tail when
they unblock. Although a precise definition of FIFO with blocked threads is missing in the cited
version of her book, Liu [Liu00] seems to assume that blocked threads keep their list position8.
To distinguish Liu’s version of first-in-first-out from the version described in the POSIX Real-
Time Extensions, I will call the former version FIFO and the latter version POSIX-FIFO.
Round Robin works very similar to FIFO except that executionbudgets of threads are split
into smaller chunks. The Round Robin scheduler then schedules the threads according to one
of the FIFO versions until their current chunk depletes. In this case, the scheduler refills the
chunk and re-enqueues the thread at the end of the FIFO queue.This refill happens until the
execution budget of a thread is depleted respectively untilthe deadline of this thread passes.
Before threads are re-scheduled by a Round Robin scheduler,they have to wait for all other
threads to complete one chunk.
If multiple threads share a single priority level, direct and i direct influence as well as influences
due to non-preemptive execution can affect also equally prioritized threads. Which threads are
7Implementations are of course free to choose a different data structure.
8I draw this conclusion from the time-demand function Liu presents in Section 6.8.4: “Priority-Driven Scheduling
of Periodic Tasks – Practical Factors – Limited-Priority Levels”.
In Section 3.3.1, Liu introduces the execution timeek of a task (in our terminology a thread) as the maximum
execution time of all its jobs. For the time demandwi(t) of a threadτi, Liu gives the following formula:
wi(t) = ei + bi+ Σ
Tk∈TE(i)
ek + Σ
Tk∈TH(i)
⌈ t
pk
⌉ek. It says that in addition to the usual time required to schedule
the threadτi (first two terms) and simultaneously released higher prioritized threads (last term), a time demand
of Σ
Tk∈TE(i)
ek is required. This additional third term seeks to characterize the worst-case time demand of
threads executing at the same priority.
Let us assume a system with two equally prioritized simultaneously released threadsτ1 andτ2. Assume
further thatτ2’s periodΠ2 is twice as large asτ1’s period (i.e.,Π2 = 2Π1). Assume also thatτ1 never blocks
and that both jobs ofτ1 execute fore1 milliseconds.
If τ2 keeps its list position while blocked, only the first job ofτ1 can execute beforeτ2. I assume here that the
scheduler insertsτ1,1 beforeτ2,1 into the FIFO list. The second job ofτ1 is released afterτ2 and will therefore
reside afterτ2 in the FIFO list. It can execute only during those times whenτ2 blocks. These are however,
bounded by the second addend: the worst-case blocking timeb2.
More generally, at most one job of each equally prioritized thread can execute before a threadτi. The term
Σ
Tk∈TE(i)
ek correctly captures this fact.
On the other hand, ifτ2 has to re-enter the FIFO list at the tail, both jobs ofτ1 can execute beforeτ2
completes unlessτ2 wants to execute for less thanΠ1 − e1 milliseconds. In this situation, the additional time
demand ofτ2 is 2e1. That is, twice the amount thatwi(t) considers.
To conclude, Liu assumes either
1. that equally prioritized threads also have equal periods(an assumption Liu abandons immediately after
Section 6.8.4), or
2. she assumes that threads never block during their execution (which is unlikely given the definition ofbi), or
3. she assumes that blocked threads keep their list position.
Of these assumptions, the last is most likely as it is consistent with the other parts of Liu’s book.
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effected by these influences depends on the scheduling policy f r equally prioritized threads. In
the following two sections, I discuss direct and indirect influences on equally prioritized threads
and influences due to non-preemptive execution for FIFO, POSIX FIFO and two corresponding
versions of Round Robin.
3.3.8.1. Direct and Indirect Influence of Equally Prioritiz ed Threads
A threadτi that is scheduled according to FIFO (Liu’s version) can directly influence later
released threads. The blocking behavior ofτi cannot affect earlier released threads because
these threads maintain their list position and are always selected beforeτi is considered. Unless
a later released thread executes non-preemptively (see below) it is preempted once an earlier
released thread resumes its execution.
POSIX FIFO re-enqueues blocked threads at the tail of the FIFO list. Therefore, a later released
threadτj can also affect an earlier released threadτi when this thread has finished its blocking.
Unless a threadτi runs and blocks for at most the duration of one chunk, both versions of
Round Robin allow a threadτj to directly influenceτi even ifτi never blocks. In this case, the
execution and blocking behavior ofτj influences how earlyτi can run its next chunk.
Countermeasure Iavoids also direct and indirect influences of equally prioritized threads. Be-
cause a possibly leaking active threadτj is treated-as-ready, it maintains its position in the FIFO
list until its deadline passes, until its total budget depletes or, in the case of Round-Robin, un-
til the current chunk of its total budget depletes. Consequently, later-enqueued threads cannot
distinguish whetherτj executes or whether another thread consumesτj ’s budget.
The setTlow (τh) in the definition of the countermeasure predicateptransitive(τh) (Defini-
tion 11) already contains equally prioritized threads. However, fo FIFO, a more optimistic
predicate thanptransitive is imaginable. A threadτj can only directly influence later released
threads. Therefore, if the order in which threads are releasd is known at admission time, only
later released threads need to be considered. In general however, the release points and hence
the order in which threads are released are not known at admission time.
3.3.8.2. Influence due to Non-Preemptive Execution of Equal ly Prioritized
Threads
In FIFO (Liu’s Version), blocked threads maintain their list position. As a consequence, earlier
released threads can preempt a currently running later releas d thread of the same priority un-
less this thread executes non-preemptively. Conversely, later-released threads can delay the pre-
emptions of earlier released threads by executing non-preemptively, which constitutes a covert
channel.
Surprisingly, these channels cannot occur in POSIX FIFO andin the corresponding version
of Round Robin. Provided that non-preemptively executing threads cannot defer end-of-release
preemptions, and provided a similar precaution prevents threads from deferring end-of-chunk
preemptions, later-enqueued threads cannot influence earli r-enqueued threads because if an
earlier-enqueued thread blocks it is re-enqueued after thela er-enqueued thread. Therefore, it
cannot preempt this thread, which means leakage due to non-preem tive execution cannot occur
between threads of this priority.
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For POSIX FIFO and for POSIX Round Robin, the countermeasurepredicate forCountermea-
sure II needs to consider only strictly lower prioritized threads.For FIFO, all equally prioritized
threads must be considered unless the order of thread release points is known at admission time.
The predicatepdelay(τ) (see Definition15) checks for the existence of a possibly leaking thread
in the set of all lower or equally prioritized threadsTlow (τ).
3.3.9. Internal-Timing Channels
In our envisaged open microkernel-based system the scheduler m st only eliminate external-
timing channels in order to avoid all software-centric covert timing channels. This is because
software-centric internal timing channels cannot exist inhe unchecked and thus potentially
untrustworthy single-level programs and because we assumea timing-leak transformation to
eliminate internal timing leaks from the checked multi-level servers.
A single-level program cannot contain internal timing leaks although it may well encode
information in the timing of externally observable events.However, because single-level
programs can access only lower or equally classified information, these information flows
cannot violate the information-flow policy. Legitimate observers of the events of a single-level
program are already cleared to the secrecy level of the program and hence to all secrecy levels
the program may read from.
This concludes the discussion of non-interference secure fixed-priority schedulers. Before I
introduce the machine-checked non-interference proof forthe budget-enforcing fixed-priority
scheduler, let us briefly consider proportional-share schedulers.
3.3.10. Information-Flow Secure Proportional-Share Sche dulers
Although most L4-family microkernels implement fixed-priority schedulers, it is interesting to
briefly discuss the information-flow properties of proportinal share schedulers .
3.3.10.1. Basic Version of the Lottery and Stride Scheduler
The basic version of the stride scheduler and the basic version of the lottery scheduler are both
non-interference secure.
For both schedulers, the decision to run a thread depends only on the tickets it holds. If the
selected thread blocks, the system idles for one unit of time. Th refore, variations of a threads
execution and blocking behavior have no influence on the point in time when other threads are
scheduled.
Non-interference of the basic versions of the stride scheduler and of the lottery scheduler
is preserved even if threads forward some of their tickets tolegitimate receivers. Assume a
threadτH (with dom(τH) = H) forwards some of its tickets to a threadsτX . If a threadτL
is not authorized to receive information fromτH it cannot distinguish whetherτH or whether
τX runs on one ofτH ’s tickets. To detect thatτX has received additional tickets,τL must be
authorized to receive messages directly or indirectly fromτX (i.e.,dom(τX) ≤ dom(τL) must
hold). However then,τL may legitimately receive information fromτH becausedom(τH) ≤
dom(τL) follows from the transitivity of≤ and from the requirement that tickets can only be
forwarded to legitimate receivers (i.e.,dom(τH) ≤ dom(τX) must hold).
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3.3.10.2. Compensate Tickets
Compensate tickets give rise to the following covert channel. While a threadτ blocks, other
threads receive a larger share of the processor because the lottery scheduler and the stride
scheduler repeat their selection procedure until they find aready thread. Whenτ resumes
its execution, it receives the compensation tickets. As a result, the share of other threads is
temporarily reduced. Because threads may sample the sharest ey receive, they can detect
variations in the execution and blocking behavior of other treads.
Countermeasure I(see Definition14 on page70), that is to treat possibly leaking threads as
if they were ready, also works for proportional-share schedulers. If the scheduler selects the
ticket of a possibly leaking threadτ , it runs a budget-consumer thread if the selected thread is
blocked or if it has stopped. Therefore, whenτ resumes its execution, it will not receive any
compensate ticket. However, because compensation ticketsaff ct the share of all threads, the
predicate which activates this countermeasure must hold for all threads that are not classified at
the lowest secrecy level⊥. In practice, a such constrained proportional-share scheduler achieves
no benefit over the respective basic version without compensat tickets.
3.3.10.3. Proportional-Share Workloads on the Budget-Enf orcing Fixed-Priority
Scheduler
In Section 3.1.3.5, we have seen a possible mapping of proportional-share workloads to
ReThMo. In this mapping, thread priority is a free parameter, whichwe can use to minimize the
time whenCountermeasure Ihas to be applied.
If the dominates relation≤ of a transitive information-flow policy is a total order of secr cy
levels (i.e.,∀l, l′.l ≤ l′ ∨ l′ ≤ l holds),Countermeasure Iis never enabled if we assign thread
priorities proportional to this order. That is, ifdom(τh) ≤ dom(τl) holds for two threadsτh and
τl, they are assigned priorities that fulfilprio(τh) > prio(τl).
If ≤ orders the set of secrecy levels only partially, we may have to applyCountermeasure Ifor
some threads. If≤ is a partial order, threads can exist for which neitherdom(τm) ≤ dom(τ ′m)
nor dom(τ ′m) ≤ dom(τm) holds. To prevent leakage due to direct and indirect influence, the
scheduler must activateCountermeasure Iat least for one of these threads: the one we choose
to run at a higher priority. To minimize the timeCountermeasure Iis active we therefore have
to select the thread with the smaller share to receive a higher priority.
Obviously, a setting oftbi,k = Π no longer works for threadsτi for which ptransitive(τi) holds:
Countermeasure Iwould only runτi and the budget-consumer thread but no thread that is lower
prioritized thanτi. Therefore, we have to limit the total budgets ofτi to the share it receives.
That is,tbi,k = propi Π for all jobsτi,k of τi.
3.4. A Machine-Checked Proof of Non-interference
In the following section, I describe the PVS-based non-interfer nce proof for the proposed
budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler in the variant described below. First, I briefly intro-
duce the formalization of the model and the key concepts of this proof. In Sections3.4.2ff, I
will then revisit the individual parts of this model and describe the proof in greater detail.
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The non-interference proof covers the following variant ofhe budget-enforcing fixed-priority
scheduler:
1. the scheduler implements bothCountermeasure IandCountermeasure II;
2. the information-flow policy is assumed to be transitive, that is,ptransitive , as introduced in
Definition11, is used to activateCountermeasure I, pdelay , as introduced in Definition15,
is used to activateCountermeasure II;
3. the idle thread serves as budget-consumer thread forCountermeasure I;
4. threads are not assumed to have distinct priorities. Equally prioritized threads are sched-
uled according to FIFO. That is, blocked threads maintain their position in the FIFO list;
5. non-preemptively executing threads cannot delay end-of-release preemptions;
6. Countermeasure Iis accounted to the treated-as-ready thread’s total budget, Counter-
measure IIis accounted to the highest-prioritized treated-as-readythread as described in
Section3.3.6;
7. all threads are assumed to be cleared to the release points, deadlines and total budgets of
higher or equally prioritized threads.
A corresponding proof for a simplified version of this schedul r and forpinfluence = pintransitive
is available in Völp et al. [VHH08a]. The PVS sources of the model and of the non-interference
proof are published [Völ10]. Both are based on an abstract model of the scheduler. To ex-
tend these results to an actual implementation, the implementation must be shown to refine
the abstract model in a confidentiality-preserving way [HPS01]. Extending the model to other
versions of the scheduler should be straightforward.
3.4.1. Overview
The machine-checked proof of non-interference is based on af rmal model of the above variant
of the proposed budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler. I have formalized the behavior of this
scheduler as a discrete-time state-transitioning system.Given an absolute point in timet and a
states as inputs, the state-transitioning system produces a new states′ that corresponds to the
absolute point in timet+1. Without loss of generality, assumet = 0 for the initial states0. Al-
though this state-transitioning system operates on discrete time values of typeTime : Type = nat ,
it can produce schedules at any desired accuracy. This is becaus I do not specify how much
time passes between two successive points in timeandt + 1, which means we can choose it
to be arbitrary small.
State In the formal model, the states keeps track of the scheduling parameters of theReThMo
task model (see Section3.1.2on page48). The type ofs is State . More precisely,State is a
function type, which relates each thread to a record containi g its non-constant scheduling
parameters. In the non-interference proof, some of these parameters are left arbitrary but fixed.
As a result, the proof holds for all possible settings of these parameters.
The formal model of the scheduler abstracts from certain imple entation details such as the
encoding of scheduling parameters in the thread control blocks, the various timers, which the
scheduler programs to regain control, and the ready queue, in which the scheduler keeps all
ready or treated-as-ready threads. The fundamental properties of these implementation details
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are however preserved. For example, instead of formalizingtimeouts, the model maintains a
number of down-counting clocks, which indicate when such a timeout would fire. The ready
list is replaced by a state-dependent predicate, which evaluates to true for the highest-prioritized
ready or treated-as-ready thread of the given state, respectively for the first thread in the FIFO
list if multiple threads share the same priority. For the proof f non-interference, only the total
budget is relevant. The formal model of the scheduler therefore abstracts from the execution
budget of a thread.
State Transformers State transformers encode the transitions that the scheduler represent-
ing state-transitioning system makes. A state transformeris a function of type:
State Transformer : Type = [[State, Time] →State]
The input parameters of a state transformer are the statend an absolute point in timet. To
reduce the complexity of both, the model and the proof, I haveformalized the scheduler as eight
separate state transformers. Each of these state transformers stands for a specific scheduling
decision. Together, they produce the result states′, which corresponds to the absolute point in
time t+ 1.
In a real-life system, scheduling decisions are triggered by timeouts, by explicit invocations
of the scheduler in system calls (e.g., in blocking IPC) or byexternal interrupts that trigger the
release or unblocking of a thread. In the formal model, I abstr ct from these specific invoca-
tions. Instead, the state transformers, which implement these scheduling decisions, are invoked
for every absolute point in timet. When invoked, they check whether a triggering event has
occurred and update the states accordingly. For example, to produce the state for timet + 1,
the state transformer that is responsible for releasing threads —release thread — checks the
release points of all threads to determine which threads arereleased at timet and modifies the
states accordingly.
The state transformerdispatch step combines all eight state transformers. The function
dispatch invokesdispatch step recursively to produce the result states′ for the absolute point
in time t+1 from a given initial states0. Quantification overt gives the desired universal result
for all points in time.
Non-interference Non-interference formalizes the complete absence of security-policy
violating information flows as the indistinguishability ofbservable outputs of a system. Pro-
vided that hardware covert channels have been addressed by other means, users can observe
the microkernel-based system only through the threads thatexecute on their behalves. Given
access to precise clocks, such a threadτ can report all those times when the scheduler runsτ or
when it runs other threads that are authorized to send toτ . That is, anl-classified observer may
learn about all points in time when a threadτ with dom(τ) ≤ l executes, blocks or stops. The
functionoutput(l,s) extracts this information from the states. It returnsnil whenever no such
thread runs and the state ofτ if dom(τ) ≤ l holds andτ is the highest-prioritized ready thread
(respectively the first such thread in the FIFO list).
A scheduler is non-interference secure if for alll-similar initial statess0 ands′0 and for all points
in time t it holds that:
output(l, dispatch(s0, t)) = output(l, dispatch(s
′
0, t)) (3.4)
Informally, two initial statess0 ands′0 are l-similar if they agree on the parameters of those
threads that anl-classified observer may see. Recall from Section3.3that threadsτ are cleared
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to the release points, deadlines and total budgets of higheror qually prioritized threads. See
also Point 5 in the above list at the beginning of this section. Therefore,l-similar states must
also agree on these parameters if anl-classified observer is cleared to such a threadτ .
The intuition behind Equation3.4is the following. Assume anl-classified observer is able to
see the points in time whenl-observable threadsτ execute preemptively or non-preemptively
(denoted byoutput ). If this observer cannot distinguish any two schedules, which origin from
two l-similar initial statess0 ands′0 and which are produced bydispatch, then higher or incom-
parably classified threads cannot influence the execution ofl-observable threads. Therefore,
higher or incomparably classified threads cannot leak information over scheduling-related tim-
ing channels. The scheduler is non-interference secure with regards to this observer.
Proof The non-interference proof of the budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler proceeds
in two stages: First, I show that the following property about pairs of states(st, s′t) is invariant
for the individual scheduler steps if they origin from twol-similar initial statess0 ands′0. The
main non-interference result then follows from the observation that pairs of states, which fulfill
this property produce the same outputs as seen by anl-classified observer.
Let st = dispatch(s0, t) and s′t = dispatch(s
′
0, t) for the pair of l-similar initial states
(s0, s
′
0) and for some point in timet. Then st+1 = dispatch step(s, t + 1) and s
′
t+1 =
dispatch step(s′, t + 1) is a new pair of states for the point in timet + 1. A propertyP about
pairs of states is invariant if it holds for(s0, s′0) and if we can conclude fromP (st, s
′
t) that
P (st+1, s
′
t+1) holds as well. The property of interest for the non-interference proof states:
1. thatl-observable threads agree on their dynamic scheduling parameters; and
2. that if a low-priority threadτ is legitimately observable by anl-classified observer, then
all higher and equally prioritized threads agree on the jobsthey execute, on the remaining
total budgets of these jobs, on the time that remains to the deadlin s of these jobs and on
the thread states of these jobs as far as activity is concerned. That is, either such a job is
active in both states of the pair or it is inactive in both states.
The following four sections discuss the above ingredients of he scheduling model and of the
non-interference proof in greater detail.
3.4.2. State
This section details the formalization of the state of the scheduler. I formalize the scheduling-
related state of a thread with three record types:
• Dynamic State ,
• Constant Secrecy Independent State , and
• Constant Secrecy Dependent State .
The typeState is an alias forState : Type = [Thread →Dynamic State] . A corresponding map-
ping fromThread to the last two records are passed as additional input parameters to the eight
state transformers.
The primary purpose of this split is to speed up the verification process by avoiding trivial
results that the state transformers do not modify parameters in the last two records.
Later in this chapter, I will introduce a relation on pairs ofscheduler states calledl-similar.
For now notice that twol-similar scheduler states agree on the parameters in the record type
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Constant Secrecy Independent State . The parameters in the record typeDynamic State and in
the record typeConstant Secrecy Dependent State may however differ for those threads that are
classified at a higher secrecy level thanl or are classified at a secrecy level that is incomparable
to l.
In the following, I describe the above three record types in greater detail. For better readabil-
ity I use the typesJob , Time andTimeSpan as aliases for the typenat .
3.4.2.1. Dynamic State
Dynamic State : Type = [#
job : Job,
remaining total budget : TimeSpan,
remaining deadline : TimeSpan,
remaining max delay : TimeSpan,
thread state : Thread State,
effective release : Time
#]
The parameterjob denotes the job of a threadτi that is currently active respectively that is wait-
ing for its release point ifτi is currently inactive. The parametersremaining total budget and
remaining deadline are two down-counting clocks fortb rem i,k and for the time until the dead-
line di,k passes. The parameterr maining max delay is a down-counting clock, which records
the time that remains before the thread has executed non-preem tively formax delay i. In
thread state , I store whether the thread isReady , Blocked , Stopped or Inactive . A thread is run-
ning if it is the highest prioritized ready thread and if it isat the head of the FIFO list. The latter
condition is captured byhigher effective priority (see Section3.4.3.1below). A thread executes
non-preemptively (i.e., it is delaying) if it is running andif remaining max delay is positive.
The typeThread State contains one state —Delayed — that is not one of the thread states
of theReThMotask model (see Section3.1.2). The state transformers transition a thread into
this state wheneverCountermeasure IIis active for this thread to avoid leakage due to non-
preemptive execution (see Definition14 on page70). The scheduler defers the points in time
when aDelayed thread resumes its execution after it is released and after it unblocks. The
down-counting clockeffective release denotes how long a threadτ has to remains in this state.
That is,effective release denotes the time that remains untiltpreemption + max delay low(τ)
(see Section3.3.5.2). The typeState is defined as:State : Type = [Thread →Dynamic State] .
3.4.2.2. Constant Secrecy-Independent State
Constant Secrecy Independent State : Type = [#
prio : Priority ,
label : Label,
release label : { l : Label | l ≤ label},
max delay : TimeSpan,
max delay low : TimeSpan
#]
The parametersprio , max delay , and max delay low store the respective parameters of the
ReThMotask model (see Section3.1.2). The parameterlabel is the secrecy level of the thread.
The release label of a thread is the secrecy level of its existence. Threads that are classi-
fied at a secrecy level, which dominates therel ase label of a thread are cleared to observe
the release points, deadlines and total budgets of this thread. The type ofrelease label is
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{l : Label | l ≤ label }. This dependent type ensures that all threads are cleared totheir own
existence.
The eight state transformers take as an implicit parameter the PVS constant:
cts : (well formed constant secrecy independent state)
The type ofcts is a predicate subtype of[Thread → Constant Secrecy Independent State] . The
predicate for this subtype is:
well formed constant secrecy independent state
(cts : [Thread → Constant Secrecy Independent State]) : bool =
(Forall ( t l , t h : Thread) :
cts( t l )‘ prio ≤ cts( t h )‘ prio =⇒ cts( t h )‘ release label ≤ cts( t l )‘ label ) ∧
(Forall ( t l , t h : Thread) :
cts( t l )‘ prio ≤ cts( t h )‘ prio =⇒ cts( t l )‘ max delay ≤cts(t h )‘ max delay low)
The first clause of this predicate formalizes the assumptionthat lower prioritized threads are
cleared to the release-points, deadlines and total budgetsof higher prioritized threads (Point 5
of the list on page79).
The second clause encodes the definition ofmax delay low(τ) (Definition13on page69). It
states thatmax delay low is an upper bound on the maximum time that lower prioritized threads
can contiguously execute non-preemptively.
3.4.2.3. Constant Secrecy-Dependent State
Constant Secrecy Dependent State : Type = [#
release point : [Job → Time],
deadline : [Job → posnat],
total budget : [Job → TimeSpan],
action : [Time → Action]
#]
The recordConstant Secrecy Dependent State stores those constant thread parameters that may
differ in l-similar scheduler states for higher thanl or incomparably classified threads. These
parameters are the release pointsri,k, the deadlinesdi,k and the total budgetstbi,k. Positive
deadlines ensure that a thread is released for at least one unit of time before it gets deactivated
by its deadline.
The parameteraction encodes the action trace of a threadτ . The type of action is
[Time → Action] whereAction is a type which contains all the actions a thread can perform.
These are:block , stop , run , andrun non preemptively .
For the traceaction , the type[Time → Action] is rather unconventional. However, because the
state transformers use the parameteraction only in a very restricted form, we can reap benefit
of this simple formalization. There are three situations inwhich the state transformers read the
action trace of a thread:
1. If the state transformers compute the state for the absolute point in timet, they read the
current action of the highest prioritized ready threadτh that is at the head of the FIFO list
of this priority. This action isaction(t) . It denotes whatτh will do in betweent andt+ 1;
2. If a blocked threadτb unblocks immediately att or if an inactive thread is released im-
mediately att, the current action ofτb is read to determine in which thread stateτb is
unblocked. Notice, a thread can be released in the blocked state (e.g., if its previous job
has stopped while awaiting the reception of a message); and
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3. If the scheduler deactivatesCountermeasure IIafter having delayed a threadτb, the cur-
rent action ofτ is read to determine the thread state ofτ .
The current actions of other threads are ignored.action(t) denotes the action a thread will do in
betweent andt + 1. Actions that last longer than one unit of time (i.e., longerthan this time)
are encoded by repeating the same action at successive points in time in the action trace. The
above formalization simplifies the verification in two ways:
1. Action traces are constant parameters. This relieves thestat transformers form maintain-
ing a list of remaining actions inDynamic State .
2. Because action traces are a parameter inConstant Secrecy Dependent State , l-similarity
can simply require these parameters to agree forl-observable threadsτ (i.e., for threads
for whichdom(τ) ≤ l holds).
The eight state transformers take the variablests as an input parameter. The type of this variable
is: [Thread → Constant Secrecy Dependent State] .
3.4.3. State Transformers
The following eight state transformers formalize the behavior of the scheduler.
% State transformers
stop delaying thread(sts )(s, time) : State = ...
deactivate thread(sts )(s, time) : State = ...
release thread(sts)(s, time) : State = ...
unlock blocked thread(sts)(s, time) : State = ...
block thread(sts )(s, time) : State = ...
resume delayed thread(sts)(s, time) : State = ...
delay preemptions(sts)(s, time) : State = ...
run(sts )(s, time) : State = ...
The input parameters of these state transformers are, time , andsts . The PVS constantcts is
a further implicit constant. The parameterime of typeTime denotes the absolute point in time
that corresponds to the states. Taken together, these eight state transformers produce a state
that corresponds totime + 1 . The parameters, sts , andcts contain the dynamic thread state,
the secrecy dependent state, and the secrecy independent stat of all threads.
The wrapperdispatch step combines all eight state transformer in the order listed above. That
is, the result ofstop delaying thread is passed as input todeactivate thread , and so on. The
wrapperdispatch takes an initial states0 and a timetimemax and invokesdispatch step recur-
sively for all points in time0 ≤ time ≤ timemax .
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The PVS encoding ofdispatch step and ofdispatch is:
dispatch step(sts )(s, time) : State =
run(sts )(
delay preemptions(sts)(
resume delayed thread(sts)(
block thread(sts )(
unblock blocked thread(sts)(
release thread(sts)(
deactivate thread(sts )(
stop delaying thread(sts )(s, time)
, time)
, time)
, time)
, time)
, time)
, time)
, time)
and:
dispatch(sts )(s, time max) : Recursive State =
If time max = 0 Then
dispatch step(sts )(s, 0)
Else
dispatch step(sts )(dispatch(sts )(s, time max − 1), time max)
Endif
Measure time max
Before I present the formalization of the above eight state transformers, let me introduce the
helper functions I used in their formalization.
3.4.3.1. Helper Functions
The formalization of the eight state transformers makes useof the following two helper func-
tions to identify the highest prioritized thread that execut s non-preemptively and that is at the
head of the FIFO list respectively the highest prioritized trea ed-as-ready thread that is also at
the head of this list. They are defined as:
highest prioritized non preemptively executing thread(sts )(s) : Thread =
singleton elt (λ ( t l : Thread) :
s( t l )‘ remaining max delay > 0 ∧
Forall ( t h : Thread) :
higher effective priority (sts )(s)( t l , t h ) =⇒ ¬ s(t h )‘ remaining max delay > 0)
and as:
highest prioritized treated as ready (sts )(s) : Thread =
singleton elt (λ ( t : Thread) :
treated as ready(s)( t ) ∧
Forall ( t h : Thread) : higher effective priority (sts )(s)( t , t h ) =⇒
¬ treated as ready(s)( t h ))
wheres is a state in which a non-preemptively executing thread respectively in which a treated-
as-ready thread must exists. The above two functions are undfine if no such thread exist9.
In the above two functions,singleton elt(S) returns the single element of the single-
ton set S 10. The relationhigher effective priority(sts)(s) establishes a strict total order
9In the PVS sources [Völ10], this requirement is expressed with a suitable predicate subtype ofState .
10A singleton set is a set, which contains precisely one element.
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between threads. A threadt h has a higher effective priority than a threadt l (i.e.,
higher effective priority(sts)(s)( t l , t h) holds) if either t h has a higher priority or if both
threads have the same priority andt h precedest l in the FIFO list. This is the case if the last
release point oft h was earlier than the last release point oft l . A clash of equally prioritized
simultaneously released threads is resolved with an arbitry secrecy independent total order
on threads (e.g., smaller values of a large random number that is stored in the thread control
block at thread creation time). Here we use the natural numbers t h and t l . The PVS encoding
of higher effective priority is straightforward
higher effective priority (sts )(s)( t l , t h : Thread) : bool =
% t h is higher prioritized than t l
(cts( t l )‘ prio < cts( t h )‘ prio ) ∨
% t h and t l share the same priority , t h is released earlier
(cts( t l )‘ prio = cts( t h )‘ prio ∧
sts( t h )‘ release point(s( t h )‘ job) < sts( t l )‘ release point(s( t l )‘ job )) ∨
% t h < t l to avoid clashes of equally prioritized simultaneously released threads
(cts( t l )‘ prio = cts( t h )‘ prio ∧
sts( t h )‘ release point(s( t h )‘ job) = sts( t l )‘ release point(s( t l )‘ job) ∧
t h < t l )
The predicate over threadstreated as ready returns true for all threads that are ready or that are
treated-as-ready. That is, it holds for a threadt either if t is ready or delayed, or if the counter-
measure predicateptransitive holds for this thread and it is either blocked or it has stopped. Recall,
ptransitive is the countermeasure predicate forCountermeasure I, which avoids leakage due to
direct and indirect influence (see Definition11on page64). The PVS code fortreated as ready
is:
treated as ready(s)( t : Thread) : bool =
is (Ready)(s, t) ∨ is (Delayed)(s, t ) ∨
p transitive ( t ) ∧ ( is (Blocked)(s, t ) ∨ is (Stopped)(s, t ))
In treated as ready (and elsewhere),is(Ready)(s, t) abbreviatess(t )‘ thread state = Ready . The
predicate,is delayed(sts)(s) : bool returns true if there exists a thread ins that executes non-
preemptively.
Two further helper functions are:apply action andunblock thread 11. The functionapply action
reads the current action from the action trace of a given thread t and updates the member
thread state of s(t ) accordingly. If t intends to run (preemptively or non-preemptively), it be-
comesReady . A thread that stops executing or that blocks becomesStopped and Blocked ,
respectively.
apply action(sts )(s, time, t ) : Dynamic State =
Cases sts(t)‘action(time) Of
run : s( t ) With [(thread state) := Ready],
run non preemptively : s( t ) With [(thread state) := Ready],
stop : s( t ) With [(thread state) := Stopped],
block : s( t ) With [(thread state) := Blocked]
EndCases
The second helper functionunblock thread wrapsapply action to update the dynamic state of
a thread that unblocks or that is released. In situations where t scheduler has to applyCoun-
termeasure IIto avoid timing channels due to non-preemptive execution,unblock thread sets
11Recall from Section2.7: the notionx With [(y) := z] stands for a partial update of the record variablex. The
membery of this record is set to the valuez.
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the thread toDelayed and initializes the clockeffective release to max delay low . The coun-
termeasure predicatepdelay holds in this case (see Definition15 on page70). In situations
where the currently running thread executes non-preemptively, the unblocked thread is also set
to Delayed however without settingeffective release . In this case, the thread resumes execut-
ing immediately when the lower prioritized thread stops executing non-preemptively. Threads
at a lower priority than the non-preemptively executing thread are not affected. The func-
tion unblock thread can therefore directly invokeapply action without first having to set the
thread state to Delayed . apply action is also invoked to unblock a thread immediately if no
thread executes non-preemptively and ifCountermeasure IIneeds not to be applied for the
unblocking thread. The PVS code ofunblock thread is:
unblock thread(sts)(s, time, t ) : Dynamic State =
If p delay(t )
Then
s( t ) With [(thread state) := Delayed,
( effective release ) := cts( t )‘ max delay low]
Else
If is delayed(sts )(s) ∧
cts(highest prioritized non preemptively executing thread(sts )(s ))‘ prio ≤ cts( t )‘ prio
Then
s( t ) With [(thread state) := Delayed]
Else
apply action(sts )(s, time, t )
Endif
Endif
3.4.3.2. Stop Delaying Thread
The first of the eight state transformers istop delaying thread . It resetss(dt )‘ remaining max delay
if the non-preemptively executing thread (dt) re-enables preemptions or if it has contiguously
executed non-preemptively formax delay i. The former is the case if its current action is not
run non preemptively . The latter is the case ifs(dt )‘ remaining max delay = 0 . The PVS code of
stop delaying thread is:
stop delaying thread(sts )(s, time) : State =
If is delayed(sts )(s)
Then
Let dt = highest prioritized non preemptively executing thread(sts )(s) In
If
(s(dt )‘ remaining max delay = 0 ∨
¬ run non preemptively(sts(dt )‘ action(time )))
Then
s With [(dt ‘ remaining max delay) := 0]
Else
s
Endif
Else
s
Endif
88
3.4. A MACHINE-CHECKED PROOF OF NON-INTERFERENCE
In those L4-family microkernels that implement thed layed preemption mechanism, the
scheduling decision, which is formalized instop delaying thread , is triggered in two situations:
• if the kernel-programmed timeout fires aftermax delay i; or
• if the thread voluntarily yields the CPU (e.g., after it has seen that a preemption is pend-
ing).
3.4.3.3. Deactivate Thread
The second state transformer isdeactivate thread . It sets a thread to inactive either if the total
budget of this thread is depleted or if its deadline has passed. B cause non-preemptive execu-
tion cannot delay the deactivation due to total budget depletion or due to a passing deadline,
deactivate thread needs not to consider non-preemptively executing threads.The PVS code of
this state transformer is:
deactivate thread(sts )(s, time) : State =
λ ( t : Thread) :
If s( t )‘ remaining total budget = 0 ∨
s( t )‘ remaining deadline = 0
Then
s( t ) With [(thread state) := Inactive ,
(job) := s( t )‘ job + 1,
(remaining deadline) := 0,
(remaining total budget) := 0]
Else
s( t )
Endif
In an implementation of the scheduler, the scheduling decision, which deactivate thread de-
scribes, is triggered by a timeout. The kernel programs thistimeout immediately before it re-
turns control to this thread. It sets the timeout to the minimum of the remaining total budget, of
the remaining execution budget, and of the time that remainsuntil the thread’s deadline passes.
If a thread is blocked or if it has stopped, the deactivation ca occur lazily (e.g., as described in
Footnote3 on page50).
3.4.3.4. Release Thread
The third state transformer —release thread — releases a thread whose next release point has
occurred. For that, it invokes the helper functionunblock thread and refills the remaining total
budget of this thread to the total budget of its released jobτi,k. Moreover, it resets the remaining
time until the deadline expires todi,k. The PVS code is:
release thread(sts)(s, time) : State =
λ ( t : Thread) :
If time = sts( t )‘ release point(s( t )‘ job) ∧
is ( Inactive )(s, t )
Then
unblock thread(sts)(s, time, t )
With [(remaining total budget) := sts( t )‘ total budget (s( t )‘ job ),
(remaining deadline) := sts( t )‘ deadline(s(t )‘ job )]
Else
s( t )
Endif
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In an implementation of the scheduler, a release is triggered by a timeout, by the occurrence of
a releasing event or by both.
3.4.3.5. Unblock Blocked Thread
A blocked thread resumes its execution if its next action is not block . In this case, the fourth state
transformer —unblock blocked thread — resumes this thread by invoking the helper function
unblock thread .
unblock blocked thread(sts)(s, time) : State =
λ ( t : Thread) :
If is (Blocked)(s, t ) ∧
¬ block(sts( t )‘ action(time))
Then
unblock thread(sts)(s, time, t )
Else
s( t )
Endif
In an implementation of the scheduler, unblocking is typically triggered by an unblocking event
such as the reception of a message or the occurrence of an interrupt.
3.4.3.6. Resume Delayed Thread
The fifth state transformer —resume delayed thread — resumes the normal execution of a
thread that is in the stateDelayed . The normal execution of a threadτ is resumed after
effective release reaches zero. This is the case either afterCountermeasure IIwas active for
max delay low(τ) (see Definition14 on page14) or after the currently running thread has
stopped executing non-preemptively.
resume delayed thread(sts)(s, time) : State =
If (Exists ( t : Thread) : treated as ready(s)( t )) ∧
¬ is delayed(sts )(s)
Then
Let t = highest prioritized treated as ready (sts )(s) In
If is (Delayed)(s, t ) ∧
s( t )‘ effective release = 0
Then
s With [( t ) := apply action(sts )(s, time, t )]
Else
s
Endif
Else
s
Endif
The pre-located trampoline code, which I have described in Section3.3.5.2on page73 is one
implementation of this state transformer.
3.4.3.7. Block Thread
The sixth state transformer —block thread — formalizes the state changes that occur when
the currently running thread blocks or when it stops. In these situations, it sets the thread’s
thread state to Blocked respectively toStopped .
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block thread(sts )(s, time) : State =
If Exists ( t : Thread) : treated as ready(s)( t )
Then
Let t = highest prioritized treated as ready (sts )(s) In
If is (Ready)(s, t) ∧
¬ s( t )‘ remaining max delay > 0
Then
If block(sts( t )‘ action(time)) Then
s With [( t ) := s( t ) With [(thread state) := Blocked]]
Else
If stop(sts( t )‘ action(time)) Then
s With [( t ) := s( t ) With [(thread state) := Stopped]]
Else
s
Endif
Endif
Else
s
Endif
Else
s
Endif
3.4.3.8. Delay Preemptions
The seventh state transformer —delay preemption — formalizes the effect of a non-preemptive
execution of the currently running thread. The PVS code fordelay preemption is:
delay preemptions(sts)(s, time) : State =
If Exists ( t : Thread) : treated as ready(s)( t )
Then
Let t = highest prioritized treated as ready (sts )(s) In
If is (Ready)(s, t) ∧
¬ s( t )‘ remaining max delay > 0 ∧
run non preemptively(sts(t )‘ action(time)) ∧
cts( t )‘ max delay > 0 ∧
cts( t )‘ max delay ≤s(t )‘ remaining total budget ∧
cts( t )‘ max delay ≤s(t )‘ remaining deadline
Then
s With [( t ) := s( t ) With [(remaining max delay) := cts(t )‘ max delay]]
Else
s
Endif
Else
s
Endif
The proof of non-interference also holds for systems where some threads cannot execute
non-preemptively. In the formal model of the scheduler, these threads are represented by
max delay i = 0. The checkmax delay i > 0 determines whether a thread is authorized to
execute non-preemptively. The check
cts( t )‘ max delay ≤s(t )‘ remaining total budget ∧
cts( t )‘ max delay ≤s(t )‘ remaining deadline
disallows non-preemptive execution during end-of-release events.
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In L4 kernels, the intent of an application thread to executenon-preemptively is only detected
at the occurrence of an interrupt. If the in-kernel interrupt handler notices that thedelayed
preemption mechanism is active, it returns control to the application program. In the formal
model of the scheduler, this situation is represented by action traces, which containrun until the
point in time when the kernel would notice the intent to execut non-preemptively and which
then containsrun non preemptively to express precisely this intent.
3.4.3.9. Run
The eighth state transformer —run — formalizes no scheduling decision.
run(sts )(s, time) : State =
λ ( t : Thread) :
s( t ) With [( effective release ) := If s( t )‘ effective release > 0 Then
s( t )‘ effective release − 1
Else s(t )‘ effective release Endif ,
(remaining max delay) := If s( t )‘ remaining max delay > 0 Then
s( t )‘ remaining max delay − 1
Else 0 Endif ,
(remaining deadline) := If s( t )‘ remaining deadline > 0 Then
s( t )‘ remaining deadline − 1
Else s(t )‘ remaining deadline Endif ,
(remaining total budget) := If highest prioritized treated as ready (sts )(s)( t ) ∧
s( t )‘ remaining total budget > 0 Then
s( t )‘ remaining total budget −1
Else s(t )‘ remaining total budget Endif ]
The sole purpose of the state transformerrun is to advance the various down-counting clocks,
which I use to emulate timeouts. The total budget of a thread is only consumed if this thread is
the highest prioritized treated-as-ready thread. Hence,remaining total budget is a thread-local
clock.
3.4.4. Invariants
To give some confidence on the correctness of this formalization, I have shown the following
six predicates over states to be invariants. The formalization of the first four predicates are
straightforward. I will therefore explain these predicates only informally. A predicateP is
invariant of the scheduler ifP (dispatch step(s0, 0)) holds for an initial states0 and if for all
points in timet, we can conclude fromP (dispatch(s0, t)) thatP (dispatch(s0, t + 1)) holds as
well.
• delay max
cts(t )‘ max delay is an upper bound ofs(t )‘ remaining max delay .
• delaying max delay
Only threadsτi with max delayi > 0 can execute non-preemptively.
• delay remaining
No thread exceeds its remaining total budget or its deadlinewhen it delays preemptions.
The proof thatdelay remaining is an invariant of the scheduler rests ondelay max .
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• λ (s) : singleton delaying(s) ∧delaying ready(s)
The first clause of this predicate states that at most one thread is delaying preemptions.
The second clause establishes that the delaying thread isReady and that no higher pri-
oritized thread is in this state. These threads are therefore eitherDelayed , Blocked ,
Stopped or Inactive . The proof that this predicate is an invariant of the schedulr rests
on delay remaining .
The predicates of the fifth and sixth invariant are:
delay effective release (sts )(s) : bool =
Forall ( t l , t h : Thread) :
s( t l )‘ remaining max delay > 0 ∧ s(t h)‘thread state = Delayed ∧
higher effective priority (sts )(s)( t l , t h ) ∧ p delay(t h )
=⇒
s( t l )‘ remaining max delay ≤s(t h)‘ effective release
and
p delay delayed(sts)(s) : bool =
Forall ( t l , t h ) :
s( t l )‘ remaining max delay > 0 ∧ higher effective priority (sts )(s)( t l , t h ) ∧
treated as ready(s)( t h ) ∧ p delay(t h )
=⇒
s( t h )‘ thread state = Delayed
The fifth predicate states that a delayed higher prioritizedthreadτ , which is subjected to
Countermeasure II(i.e., for whichpdelay(τ) holds) resumes execution only after a lower priori-
tized thread stopped executing non-preemptively. The proof that this predicate is a scheduler
invariant rests ondelay max anddelay remaining .
The sixth invariant establishes that whenever a thread executes non-preemptively, higher pri-
oritized treated-as-ready threads that the scheduler subjects toCountermeasure IIareDelayed .
The proof rests onsingleton delaying anddelay remaining .
The proofs of the above six invariants are straightforward by case distinction.
3.4.5. Non-interference
The non-interference property that I have shown for the proposed budget-enforcing fixed-
priority scheduler establishes the indistinguishabilityof outputs onl-similar initial scheduler
states. Its PVS code is the following.
main theorem : Theorem
Forall (s 0 : ( initial state ), t conf : Thread, time : Time,
sts1, sts2 : [Thread → Constant Secrecy Dependent State]) :
l similar ( t conf )(sts1, sts2) =⇒
output(cts( t conf )‘ label , sts1)(dispatch(sts1)(s 0, time)) =
output(cts( t conf )‘ label , sts2)(dispatch(sts2)(s 0, time))
In the definition of this theorem, the predicate subtype( initial state ) stands for the initial
dynamic state in which all threads are inactive awaiting therel ase point of their first job. The
observer clearancel is given as the domain of the threadt conf .
93
CHAPTER 3. AVOIDING EXTERNAL TIMING CHANNELS IN FIXED-PRIORITY
SCHEDULERS
Two constant secrecy-dependent statess s1 andsts2 arel-similar if the following relation con-
tains the pair(sts1, sts2) .
l similar ( t conf : Thread)(sts1, sts2) : bool =
(Forall ( t low : Thread) :
cts( t low )‘ release label ≤ cts( t conf )‘ label =⇒ same params(t low)(sts1, sts2)) ∧
(Forall ( t low : Thread) :
cts( t low )‘ label ≤ cts( t conf )‘ label =⇒
sts1( t low )‘ action = sts2(t low )‘ action)
In this relation,same params is defined as:
same params(t)(sts1, sts2) : bool =
(sts1( t )‘ release point = sts2( t )‘ release point) ∧
(sts1( t )‘ deadline = sts2( t )‘ deadline) ∧
(sts1( t )‘ total budget = sts2( t )‘ total budget )
If an l-classified observer (represented byt conf ) is cleared to observe the existence of a thread
τ , then two constant secrecy-dependent states arel-similar if they agree on the release points,
deadlines and total budgets of this thread. If thel-classified observer is also cleared to receive
information fromτ , the action trace of this thread must also be the same for the two states to be
l-similar.
The PVS code foroutput is:
output( l , sts )(s) : Output =
If is delayed(sts )(s) Then
Let dt = highest prioritized non preemptively executing thread(sts )(s) In
If cts(dt )‘ label ≤ l Then
delay out(dt)
Else
nil
Endif
Else
If (Exists ( t : Thread) : treated as ready(s)( t )) ∧
s( highest prioritized treated as ready (sts )(s ))‘ thread state 6= Delayed
Then
Let ht = highest prioritized treated as ready (sts )(s) In
If cts(ht )‘ label ≤ l Then
action(ht , s(ht )‘ thread state)
Else
nil
Endif
Else
nil
Endif
Endif
The functionoutput maps each state of the scheduler to an element of the type:
Output : Datatype
Begin
nil : nil ?
delay out ( t : Thread) : delay out?
action ( t : Thread, ts : Thread State) : action?
End Output
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It contains three variants:
• nil — the observer is not cleared to the currently running thread;
• delay out(t) — the currently running thread ist . It executes non-preemptively; and
• action(t, ts) — the highest prioritized treated-as-ready thread ist . Its thread state ists .
What do we know about a scheduler for which the main theorem holds? If such a scheduler
starts from twol-similar initial scheduler states, which are comprised ofs 0, cts andsts1 re-
spectively ofs 0, cts andsts2 , thenl-classified observers cannot distinguish the two schedules
from the behaviorl-observable threads have at a given point in time. Quantification over the
parametertime , which is passed todispatch , extends this statement to all points in time and
to arbitrarily long running systems. Thereby, initial scheduler states can differ in the actions
higher or incomparably classified threads will perform and othe existence of threads that run
at a lower priority than the lowest prioritizedl-observable thread.
The non-interference property of the main theorem, as states bove, is a simplified form of
non-influence: Definition6 on page24 introduced non-influence as
∀α, β ∈ A∗, s0, si, t0 ∈ S. ipurge(α, l) = ipurge(β, l) ∧ s0 sources(α,l)≈ t0 ∧ s0 α⇁ si
⇒ ∃tj ∈ S. t0 β⇁ tj ∧ output(l, si) = output(l, tj)
(3.5)
The encoding of actions as mappings of type[Time → Action] and the transitivity of≤ simplifies
the preconditionipurge(l, α) = ipurge(l, β) to sts1(t )‘ action = sts2(t )‘ action for all lower-than-
l classified threadst .
s
sources(α,l)≈ t is simplified to the first condition ofl similar (t conf)(sts1, sts2) . For the
dynamic part of the states
sources(α,l)≈ t holds trivially because in the above lemma, dis-
patch starts from the same initial state. Also, becausedi patch(s 0, time) is deterministic
and because it terminates aftertime steps, the quantification oversi and the existence oftj
can simply be expressed as the result ofdispatch(sts1)(s 0, time) respectively as the result of
dispatch(sts2)(s 0, time) . The functionoutput of Definition 6 is instantiated with the above
output function.
3.4.6. Proof of Non-interference
The non-interference proof of the proposed budget-enforcing scheduler proceeds in two steps:
First, it must be shown that the property on pairs of states —same high state — is invariant for
the given scheduler. Then, the main theorem follows immediat ly from the following lemma.
same high state same output : Lemma
Forall (s1 : (scheduler invariants(sts1 )), s2 : (scheduler invariants(sts2 ))) :
l similar ( t conf )(sts1, sts2) ∧ same high state(t conf)(s1, s2)
=⇒
output(cts( t conf )‘ label , sts1)(s1) = output(cts( t conf )‘ label , sts2)(s2)
It says that two states, which are related bysame high state , yield identical outputs as seen by
anl-classified observer.
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The predicatesame high state is defined as follows.
same high state(t conf)(s1, s2 : State) : bool =
(Forall ( t ) : cts( t )‘ label ≤ cts( t conf )‘ label =⇒ s1(t ) = s2(t )) ∧
(Forall ( t l , t h ) :
cts( t l )‘ label ≤ cts( t conf )‘ label ∧
cts( t l )‘ prio ≤ cts( t h )‘ prio =⇒
(s1(t h )‘ job = s2(t h )‘ job ∧
s1(t h )‘ remaining total budget = s2(t h )‘ remaining total budget ∧
s1(t h )‘ remaining deadline = s2(t h )‘ remaining deadline ∧
(s1(t h )‘ thread state = Inactive ) = (s2(t h )‘ thread state = Inactive )))
The first clause of this predicate says that if anl-classified observer (represented byt conf ) is
cleared to receive information about a threadt , then the dynamic state of this thread is the same
in both states1 ands2 of the related pair. Because the property is an invariant of the scheduler,
it follows for l-similar initial states that the behavior ofl-observable threads cannot be altered
by higher or incomparably classified threads.
The second clause of this predicate says that for threads, which have the same or a higher
priority than anl-observable thread, the following holds: they execute the same jobs in the two
states of the pair; they have the same amount of total budget left to execute or to block in the
subsequent schedule that follows the two state of the pair; their deadlines expire after the same
amount of time; and the jobs that these threads execute are either active in both states or they
are inactive in both states. That is, in the two schedules, higher prioritized threads are either
simultaneously active or they are simultaneously inactive. If an l-observable lower or equally
prioritized thread is not cleared to receive information from these threads, we can conclude
from this second clause thatCountermeasure Iis applied for such a thread at the same time in
both of these schedules.
The proof ofsame high state same output is by distinction of the cases that stem from the
if-statements in the functionoutput . The cases where the functionutput evaluates tonil for
both states1 = dispatch(sts1)(s 0, time) ands2 = dispatch(sts1)(s 0, time) hold trivially.
Of the remaining four cases, the following two are straightforward:
Case 1: in both states,s1 ands2, there exists a highest prioritized thread that executes non-
preemptively and thel-classified observer is cleared to see these threads; and
Case 2: a highest prioritized treated-as-ready thread exists in both s1 and s2 and thel-
classified observer is authorized to see these threads.
The remaining two cases are more challenging:
Case 3: the conditionis delayed holds in precisely one of the two states,s1 ands2, and thel-
classified observer is not cleared to see the highest prioritized non-preemptively executing
thread; and
Case 4: a highest prioritized non-preemptively executing thread respectively a highest prior-
itized treated-as-ready thread exists in both,s1 and s2, but thel-classified observer is
cleared only to one of these threads.
The proofs of Case 1 and Case 2 proceed by instantiating the parametert in the precondi-
tion cts(t )‘ label ≤cts(t conf)‘ label of the first clause ofsame high state(t conf)(s1, s2) with the
highest prioritized non-preemptively executing thread (Case 1) respectively with the highest
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prioritized treated-as-ready thread (Case 2) of one of these states. Becausects(t conf)‘ label = l ,
cts(t )‘ label ≤cts(t conf)‘ label holds for both of these threads and from the first clause of
same high state(t conf)(s1, s2) it follows that s1(t) = s2(t) . However then, the singleton de-
laying thread ins1 is the same thread as the singleton delaying thread ins2 and the singleton
highest prioritized treated-as-ready thread ins1 is the singleton highest prioritized treated-as-
ready thread ins2. But this means, thel-observable outputs are the same. In the sources, two
auxiliary lemmas establish this identity of the above threads:
• visible high priority runnable thread same , and
• visible high priority delaying thread same .
For the proof of Case 3, let us assume thatis delayed holds ins1 but not ins2. The proof where
is delayed holds in s2 is symmetric. Because thel-classified observer is not cleared to see
the highest prioritized non-preemptively executing thread that exists ins1, output(sts1)(s1) = nil
holds. The functionoutput(sts2)(s2) can match this result only in the following two situations:
• if there is no highest prioritized treated-as-ready threadth t is notDelayed , or
• if the l-classified observer is not cleared to see such a thread.
So let us assume that there exists such a thread ins2, which the l-classified observer is
cleared to see. Our goal is now to find a contradiction. Because of the above assump-
tion, the precondition of the first clause ofsame high state(t conf)(s1, s2) is fulfilled. From
visible high priority runnable thread same we know that in this case, the highest prioritized
treated-as-ready thread ins2 is also the highest prioritized treated-as-ready thread ins1. Let
τh be this thread. We have to distinguish two cases:
Case 3a: The singleton non-preemptively executing threadτd is authorized to send to the high-
est prioritized treated-as-ready threadτh.
In this case, the transitivity of≤ immediately reveals thatτd is also authorized to send to
thel-classified observer, which contradicts the second preconditi of Case 3.
Case 3b: No such communication is authorized.
In this case, the countermeasure predicatepdelay(τh) does not hold for the highest prior-
itized treated-as-ready threadτh because otherwise the invariantp delay delayed would
require this thread to beDelayed .
However, the non-preemptively executing threadτd has the same or a lower priority than
τh andmax delay > 0 holds forτd. But then,pdelay (τh) must hold, which contradicts the
assumption thatτh is notDelayed .
Case 4 contradicts the results ofvisible high priority delaying thread same respectively of
visible high priority runnable thread same . If the l-classified observer is cleared to see such
a thread in one of the two statess1 or s2, this thread is the single highest prioritized non-
preemptively executing respectively the single highest prioritized treated-as-ready thread in the
respective other state. As a consequence, thel-classified observer is cleared to see this thread.
This concludes the proof ofsame high state same output .
The proofs of the lemmas, which establish thatsame high state is a scheduler invariant for
the eight state transformers, are straightforward. The accompanying PVS sources contain these
proofs.
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3.4.7. Temporal Isolation of Non-interfering Threads
From the above proof, we can immediately conclude that the proposed budget-enforcing fixed-
priority scheduler isolates threads in a temporal manner from certain other threads: Assume
dom(τ)  dom(τ ′) holds for two threadsτ andτ ′ and(L,≤, dom) is a transitive information-
flow policy. Then,τ can neither influence the points in time whenτ ′ runs nor the points in time
when a threadτ ′′ runs that can legitimately send messages toτ ′. The subsystem, which consists
of τ ′ and of all its legitimate sendersτ ′′, is temporally isolated fromτ .
Commercial time-partitioning systems (such as LynxOS [Lyn]) often implement a hierarchi-
cal fixed-priority scheduler to schedule the threads of a single partition once the underlying
scheduler selects this partition. These systems can only temporally isolate threads by running
them in different partitions. The proposed budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler directly
isolates threads in a temporal manner without having to revert to hierarchical scheduling.
3.5. Real-Time Guarantees
In real-time systems, it is crucial that hard real-time threads complete their jobs before their
deadlines. Admission tests give this guarantee. Probably the two most popular admission tests
are thetime-demand analysisby Lehoczky et al. [LSD89] and the Liu and Layland criterion
[LL73] for the rate-monotonic scheduling (RMS) algorithm.
In the following, we shall see how an adjustment of the per thread blocking term allows us to
reuse a large class of existing admission tests for the proposed budget-enforcing fixed-priority
scheduler. We shall further see how the above two admission tests perform in comparison to
their adjusted versions and how the latter perform in comparison to admission tests for time-
partitioning schedulers.
3.5.1. Time-Demand Analysis and Liu-Layland Criterion
Time demand analysis delivers sufficient and necessary conditi s to test whether a given set of
threads is schedulable, that is, whether all threads in thisset meet their deadlines. If the relative
deadlines of all jobsτi,k are at most as large as the period of the thread (i.e.,di,j ≤ Πi), the time
demand to schedule a threadτi in the interval[t0, t0+ t] along with higher prioritized threads12
is
wi(t) = ebi +
i−1
∑
k=1
⌈
t
Πk
⌉
ebk, for 0 < t ≤ Πi (3.6)
Here,ebi is the worst case timeτi can execute (i.e., its execution budget), the timet0 is a critical
instant forτi. That is,t0 is the release point a job ofτi where the response time of this job will
be at its maximum. If a job is schedulable at a critical instant, it remains schedulable for all
other combinations of release times (see e.g., Liu [00, Chapter 6.5.1] for more details on
critical instant analyses).
A job of τi meets its deadline if at some timet before its deadline, the supply of processor
time t is equal to or greater than the time demandwi(t).
The Liu Layland criterion is a sufficient condition for the schedulability of a set of strictly
periodic threads that are scheduled by the rate-monotonic scheduling algorithm. Recall, the
12In the following, thread indices are assigned inverse proportional to thread priorities. That is, threads with
smaller indices are higher prioritized:i < j ⇒ prio(τi) ≥ prio(τj).
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RMS algorithm prioritizes threads inverse proportionallyto their period lengths (i.e.,Πi ≤
Πj ⇒ prio(τi) > prio(τj)). A set ofn strictly periodic threads is schedulable if
n
∑
i=1
ebi
Πi
≤ n · (2 1n − 1) (3.7)
A limitation of the above two schedulability tests is the implicit assumption that threads never
block. To consider the blocking of threads, extended versions of these admission tests include
a per thread blocking termbbi. This blocking term is an upper bound of the time thatτi blocks.
Sha et al. [SRL90] show that blocked threads remain schedulable with RMS if Equation3.8
holds.
∀k ∈ {1, ...n}.
k
∑
i=1
(
ebi
Πi
+
bbk
Πk
)
≤ k · (2 1k − 1) (3.8)
Equation3.9shows an analogous adjustment for time demands.
wi(t) = ebi + bbi +
i−1
∑
k=1
⌈
t
Πk
⌉
ebk, for 0 < t ≤ Πi (3.9)
If the effect ofCountermeasure I(see Definition10 on page61) on other threads can be ex-
pressed as a blocking term, admission tests such as the two above could immediately be reused
to decide whether a set of threads is schedulable with the proposed budget-enforcing fixed-
priority scheduler. Theprohibition timesbbpr is such a blocking term.
3.5.2. Prohibition Times
In situations where the scheduler activatesCountermeasure Ito avoid leakage due to direct and
indirect influences, only budget-consumer threads can run while the highest prioritized treated-
as-ready thread blocks or stops.
Let bbh be the maximum time thatτh can block without consuming its execution budget (i.e.
bbh = tbh − ebh). In the worst case, the scheduler switches to a budget consumer whenever a
higher prioritized thread blocks for whichptransitive(τh) holds. A lower prioritized threadτl is
prohibited from running. I call this timebbprl theprohibition timeof a threadτl. It holds:
Proposition 1. Prohibition Times.
For a threadτl of the set of threadsT , the prohibition timebb
pr
l is:
bbprl =
∑
τh∈TH+
⌈
Πl
Πh
⌉
.bbh with TH+ := {τ ∈ Thigh(τl) | ptransitive(τ)}
Obviously, if the idle thread is the budget consumer or if no other higher classified, ready
budget consumer could be found, prohibiting threads from running increases the idle time of
the system. I quantify the worst-case increase of idle time by the prohibition time of the lowest
prioritized threadbbpridle .
To reuse existing admission tests for the proposed scheduler, the prohibition time must be con-
sidered as an additional blocking term. In addition, the influence of threadsτ with ptransitive(τ)
must be removed form the original blocking term of a threadτi. For the time-demand analysis,
this results in:
wi(t) = ebi + bb
′
i + bb
pr
i +
i−1
∑
k=1
⌈
t
Πk
⌉
ebk, for 0 < t ≤ Πi (3.10)
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Figure 3.11.: Blocking due to self suspension. The threadτl misses its deadline because the
first job of τh suspends itself. The shaded part ofτl cannot completed beforeτl’s
deadline.
wherebb′i is the blocking term due to those threads for whichptransitive(τ) does not hold. The
corresponding result for the Liu Layland criterion is:
∀k ∈ {1, ...n}.
k
∑
i=1
(
ebi
Πi
+
bb′k + bb
pr
k
Πk
)
≤ k · (2 1k − 1) (3.11)
The contribution of a threadτh to the prohibition time is larger than its contribution to the
blocking term if the scheduler would not applyCountermeasure Iduring those times whenτh
blocks or stops. In some situations, a modified admission test mu t therefore reject a thread set,
which an admission test for an unmodified scheduler could accept. The achievable utilization
of the proposed budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduleris lower. In the worst case, the differ-
ence between the achievable utilization of an unmodified scheduler (Uorig ) and of the proposed
scheduler is as large as the prohibition time of the lowest prioritized threads:
Uorig − U =
bbpridle
Πidle
(3.12)
Because preemptions are rare and becausemax delay low(τ) is small compared to the time a
threadτ runs, the utilization loss due toCountermeasure IIis negligible.
To see how the modified scheduler affects well-behaving real-time threads it is interesting to
compare the different causes of blocking in admission testswith and without prohibition times.
It is also interesting to relate these results to a time-partitioning scheduler.
3.5.3. Blocking due to Self Suspension
Self suspension is one reason for blocking. A thread suspends itself when it voluntarily releases
the CPU to sleep for some time or when it invokes a blocking system call to wait for the arrival
of a message or for the completion of asynchronous I/O.
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Let xi be an upper bound on the time the threadτi suspends itself. According to Liu [Liu00,
Chapter 6.8.2 pg. 164ff], the blocking time due to self suspen ionbbssl is
bbssl = xl +
∑
τh∈Thigh (τl)
min(ebh, xh) (3.13)
Figure3.11illustrates this formula in an example. A lower prioritizedthreadτl is ready when-
ever a higher prioritized threadτh suspends itself. It may therefore run any time duringτh’s
second period whenτh’s second job suspends itself. Only the execution budgetebh,2 of this job
adds to the time demand ofτl.
The blocking term ofτl origins from the self suspension ofτh’s first job. If τh,0 suspends
itself for a timexh, the critical instant ofτl, compared to its critical instant without such a self
suspension, is put off byxh. As a result,τl’s period overlaps the period ofτh’s third job by
xh. Hence,ebh,1 andebh,2 add to the time demand ofτl and, in addition, also the part ofebh,3
that overlaps with the period ofτh,3. This part is at most as large asxh because afterxh, τl’s
deadline endsτl’s period.
Countermeasure Iprevents lower prioritized threads from running whenever ahigher prioritized
threadτh suspends itself for whichptransitive(τh) holds. If blocking due to self suspension is the
only reason for blocking, the blocking term for an admissiontest must be adjusted as follows.
bbsscm,l = xl +
∑
τh∈TH−
min(ebh, xh) +
∑
τh∈TH+
⌈
Πl
Πh
⌉
xh (3.14)
In Equation3.14, and elsewhere,bbxcm stands for the blocking termbb
x, which has been adjusted
to considerCountermeasure I. It holds thatTH− := {τ ∈ Thigh(τl) | ¬ptransitive(τ)}. TH+ is
defined as in Proposition1. The last addend of this equation is the prohibition timebbprl .
Clearly, an admission test for an unmodified scheduler accepts more thread sets than a corre-
sponding admission test for the proposed modified scheduler. The term
⌈
Πl
Πh
⌉
xh is typically
much larger thanmin(ebh, xh). This is in particular the case if, like in RMS, the periods of
lower prioritized threads are larger than the periods of higher prioritized threads.
Compared to a time-partitioning scheduler, an admission test for the proposed budget-enforcing
fixed-priority scheduler accepts more thread sets because prohibition times must be considered
only for threadsτ for which ptransitive(τ) holds. A lower prioritized thread may well run dur-
ing the time a higher prioritized thread suspends itself as long as the influence of this higher
prioritized thread does not lead to information leakage.
A realistic scenario, in which this situation occurs, is a rel-time video player for constant
bit-rate videos. In this scenario, a real-time device driver reads an encrypted video that the
player decrypts and displays. Assume both have the same periods and deadlines and the driver
is assigned a higher priority. Then, because the driver has no plain-text access to confidential
data, it is safe to classify the driver at a lower secrecy level than the player. But then, the driver
runs unconstrained and the player meets its deadline as longasebdriver + ebplayer ≤ dplayer .
To avoid leakage from the decoder to the driver, a time-partitioning system must assign the
driver to a different partition of lengthebdriver + xdriver . But in this situation,xdriver additional
time is required before the player’s deadlinedplayer passes.
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3.5.4. Blocking due to Non-preemptive Execution
The blocking time due to non-preemptive executionbbnph depends on the number of timeskh
that a higher prioritized threadτh suspends itself. Lower prioritized threads can defer when
τh resumes after any such self suspension bymax delay low(τh). Moreover, lower prioritized
threads can delay the resumption ofτh after its release by this value. Hence, it holds for the
blocking termbbnph of τh that (Liu [Liu00, Chapter 6.8.1]):
bb
np
h = (kh + 1) max delay low(τh) (3.15)
On the other hand, if the proposed budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler appliesCounter-
measure Ifor τh, lower prioritized threads can defer only the release ofτh. Hence, the blocking
term for threads run by the proposed scheduler is
bb
np
cm,h =
{
max delay low(τh) if ptransitive(τh)
(kh + 1) max delay low(τh) otherwise
(3.16)
In theory, ifkh max delay low(τh) is large compared to the maximum self-suspension timexh,
admission tests for the proposed non-interference-securesch duler could accept more thread
sets than corresponding tests for unmodified schedulers. Inpractice however, non-preemptive
critical sections are short and this effect can not be seen. Still, as far as blocking due to non-
preemptive execution is concerned, admission tests for theproposed modified scheduler per-
form no worse than those for unmodified schedulers.
3.6. Practical Matters
In Section3.3, I have made several assumptions, which limit the applicability of the proposed
scheduler. In the following, I will partially lift these assumptions and allow threads
• to have precedence constraints (Section3.6.1),
• to be created dynamically (Section3.6.2),
• to hierarchically schedule other threads (Section3.6.3),
• to donate time to other threads (Section3.6.4), and
• to acquire resources (Section3.7).
3.6.1. Precedence Constraints
In real-life systems, jobs typically depend on results thatare produced by other jobs. As a
consequence, they cannot sensibly be released before such aresult is available.
Precedence constraints are one way to formally capture thisdependency. Precedence con-
straints are typically described as a directed graph: theprecedence graph. The vertices of
this graph are the jobs. The edges denote the dependencies between jobs. That is, an edge
from the jobτh,0 to the jobτl,0 denotes thatτl,0 depends on a result produced byτh,0. In this
situation,τh,0 is called the predecessor ofτl,0. For the following discussion, I assume that the
precedence graph is known at admission time and that lower prioritized threads are cleared to
the precedence constraints of higher or equally prioritized threads.
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There are two principle approaches to schedule threads withprecedence constraints:
1. by setting the release point of a job to the point in time when t results of all predecessors
are available; and
2. by setting the release point of a job to its effective release time.
The intuition behindeffective release timesi that a job is released no earlier than its predeces-
sors. On uniprocessor systems, a scheduler, which releasesjobs at effective release times, can
in principle forget about precedence constraints [GJ77].
3.6.1.1. Result Dependent Release Points
The unspecified nature of release points inReThMosuggests a setting of release points to the
points in time when predecessor results are available. However, it is easy to see that such
a setting allows predecessors to leak information by manipulating the release points of their
successors: Assumeτl,0 is a predecessor ofτh,0. Then,τl,0 can encode secret information in the
time when it produces the result forτh,0. Lower thanτh prioritized threadsτm can learn about
this secret by observing the release ofτh,0.
Countermeasure I(see Definition10on page61) cannot eliminate this channel ifτh is higher
prioritized thanτl. The release ofτh is not affected by this countermeasure.
3.6.1.2. Effective Release Times
In [Liu00, Chapter 4.5], Liu discusses two algorithms to calculate the effective release times of
a thread. The basic algorithm13 sets the effective release time of a jobτi,j
1. to its release point, ifτi,j has no predecessors; and otherwise,
2. to the maximum effective release times ofτi,j ’s predecessors.
Worst-case response times are not considered in this basic algorithm. In the more accurate
algorithm, the effective release time of a jobτi,j with predecessors is set to the maximum of the
effective release times of its predecessors plus the respective worst-case response times of these
predecessors.
In both versions, the release points of jobs cannot be influenced by their predecessors. How-
ever, the basic algorithm requires an adjustment of total budgets to accommodate for the block-
ing of predecessors. Assumeτh is a predecessor ofτl. Wheneverτh blocks before having
produced the desired result forτl, τl blocks also because it cannot proceed without this result.
This increases the time thatτl blocks by the time thatτh can block. Hence,τl’s total budget
must be increased by the worst-case blocking time ofτh.
3.6.2. Dynamic Thread Creation
In Section3.3, I assumed that all threads are cleared to know the release points and hence the
existence of higher or equally prioritized threads. However in practice, threads are often created
dynamically and scheduled as aperiodic or sporadic threads.
As long as the creation of a thread is a legitimately observable event for lower or equally
prioritized threads, we can reap benefit ofReThMo’s arbitrary but fixed release points and action
13As mentioned in Liu [Liu00, Chapter 4.5], the basic algorithm may have to swap jobs in the sc edule to ensure
their correct execution order.
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traces to create threads dynamically. To do so, a dynamically reated thread is inserted right
from the beginning into the set of threadsT . The first release point of this thread is set to
the point in time of its creation. For the more general case, when threads are also created
in a secret context, there are two principle approaches to schedule threads with the proposed
budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler without revealing their existence:
1. The first is to schedule newly created threads hierarchically on top of threads that already
exist in the schedule (see Section3.6.3below).
2. The second is to split the budgets of such an existing thread.
Assume a lower prioritized threadτl is not authorized to receive information from a threadτh.
Then, if τh creates a threadτn such thatτh andτn together consume at most the time thatτh
could have consumed alone,τl cannot distinguish whetherτh did run or block or whetherτn
performed these actions.
A split of τh’s total budgets fulfills the above condition ifτn shares the priority and all release
points and deadlines withτh. Becauseτh may encode secrets in the portion of its total budget
that it transfers toτn, we have to require thatdom(τh) ≤ dom(τn) holds for newly created
threads. Also, thread creation must not allow the creator toelevate its secrecy level. Unless the
creator can be trusted not to leak information in the transferred budget, we can therefore only
allow the creation of equally classified threads (i.e.,dom(τh) = dom(τn) must hold).
3.6.3. Hierarchical Scheduling of Differently Classified T hreads
Hierarchical CPU scheduling is an elegant way to support applications with diverse schedul-
ing requirements in one system. The principle idea is to allow placeholder threads to act as
schedulers. That is, whenever an underlying scheduler select the placeholder, this placeholder
decides which of its nested threads to run. The underlying scheduling policy and the nested
scheduling policy of the placeholder can thereby differ.
In this work, I use placeholder threads merely as a vehicle toexplain hierarchical schedulers.
Implementations are free to implement the nested scheduling policy in a real thread that for-
wards its received time [FS96] or to merge the schedulers in one kernel implementation. Regehr
et al. [RS01] use the latter approach for HLS. In the context of HLS, Regehr and Stankovic also
discuss how the real-time guarantees of multimedia applications are preserved by hierarchical
scheduling policies. Let us here focus our attention on the following two points:
• How does the proposed budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler preserve non-
interference-properties of nested schedulers, and
• How does it avoid unauthorized information-flows between the threads it schedules and
the nested threads that a placeholder thread schedules.
3.6.3.1. Avoiding Leakage due to Direct and Indirect Influen ce
AssumeTnested is the set of threads that a placeholder threadτp schedules.Countermeasure
I of the budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler preventshigher prioritized threadsτh from
directly or indirectly influencing the placeholder thread if dom(τh)  dom(τp). Therefore, if
we setdom(τp) to be the greatest lower bound of the secrecy levels of the threads inTnested it
holds thatdom(τp) ≤ dom(τn) for all τn ∈ Tnested . Only threadsτ with dom(τ) ≤ dom(τp)
affect when the threads in the setTnested are scheduled but these threads are already authorized to
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send to all threads in this set becausedom(τ) ≤ dom(τp)∧ dom(τp) ≤ dom(τn) ⇒ dom(τ) ≤
dom(τn).
To avoid leakage from a nested threadτn to threads of the underlying scheduler, we have to
treat the placeholderτp differently. The threadτn can directly influence lower prioritized threads
of the budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler only ifptransitive(τp) evaluates to false. Other-
wise, whenever all threads inTnested block or when they have stopped, the proposed scheduler
switches to the budget consumer to avoid leakages from the nest d threads thatτp schedules.
For the predicateptransitive(τp) to evaluate to false,dom(τp) ≤ dom(τl) must hold for all threads
τl that are lower prioritized thanτp. Settingdom(τp) to the least upper bound of the secrecy
levels of threads inTnested authorizes direct and indirect influences only if all threads τn are
cleared to send to these lower prioritized threadsτl. From the least upper bound we know that
dom(τn) ≤ dom(τp). Hence,dom(τn) ≤ dom(τl) holds because of the transitivity of≤ and
dom(τp) ≤ dom(τl).
However,dom(τp) is the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound of the secr cy levels
of the threads inTnested only if all these threads are equally classified. To support differently
classified threads inTnested , placeholder threads need two secrecy levels:
• dom⊓(τp), to replacedom(τp) in ptransitive(τh) in order to determine whetherCounter-
measure Imust be applied for a threadτh in the underlying schedule; and
• dom⊔(τp), to replacedom(τp) in ptransitive(τh) in order to determine whetherCounter-
measure Imust be applied for the placeholder threadτp itself.
To avoid leakage due to direct and indirect influences,dom⊓(τp) is set to the greatest lower
bound of the secrecy levels of the threads inTnested ; dom⊔(τp) is set to the least upper bound of
these secrecy levels.
3.6.3.2. Avoiding Leakage due to Non-Preemptive Execution
Countermeasure IIavoids information leakage due to non-preemptive execution. The counter-
measure predicatepdelay(τh) prevents a threadτl from delayingτh’s resumption ifdom(τl) 
dom(τh).
We must therefore usedom⊔(τp) to determine whetherCountermeasure IImust be applied
for threadsτh in the underlying schedule.dom⊓(τp) must be used to determine whetherCoun-
termeasure IImust be applied forτp itself.
Because lower prioritized threads are cleared to know the releas points, deadlines and total
budgets of a placeholder thread, the placeholder hides the existence of dynamically created,
aperiodic or sporadic threads as long as the budget-enforcig fixed-priority scheduler subjects
the placeholder to both countermeasures.
3.6.4. Timeslice Donation
Hands-off scheduling [BALL90] is a technique to avoid potentially costly scheduling decisions
in the performance critical IPC path. A synchronous IPC calloperation (i.e., an atomic send
and receive operation) blocks the caller once the callee hasreceived the message. In situations
where a higher prioritized thread calls a lower prioritizedcallee, the scheduler would have to
check for intermediate prioritized threads. To avoid this check, hands-off scheduling allows the
caller to donate the remainder of its current timeslice to the callee. Hence, the callee runs on
the caller’s time and priority until the next scheduling-relat d event occurs.
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Timeslice donation in L4-Fiasco [Ste04] extends hands-off scheduling by allowing callers to
provide their time until the callee replies to their request. Wolter et al. [SWH05] distinguish
two forms of timeslice donation:
• upward donation, and
• downward donation.
Upward donation accounts the time the donatee runs to the donator’s budget. The donatee runs
on its own priority. Downward donation transfers both the time and the priority of the donator
to the donatee. Hands-off scheduling is a form of downward donati n, which lasts until the
respective next scheduling event.
Because donatees can call other threads and because donation tr nsfers also time when the
callee is not yet ready, donators line up in a tree. The original owners of the time form the
leaves of this tree, the thread that has received the donatedtim is located at the root of this
tree. The lower part of Figure3.14on page112shows two such donation trees: e.g., in the left
oneτ4 andτ5 donate toτR,3. While τR,3 handles a request ofτ5, it donates toτR,2 who is also
receiving time fromτ2. The requests fromτ2 and fromτ4 are currently blocked (indicated by
the bar at the end of the donation arrow).
Wolter et al. [SWH05] suggest to use upward donation whenever the priority of thedonatee
is higher than the current priority of the donator. The current priority of the donator is the max-
imum of the priorities received through downward donation and of the donator’s own priority.
Whenever the priority of the donatee is lower than the current priority of the donator, Wolter
suggests to use downward donation. This way, both the stack-b sed ceiling resource access
protocol and the priority inheritance protocol can be implemented (see Section3.7below).
3.6.4.1. Leakage due to Timeslice Donation
From an information-flow perspective, upward donation allows threads to leak information to
so-calledz-threads whereas downward donation is secure as long as the system runs the pro-
posed budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler (extended with downward donation) and as
long as downward donation is only between equally classifiedthreads.Z-threads of a donator
τs and of a donateeτr are those threads that run at an intermediate priority (i.e., for a z-thread
τz it holds thatprio(τs) ≤ prio(τz) ≤ prio(τr)).
Upward Donation: Upward donation executes the donateeτr at its own priority. Ifτs in-
vokes an upward donating system call to donate its time toτr, preemptions byz-threadsτz are
deferred untilτr replies toτs.
Applying Countermeasure Ito τr does not work either because then the scheduler would run
τr or a budget consumer as long asτr is active. Unlessτs is such a budget consumer, it cannot
send its request toτr. In the discussion about precedence constraints in Section3.6.1.1, we
have already seen that messages fromτs cannot releaseτr without introducing the possibility
for information leakage.
Downward Donation: Z-threads are not affected by downward donation. The donateeruns
on the time and priority of the donator. Hence, if the donatorτs is not authorized to send to a
z-threadτz, thisz-thread cannot distinguish whetherτs did run or whether the lower prioritized
donateeτr consumed the time ofτs. If τz is not cleared to receive information fromτs, the
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countermeasure predicateptransitive(τs) holds. The proposed budget-enforcing fixed-priority
scheduler appliesCountermeasure Ito τs and consequently also toτr for as long asτr runs
on the time ofτs. Notice thatdom(τs)  dom(τz) precludesdom(τr) ≤ dom(τz) because
otherwise, we would be able to conclude fromdom(τs) ≤ dom(τr) and from the transitivity of
≤ thatdom(τs) ≤ dom(τz) holds.
Downward donation reveals information about both, the amount f time that a donator provides
to the donatee and about the amount of donated time that the donatee consumes. This consti-
tutes a bidirectional communication channel between the donator and the donatee. However,
in synchronous reliable IPC such as L4-IPC, bidirectional iformation flows exist anyway: the
message, the message meta data and the time when the sender invok s the IPC send operation
are information flows from the sender to the receiver; the time when a receiver becomes ready
to receive and error situations due to too small buffers, timeouts and other error situations are
information flows in the reverse direction. Therefore, the additional information flows due
to downward donation are harmless because for the communication partnersτs andτr to use
L4-IPC,dom(τs) ≤ dom(τr) ∧ dom(τr) ≤ dom(τs) must hold anyway.
An immediate consequence of the above observations is that we have to reject upward donation
as a time-slice donation mechanism. As we shall see in the next section, this rules out the
stack-based priority-ceiling resource access protocol.
3.7. Resources
In practice, threads typically require other resources besides the CPU, which they use in a
mutually exclusive manner. In this thesis, I shall focus on single-unit resources. An extension
of the proposed solutions to multi-unit resource accesses is l ft for future work.
A single-unit resource is a resource that can be held by at mosone thread at a time. All
other threads block on held resources. In contrast to that, treads block on a multi-unit resource
only if all the equivalent copies of such a resource are already held by other threads. Critical
sections are examples of single-unit resources. A device with a limited number of channels,
which offers the same functionality on all channels, is a multi-unit resource.
On uniprocessor systems, short resource accesses are typically synchronized by executing the
resource access non-preemptively. In Section3.3.5, we have seen howCountermeasure II
avoids leakage due to non-preemptive execution. Because other threads will always find that
the resource is free when they are able to preempt potential resou ce holders, non-preemptive
execution also avoids leakage due to resource contention. Hwever, for long resource accesses,
non-preemptive execution is not applicable because it negativ ly affects the system’s response
time to interrupts and other asynchronous events.
3.7.1. Self Suspension
When threads hold resources for a long time, it can happen that a igher prioritized thread
preempts a resource holder. In non-real-time systems, a common strategy to react to situations
in which threads cannot proceed because of held resources isto self suspend the resource
acquiring threadτh in order to allow the resource holder to complete its operation. Counter-
measure Ijeopardizes this strategy because lower prioritized threads other than the budget
consumer cannot run while the scheduler applies this countermeasure. Hence, they cannot free
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Figure 3.12.: A threadτh suspends itself while its required resourceR is held byτl. Whereas
self suspension ofτh works in an unconstrained system (left),Countermeasure I
preventsτl from freeingτh’s resource (right).
the resourceτh requires. Figure3.12illustrates this point.
In real-time systems, the above strategy is insufficient because the time a thread has to suspend
itself is in general not bounded. For example, assume two threadsτl andτ ′l acquire a resource
R periodically that is also needed by a higher prioritized threadτh. Then, it can happen that the
resource bounces betweenτl andτ ′l without τh ever getting the chance to acquireR. Real-time
resource access protocols solve this problem.
3.7.2. Priority-Inheritance Protocol
The priority-inheritance protocol [SRL90] implements the following priority-inheritance rule
to avoid unbounded priority inversion due to held resources. Whenever a threadτl blocks a
higher prioritized threadτh because it holds a resourceR thatτh requires,τl inherits the time
and priority ofτh until τl releasesR.
Sha et al. [SRL90] show that, in the absence of deadlocks, a thread has to donate at most
|R| time to acquire a single resourceR. Here,|R| is the worst-case access time of the resource
R. The worst-case access time for acquiringn resourcesRi in a nested fashion is
n
∑
i=1
|Ri|. We
shall return to these bounds in the discussion of information fl ws due to resource contention
in Section3.7.4.2. For now, let us only discuss the possible leakages of resource-acquiring
threads to other threads that do not compete for resources. Bcause the inheritance rule of
the priority-inheritance protocol resembles the priorityand budget propagation of downward
donation, resource accesses that are controlled by the priority-inheritance protocol cannot be
used to leak information to these other threads. From an information-flow point of view, it
is therefore safe to use the priority-inheritance protocolin a system with the proposed non-
interference secure scheduler.
Unlike the priority-inheritance protocol, which has a bounded resource acquisition time only
in the absence of deadlocks, the stack-based priority-ceiling protocol and the basic priority-
ceiling protocol prevent deadlocks in the first place.
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3.7.3. Stack-Based Priority Ceiling Protocol
The stack-based priority-ceiling protocol [Bak91] and the ceiling-priority protocol [Coh96] are
two descriptions of the same protocol (see [Liu00, Chapter 8.6]). In the following, I shall use
the formulation of the ceiling-priority protocol. The ceiling-priority protocol prevents deadlocks
by running threads that hold a resourceR at the ceiling priorityR̂ of this resource. The ceiling
priority R̂ is the maximum priority of all threads that require this resource.
Threads can be blocked at a resourceR for at most the duration of one critical section|R|.
However, because once a threadτl holds a resource it runs on the priority ceiling of this re-
source,τl can prevent intermediary prioritizedz-threads from running. Hence, the stack-based
priority ceiling protocol suffers from the same covert channel as upward donation. In fact, if a
thread (e.g.,τh) with prio(τh) = R̂ is used to implement the resource, upward donation toτh
implements the stack-based priority ceiling protocol for this resource access.
3.7.4. Basic Priority Ceiling Protocol and Donation Ceilin g
The basic priority-ceiling protocol [SRL90] prevents both deadlocks and covert channels to
intermediary prioritizedz-threads. It is defined by the following three rules (see also[Liu00,
Chapter 8.5.1]):
1. Scheduling Rule: The current priorityπτ (t) of a threadτ at its release isprio(τ). τ is
scheduled preemptively in a priority-driven manner according toπτ (t). Rule 3 affects this
priority.
2. Allocation Rule: Wheneverτ requests a resourceR that is held by another thread, it
becomes blocked. Wheneverτ equests a free resourceR at timet one of the following
two situations may occur:
a) If the priorityπτ (t) is a higher priority than the current priority ceiling of thesystem
Π̂(t), R is allocated toτ . The current priority ceiling of the system̂Π(t) is hereby
the maximum of the ceiling prioritieŝR of the resources that are held at timet.
b) If τ ’s current priorityπτ (t) is not higher than this ceilinĝΠ(t) the resourceR is
allocated toτ only if τ is the thread that holds a resource with a priority ceiling
equal toΠ̂(t).
3. Priority Inheritance Rule: Whenτ blocks on a resource that is currently held by another
threadτ ′, τ ′ inherits the current priorityπτ (t) from τ . This inheritance lasts untilτ ′
releases all resources with a priority ceiling equal to or grater thanπτ (t). At this time, the
current priority ofτ ′ drops to the value before it has acquired these resources.
Figure3.13illustrates the basic priority-ceiling protocol. It showsthe scenario of Figure 8-10
in [Liu00, Chapter 8.5.1] extended byR3. A threadτ5 acquiresR2. Its current priorityπτ5(t)
remains atprio(τ5) until the point in timet0. At this time, τ4 blocks because its priority is
lower than the system ceiling prioritŷΠ(t) = R̂2 = prio(τ2). Becauseτ4 cannot acquire
R1, τ5 inherits the priority ofτ4 (i.e., πτ5(t) = prio(τ4)). When released, the threadτ3 runs
unconstrained until it is preempted by the higher prioritized threadsτ2 andτ1. At t1, τ2 blocks
becauseτ5 holdsR2. τ5 inheritsτ2’s priority until τ5 freesR2 at t2. The threadτ1 acquiresR1
immediately because its priority is larger than the system priority Π̂(t) = R̂2. At t2, τ5’s current
priority drops toprio(τ5) because it releasesR2. The threadsτ2 andτ3 run to completion. At3,
shortly afterτ2 has releasedR2, the system ceiling prioritŷΠ(t) has dropped to the ultimately
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Figure 3.13.: Resource allocation according to the Basic Priority-Ceiling Protocol. The shad-
ing of shaded bars denote the resources that a thread is holding. A bottom line
indicates blocking due to held resources. The dashed lines mark five points in
time: t0, . . . t4.
lowest priority level of the system. The threadτ3 may therefore acquireR3 immediately. The
threadτ4 receivesR1 for the same reason. Att4, the system ceiling prioritŷΠ(t4) = R̂1, which
is higher than the current priority ofτ4. Nevertheless,τ4 receivesR2 immediately becauseτ4
holdsR1 and because the ceiling prioritŷR1 of this resource is equal to the current ceiling
priority Π̂(t4) of the system.
In the next section, we shall see that the basic priority-ceiling protocol is secure if threads are
scheduled with the proposed budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler. To see this point, I will
introducedonation ceiling— an alternative description of the basic priority-ceilingprotocol
that is solely based on downward donation and on ceiling threads as accumulation points. The
equivalence of the two protocols validates the desired property that resource acquiring threads
cannot leak information to other threads if resource accesses are controlled by the basic priority-
ceiling protocol.
Like the stack-based priority ceiling protocol, the basic priority-ceiling protocol and hence
also the donation-ceiling protocol blocks a thread at a resourceR for at most|R|.
3.7.4.1. Donation-Ceiling Protocol
There is a subtle difference between the ceiling-priority protocol and the basic priority-ceiling
protocol. Whereas in the first, threads run immediately at the priority ceiling of a resource they
acquire, the priority ceiling is used in the latter only to determine when a thread can acquire
a resource. Resource holders keep their own priority until the point in time when they inherit
the current priority of the threads they block. Let us for theime being assume that lack of
resources is the only cause why resource holders can be blocked.
Thedonation-ceiling protocolworks as follows. For each distinct ceiling priority, the donation-
ceiling protocol instantiates a threadτC,k, which I shall call the ceiling thread. Except that
ceiling threads run only on donated time and except that theyimplement a significant part of the
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protocol, there is nothing special about these threads. LetCk be such a ceiling priority (e.g., of
two resourcesRi andRj : Ck = R̂i = R̂j). I sayCk is the ceiling priority of the ceiling thread
τC,k if the protocol has instantiated this thread for this priority.
To request a resourceRi, a threadτ invokes the ceiling threadτC,k whose ceiling priorityCk
is the smallest priority that is still higher or equal toprio(τ). All invocations in the donation-
ceiling protocol are downward-donating calls. When a ceiling threadτC,k gets invoked, it exe-
cutes the following protocol:
1. If the ceiling priorityR̂i of the requested resourceRi is higher than the ceiling priorityCk
of the ceiling threadτC,k, thenτC,k forwards the request with a downward-donating call
to the ceiling threadτC,l whose ceiling priority is the lowest priority that is higherthan
Ck.
2. If the ceiling priorityR̂i of the requested resourceRi is lower or equal to the ceiling
priority Ck of τC,k, thenτC,k executes the resource accessRi on behalf of the requesting
threadτ .
If during this accessτ requires a further resource, the ceiling threadτC,k treats the nested
resource request like a new invocation. That is, if the ceiling priority R̂j of the requested
resourceRj is higher than the ceiling priorityCk, τC,k will forward the request to the
ceiling threadτC,l with the next highest ceiling priority. IfR̂j is the same or a lower
priority than the ceiling priorityCk, τC,k executes the request itself.
OnceτC,k releases all resources, which it has accessed on behalf ofτ , τC,k replies to the
call. At this time,τC,k no longer receives the time and priority fromτ . After replyingτC,k
is ready to receive further requests.
Notice that it can never happen that a threadτi requests a resource from a ceiling threadτC,k
that has a ceiling priority lower thanprio(τi).
Moreover, ifτC,l processes a resource request on behalf ofτi it cannot happen that another
threadτj obtains a resourceRk with a lower ceiling priority: Ifτi is higher prioritized thanτj ,
τj cannot requestRk becauseτC,l does not block except on higher prioritized ceiling threads. If
τi is lower prioritized, it has invoked all ceiling threadsτC,k with a lower ceiling priority than
Cl and a higher or the same ceiling priority thanprio(τi). Therefore,τj will block when it
invokes its associated ceiling thread.
The upper part of Figure3.14shows the same scenario as Figure3.13. Downward donation
to the resource holder is indicated by dashed arrows. The lowr part of Figure3.14shows the
donation trees for two of the four shown points in time:t2 (left) andt3 (right). The scenario
involves 3 ceiling threadsτC,1, τC,2, andτC,3 for the ceiling prioritiesR̂1, R̂2, andR̂3, respec-
tively.
Beforet0, no thread holds resources. All ceiling threadsτC,i are therefore ready to receive
resource requests. If att0, τ5 requestsR2, τ5 issues a donating call toτC,3 becauseC3 is the
smallest ceiling priority that is still higher thanprio(τ5). When invoked,τC,3 sees thatR̂2 is a
higher priority thanC3, which means it has to forward the request toτC,2. Because both,τC,3
andτC,2, run only on donated time and priority, the current priorityof τC,2 is prio(τ5). The
ceiling threadτC,2 sees that the ceiling prioritŷR2 of the requested resourceR2 is equal to its
ceiling priorityC2 and executes the resource access on behalf ofτ5.
When att1 τ4 requestsR2, it finds τC,3 waiting for the reply to the forwarded request.τ4’s
donating call blocks onτC,3 but the time ofτ4 is downward donated toτC,2. This raisesτC,2’s
current priority toprio(τ4).
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Figure 3.14.: Donation Ceiling — an alternative description of the basic priority-ceiling proto-
col with downward donation and ceiling threads. Dashed arrows indicate down-
ward donations. More precisely, a dashed arrow to a shaded box indicates a down-
ward donation of the respective thread to the ceiling thread, which handles this
resource request.
At t2, afterτ2 has also blocked onτC,2, the current priority ofτC,2 is raised toprio(τ2). τ1 runs
at a higher priority until it requests the resourceR1. At this time, the ceiling threadτC,1 is still
waiting for resource requests, which results inτC,1 executingτ1’s request immediately and at
the priorityprio(τ1). No lower prioritized thread runs. The lower left part of Figure3.14shows
the donation tree at this point in timet2. Three threads donate their time and priority to the
ceiling threadτC,2: τ2, τ4, andτ5. τ1 donates toτC1 . BecauseτC,2 processes the request ofτ5,
both τ2 andτ4 block onτC,2. Nevertheless, they donate their time and priority to this ceiling
thread.
At t3, τC,1 holdsR1 on behalf ofτ4. τC,1 immediately continues withR2 because the ceiling
priority R̂2 is lower thanC1. The lower right part of Figure3.14shows the donation tree at
this point in time. BecauseτC,3 andτC,2 have forwardedτ4’s resource request toτC,1, no other
thread can request a resource althoughτC,1 runs only atτ4’s priority.
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Equivalence of Donation Ceiling and Basic Priority-Ceilin g To see the equivalence
of the donation-ceiling protocol and of the basic priority-ceiling protocol, let us check the rules
that define the latter protocol14:
1. Scheduling Rule:The basic priority-ceiling protocol runs a threadτ on its priority until
a higher prioritized threadτh blocks on a resource held by this thread. At this timet,
τ inherits the current priorityπτh(t) of τh. Donation ceiling parallels this behavior by
executing the resource access in a ceiling threadτC,k, which receives the time and priority
of all threads that request a resourceRi with a ceiling priorityR̂i lower or equal toCk.
2. Allocation Rule:
a) A resourceRi is allocated toτ if τ ’s current priorityπτ (t) is higher than the system
ceiling priorityΠ̂(t). Donation ceiling characterizes the system ceiling priority only
indirectly: of all ceiling threads letτC,j be the ceiling thread with the highest ceiling
priority that is executing a resource access at time. Then, the system ceiling priority
is Π̂(t) = Cj . Ceiling threads with a higher ceiling priority are waitingfor further
requests. Ifπτ (t) is higher thanΠ̂(t), τ receivesRi because its associated ceiling
thread and all ceiling threads with a higher ceiling priority are awaitingτ ’s request.
Blocking resource holders will violate this property (see blow).
b) Because ceiling threads execute resource accesses on behalf of the requesting
threads, requests for nested resources are only accepted for the current resource
holder at the respective ceiling priority. Moreover, because threads have to pass all
ceiling threads with an intermediate ceiling priority to obtain a resourceRi, τ re-
ceives a resource in situations whereπτ (t) is not higher than̂Π(t) only if τ is the
thread that holds a resource with priority ceiling equal toΠ̂(t).
3. Priority Inheritance Rule: Because threads that block on a resourceRi donate in a
downward-donating call their time and priority directly orindirectly to the ceiling thread
responsible forRi, donation ceiling executes resource accesses always at thehig st pri-
ority of all donating threads.
Because donation ceiling parallels all rules of the basic priority-ceiling protocol precisely, both
protocols are equivalent.
Implementation The above description of donation ceiling suggests a particular implemen-
tation of this protocol. Notice however that implementations are free to deviate from the proto-
col description as long as the behavior is preserved. For example, instead of executing resource
accesses themselves, ceiling threads can return to the requsting thread in such a way that it
accepts further requests only from this requesting thread.The ceiling thread can proceed with
other requests only after the resource holder indicates therelease of all resources for which
this ceiling thread is responsible. In the current implementations of time-slice donation on L4-
family kernels, the resource accessing thread must be different from the resource requesting
thread.
14The presented equivalence proof origins from joint work with Dr. Claude-Joachim Hamann.
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Blocking Resource Holders So far, we assumed that blocking on a resource is the only
situation in which a resource holder blocks. To allow for other blocking situations, donation
ceiling must be adjusted.
If a resource holder blocks, it can happen that a lower prioritized thread requests a resource
from a ceiling thread while a ceiling thread for a higher ceiling priority is blocked. The protocol
no longer avoids deadlocks.
To avoid these situations, I propose to modify donation ceiling such that ceiling threads pub-
lish when they start executing a resource access. This way, aceiling thread can check whether
all ceiling threads for a higher ceiling priority are waiting for new requests. Otherwise, it delays
the request until all ceiling threads with higher ceiling priority enter this state.
3.7.4.2. Avoiding Leakage due to Resource Contention
Resource contention occurs whenever a thread attempts to acquire a resource that is held by an-
other thread. By varying the time a resource holder occupiesa r ource, it can leak information
to other potential resource holders.
If write authority to a resource implies read authority, it is arguable whether locking the resource
for a write constitutes a covert channel at all. For read-only resource accesses, other synchro-
nization primitives such as Reed’s sequencers and event cous [RK79] can be used. Instead of
blocking writers from accessing a resource, event counts allow readers to detect whether such
a write has occurred concurrently to their read. In this case, they repeat the read operation until
no such concurrent write has happened.
In the envisaged microkernel-based system, there are several situations where the threads of
multi-level servers have to access and modify a shared resource without revealing this access
to their clients. Accesses to client-spanning data structues are a prominent example of such a
scenario.
The key insight that leads to a synchronization mechanism that avoids also leakage due to
resource contention is that the above real-time resource-ac ss protocols guarantee the acquisi-
tion of a resource latest after a donation of|R|. Hence, because the resource access itself takes
at most|R|, a timing-leak transformation, which delays the further execution of a thread to a
time2|R| after the resource request, avoids leakage of this contention channel. To also prevent
internal timing channels while holdingR, threads must only access the resource or thread-local
private memory while they holdR. This is to avoid leaking the thread-local time when the
thread receivedR in between requesting the resource attr and the thread-local timetr + 2|R|.
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3.8. Summary
In this chapter, I have presented a budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler that provably avoids
leakage over external timing channels even if threads have acc ss to precise clocks. The two
countermeasures that avoid this leakage are:
Countermeasure I: to treat possibly leaking threads as if they were ready in order to avoid
leakage due to direct and indirect influence; and
Countermeasure II: to defer when higher prioritized threads resume their execution to avoid
leakage due to non-preemptively executing lower-prioritized threads.
The resulting scheduler was formally proven non-interference secure and the proof was
machine-checked with the help of the theorem prover PVS. In afirst version of the scheduler,
I have overlooked two corner case situations in which non-preemptively executing threads can
also leak to lower prioritized threads (see Section3.3.5.1on page71). The proof of the first ver-
sion revealed this flaw. Based on the experience with this flaw, I expect that further adjustments
of the proof to other variants of the scheduler, and in particular to the extensions proposed in
Section3.6, are straightforward. To adjust the proof for a version withtimeslice donation, it is
important to realize that downward donation can be seen as scheduling time quanta15 instead
of threads. The actual thread that runs on a scheduled time quanta is the thread at the root of the
donation tree of this quanta, which unless trusted threads are involved must be classified at the
same secrecy level as the owner of the time quanta.
The characterization of delays due toC untermeasure Ias a blocking term allows for the
reuse of a large class of existing admission tests. We have seen that the proposed scheduler
preserves many real-time guarantees and that it outperforms time-partitioning schedulers — the
state of the art for temporally isolated real-time systems.
The discussion of practical matters and in particular of non-interference-secure real-time
resource access protocols concludes this chapter. These protocols allow multi-level servers and
the microkernel to safely access shared resources without leaking secret information in internal
or external timing channels that resource accesses typically mply.
In the following chapter, I introduce a static information-flow analysis for the low-level
operating-system code of open microkernel-based systems.This analysis complements the pro-
posed scheduler by establishing the absence of security policy violating information-flows in
the necessarily trusted multi-level servers and in the microkernel itself.
15Wolter et al. [SWH05] call these objects “scheduling contexts”.
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4. Statically Checking Confidentiality
of Low-Level Operating-System
Code
This chapter presents the second central contribution of this thesis: a sound control-flow-
sensitive security type system for the low-level operating-system code of microkernel-based
systems.
It is organized as follows: in the next section, I discuss thec allenges of statically checking
confidential-data protection in low-level operating-system code. Of these, side effects from
interactions with the underlying hardware are a major obstacle. In Section4.3, I demonstrate
with the help of a simple size-aligned read why contemporaryapproaches to address these hard-
ware side effects cannot scale to non-trivial amounts of operating-system code. The approach I
present in this thesis consists of two steps:
• First, the to-be-checked operating-system code is translated into the non-deterministic
intermediate languageToy.
• Then, the sound security type system forT y is used to check the resultingToyprogram
and the hardware side effects for the absence of illegal information flows. The latter
appear as interleaved executingToysubprograms.
Section4.5 presents the syntax and semantics of the intermediate languageToy. Anticipating
that security type systems abstract from concrete values anyway, I have designedToyto clearly
separate input non-determinism from control-flow non-determinism. As a result, we only have
to deal with the latter. In security-type-system-based analyses, input non-determinism comes
for free.
Typically, control-flow non-determinism is addressed by standard typing rules for non-
deterministic composition (see e.g., [Sab01b, pg. 45]). However, the specific nature of low-level
operating-system code gives also rise to a rather unusual altern tive: because only relatively
small amounts of code have to be checked at a time and because this code is typically known
to terminate quickly, it contains only a relatively few non-deterministic choices. Therefore, it
is also feasible — though much more costly — to repeat the analysis for all possible ways in
which the non-determinism in the checked program can be resolved. As we shall see in Sec-
tion 4.7.1, checking all proposed alternatives leads to a much higher precision. My proposal is
therefore to selectively trade precision against performance by checking all alternatives of se-
lected non-deterministic choices and by applying the standard typing rules for non-deterministic
composition to the remaining choices. In Section4.7, I introduce the security type system for
the deterministic core ofToy. Section4.7.1elaborates on typing control-flow non-determinism.
To cope with shared-memory programs, I introduce in Section4.6the notion of learned secrets.
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In Section4.7.3, I present the soundness proof of the security type system for Toy. The seman-
tics ofToyand the typing rules of the security type system have been formalized in the theorem
prover PVS. The soundness proof of the analysis with regardsto the proposed semantics has
been machine checked with this theorem prover. Section4.8briefly summarizes this chapter.
The formal semantics ofToy is in part based on the kernel-code semantics of the Nova verifica-
tion workpackage [TWV+08] in the European Project Robin [(Co06]. The development of this
semantics was joint work with Hendrik Tews and Tjark Weber.
4.1. A Running Example
For the further discussion, let me introduce the following x86-based implementation of an arti-
ficial system call as a running example.
1 int 42 handler:
2 pusha // push all registers to stack
3 call sys add
4 popa // pop all registers from stack
5 iret // return from interrupt
6
7 void sys add() {
8 Syscall Regs ∗ regs = reinterpret cast<Syscall Regs ∗>(stack top() − sizeof (Entry Frame));
9
10 regs−>eax = regs−>ebx + regs−>ecx;
11
12 sys add counter−−;
13 if (sys add counter == 0)
14 trigger overflow ();
15
16 asm volatile (”” :: ”memory”);
17 }
Assuming that the kernel has properly setup the underlying hardware, the system call adds the
two values in the general-purpose registersbx and ecx and returns the result ineax. More
precisely, when an application invokes this system call with theint 42 instruction, the processor
switches to kernel mode, pushes an entry frame on the kernel stack and invokesint 42 handler .
As part of the entry frame, the processor pushes the user-levl code segment descriptor. We shall
return to this fact later in this chapter. After pushing all general-purpose registers withpusha ,
int 42 handler transitions control to the C++ functionsys add . The functionsys add adds the
values of the pushed registers, updates the performance countersys add counter , which keeps
track of the number of invocations, and triggers an overflow exception if the preset value of
this counter overflows. The compiler memory barrierasm volatile (””::”memory”); ensures that
the memory representation of all variables are up to date. Atthe ime whensys add returns,
int 42 handler continues by popping the general-purpose registers from the kernel stack and by
returning to user level with theiret instruction. For the following discussion, the precise layout
of the two classesEntry Frame andSyscall Regs and the details of the involved instructions are
to a large degree irrelevant. Notice however that a stack parameter defines the code segment
to which iret returns. An incorrect setting of this parameter could result in the execution of
user-level code in kernel mode.
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4.2. Peculiarities of Low-Level Operating-System Code
Static information-flow analyses for low-level operating-system code have to address the fol-
lowing five challenges.
1. Low-level operating-system servers typically do not runin isolation. Instead, they interact
with the underlying kernel, with their clients, and with other servers. Sometimes, this
interaction happens in very peculiar ways. To prove the absence of information leakage,
an information-flow analysis has to check all these interactions for possibilities to reveal
confidential information;
2. Device drivers and large parts of the kernel interact withthe underlying hardware plat-
form. This interaction typically causes side effects through which the checked program
may leak information. A sound information-flow analysis must therefore check also these
side effects;
3. Operating-system programmers often use the low-level langu ge features of C++, C, and
Assembler in peculiar ways. Sometimes, they even rely on thespecific behavior of a sin-
gle compiler. A sound information-flow analysis and, in particular, the language seman-
tics against which this analysis is proven sound has to consider these peculiar applications
of low-level language features;
4. At the time of the analysis, the information-flow policy, to which the checked low-
level operating-system code should adhere, is typically onpartially known. Practical
information-flow analyses must be able to deal with this impreciseness; and
5. The behavior of a system call or of a server functionality,and hence the information
flows that may occur, typically depend on the parameters and on the access rights with
which a client invokes these operations. However, one the one side, these parameters are
typically not known at the time of the analysis. On the other side, summarizing results
for all possible choices of these parameters are typically not i teresting because they
overestimate the possible information flows. Imprecise parameters are therefore a second
source of impreciseness, a practical information-flow analysis has to deal with.
In the following sections, I investigate these challenges in greater detail.
4.2.1. Interactions with the Underlying Kernel and with oth er
Programs
Contemporary security type systems1 typically share the following two assumptions:
1. Interactions of the checked program with other programs are limited to the start respec-
tively to the termination of the checked program; and
2. The code of all interacting threads is known and subjectedto the same information-flow
analysis.
1O Neill et al. [OCsC06] and Martini et al. [FM06] are exceptions.
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Although the kernel and the majority of the multi-level servers never terminate while the system
is running, their abstract interface specifications suggest a similar behavior for the individual
invocations of these programs: Both, the kernel and the worker threads of multi-level servers are
invoked by clients through a respective system call or IPC message. The parameters of both,
system calls and IPC are typically passed in processor registers or in a thread-local storage
area called UTCB [DLSU04]. And, the reply typically terminates the invocation and retu ns
the result in the processor or UTCB registers. However, imple entations often violate these
assumptions:
• Parameters can also be passed in previously-established shared-memory regions;
• Although the kernel specification defines the UTCB to be a thread-local data structure,
implementations typically map kernel-backed memory to theaddress space of the corre-
sponding thread, which means other threads in this address space can also read and write
this data structure. In multiprocessor systems, they may even modify the UTCB while the
kernel executes non-preemptively; and
• The code of invoking clients is typically not known when a server gets analyzed.
4.2.1.1. Client-Server Interactions in L4-Based Systems
In L4-based systems, there are further, more subtle ways throug which threads may interact.
For instance, servers, which manage the memory of a thread, may interact with the pager of this
thread by revoking this thread’s memory read or write accessrights. Kernel-memory managers
may reclaim kernel memory to interact with the former users of objects that this reclamation
destroys. And, given a thread capability, a thread can invoke theexchange registers sys-
tem call to trigger an exception or to cancel ongoing IPC. Throughexchange registers ,
the invoker can interact with the exception handler of the targeted thread and with the commu-
nication partners of these threads.
As these examples show, two threads may interact with each other if the capabilities held by
these threads authorize system calls that read respectively modify the same kernel (or server)
objects. These objects can thereby be objects to which the capabilities refer directly, or, they
can be objects that are related to such a referred object. Forexample, for IPC gate capabilities,
the related object is the thread receiving from this gate. The kernel modifies this thread as a
result of delivering messages, which are send through the IPC gate. In the running example of
Section4.1, the countersys add counter is a related object.
Whether a thread can interact with another thread depends onthe system calls it is autho-
rized to execute and on the information flows that these system calls allow. The identifica-
tion of the latter is the purpose of an information-flow analysis of the microkernel. Once the
information-flow policy is stated, the analysis can prove that t e exercised information flows
are in compliance with the security policy.
4.2.1.2. Uniform Handling of Memory Accesses and Interrupt s as System Calls
To uniformly handle all interactions with the microkernel,I regard also virtual-memory ac-
cesses, interrupts and hardware exceptions as system calls. Although, admittedly, large parts of
these system calls proceed without executing any kernel cod.
A read or write access to some virtual address involves several access checks and a translation
of this virtual address into a physical address. The necessary information for this translation is
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located in the processor page tables, which the kernel sets up and which the memory manage-
ment unit (MMU) of the processor evaluates. If the required data is cached in the translation-
lookaside buffer (TLB) or if the page-table entries convey sufficient access rights, the MMU and
the load store units of the processor perform virtual-memory accesses entirely in hardware. The
kernel is only involved if the page-table entries convey insufficient rights or if no valid trans-
lation is present. In this case, the MMU triggers a page-fault exception to invoke the in-kernel
page-fault handler.
Actually, the MMU performs a full-fledged capability lookupwhen it checks the access
rights in the page-table entries. The pairs(pa, R) of leaf-level page-table entries are capabil-
ities, which refer to the memory pages at physical addressespa and which conveyR access
rights.
There are two important points to notice:
1. In operating-system kernels, and in particular in an L4-based system, all user-accessible
memory is effectively shared, at least with the microkernel; and hence,
2. Private memory (i.e., memory that cannot be read by other programs and that returns the
stored content) is a guarantee of the kernel and of those servr that manage the memory
of a thread.
The first point holds because the kernel can manipulate page tabl s. Hence, it can insert a
mapping to any physical memory that is available in the system.
Although all memory is effectively shared, I will assume in the analysis that certain memory
regions of the checked operating-system code are private and th t the memory-allocation policy
of the involved memory servers is free of covert channels [PN92]. The important property
that reassigned memory is free of previously stored secretsan easily be established with the
proposed information-flow analysis: when analyzing the kernel espectively the memory servers
of our envisaged microkernel-based system, we merely have to require that all secrecy levels of
the returned memory are dominated by the secrecy level of thememory requesting client.
Obviously, an all-embracing proof about the absence of illegal information flows demands
also for separately-established proofs of the remaining assumptions.
4.2.2. Interactions with the Underlying Hardware
Device-register accesses, direct memory accesses (DMA), writes to special-purpose registers,
modifications of hardware-traversed data structures, and the execution of privileged-mode in-
structions cause a variety of effects that one would not expect from executing “normal” instruc-
tions and memory accesses. Following Tews et al. [TVW09], I call these effectshardware side
effects.
Although second-generation microkernels implement device drivers outside the kernel,
drivers for interrupt controllers, timers and IO protection units have to reside inside the micro-
kernel. As a consequence, side effects due to device-register accesses and due to DMA are also
triggered by the microkernel. For example on ARM processors[Ltd], DMA is used to copy
data from main memory into on-chip scratch-pad memory and back.
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The following is a classification of hardware side effects bythe type of behavior they cause.
There are:
• side effects, which cause undefined processor behavior,
• critical side effects, and
• benign side effects.
Clearly, because undefined behavior may result in arbitraryle kages, programs that trigger side
effects with such a behavior rule out any static information-fl w analysis. Programs, which
cause these side effects, must be rejected as potentially being insecure.
Side effects, which trigger a processor behavior that is sufficiently well defined in the pro-
cessor manuals, fall into the last two classes. The determining criteria is thereby whether such
a side effect rules out a further information-flow analysis.If o, the side effect is classified as a
critical side effect and the side-effect triggering program must be rejected. Benign side effects
may give rise to potentially harmful information flows. I call side effect benign if a suitable
static information-flow analysis can check whether these information flows violate the system’s
security policy.
4.2.2.1. Side Effects causing Undefined Processor Behavior
In modern processor architectures, not all instruction combinations cause a behavior that is
defined in the processor manuals. For example, the Intel 64 and IA32 Architectures Software
Developer’s Manual specifies certain bits in the processor control registers [Cor09, § 2.5 Vol. 3a]
as reserved [Cor09, § 1.3.2 Vol. 3a]. Setting these bits to a different value may cause the
processor to enter an unpredictable state.
Likewise, accesses to memory-mapped device registers can cause undefined behavior. For
example, accessing the 32-bit registers of the local advanced programmable interrupt controller
(APIC) of an IA32 processor with loads or stores that are not 128-bit aligned or accessing these
registers with floating-point instructions can cause undefied behavior. As stated in [Cor09,
§ 9.4.1 Vol. 3a]: “This undefined behavior could include hangs, incorrect results or unexpected
exceptions, including machine checks, and may vary betweenimplementations.”
Because we do not know which information a processor leaks ifit behaves in an undefined way,
we have to assume pessimistically that any information is leaked. Hence, programs that cause
such an undefined processor behavior have to be rejected as potentially being insecure.
4.2.2.2. Critical Side Effects
The behavior of critical side effects is well defined. However, their occurrence impedes a static
information-flow analysis of programs that cause these effects.
Examples of side effects with critical state changes include page-table changes that authorize
user-level programs to modify kernel code or the stack on which this code executes. A setting
of bit 1 and 2 in the corresponding page-table entries to userrespectively to writable [Cor09,
§ 3.7ff Vol. 3a] enables this side effect. Control flows to usercode while in kernel mode and
the disabling of paging followed by a return to user code are fu ther side effects with critical
state changes. The latter is triggered by resetting bit 31 inthe IA32-CR0 register [Cor09, § 2.5
Vol. 3a] or by executing theiret instruction on a stack frame, which refers to a kernel-code
segment.
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Once arbitrary user code can be injected into the kernel, adversaries can access any information
the system stores. Consequently, programs that cause critical side effects must be rejected as
potentially being insecure.
Our running example in Section4.1 modifies the variableregs→ eax on the kernel stack. This
stack contains also the code-segment descriptor of the invoki g user-level thread. Therefore,
a precondition for accepting the example as secure is that the memory locations of the entry
frame and of the variableregs→ eax are disjoint.
To verify the absence of critical side effects it is often helpfu to observe that programs typi-
cally modify special-purpose registers and hardware-traversed data structures only during their
respective initialization phase. Assuming a correct setup, we can therefore verify the absence
of critical side effects by showing that no writes happen to these critical locations.
One way to perform such an analysis is to mark the corresponding fields as unmodifiable and
to reject programs that write to unmodifiable fields. For our running example, the entry frame,
all page tables and other hardware-traversed data structures have to be marked as unmodifiable.
When registers and hardware-traversed data structures aremodified also after the initializa-
tion phase, we have to rely on separately-established correctness results. An elaborate discus-
sion how these properties can be established with the help ofstatic analyses is out of the scope
of this thesis.
4.2.2.3. Side Effects that cause Benign State Changes
If the processor manuals describe a hardware side effect sufficiently well to allow for an
information-flow analysis of this side effect, I regard it asa benign side effect.
On IA32 processors, executing a read on a virtual addressv causes such a benign side effect.
If this read access was the first access to the page containingv, the processor will set the
accessed bits [Cor09, § 3.7.6 Vol. 3a] in those page-table entries that are involvedin the trans-
lation of v to the physical addressp. If we assume thatp is located in RAM, the read access of
v does not modify the value atp. However, the fact of reading can be leaked to other programs
if these other programs are able to read the accessed bits from the used page-table entries. In
the two L4-family microkernels L4-Pistachio [DLSU04] and Fiasco [Hoh02], the system call
L4-unmap returns the accumulated accessed and dirty bits of all direct and indirect recipients
of an unmapped memory page. In these systems, the setting of accessed bits constitutes an
implicit information flow. The flow is implicit because only the access but not the accessed
data is revealed. An immediate consequence of this information flow is that multi-level servers
must not access client-provided memory in a secret context,that is, in a context with a secrecy
level lip to which the respective clientsτ are not cleared (lip  dom(τ)). We shall return to
this example in greater detail in Section4.3 and in the case study in Section5.1. The IA32
processor manuals describe the processor behavior on virtual memory accesses sufficiently
well to allow for a formalization of the above hardware side eff cts and for an analysis of the
information flows it involves.
Further examples of benign hardware side effects include legitimate modifications of memory-
mapped device registers, the modification of the kernel stack in situations where interrupts or
exceptions cause a kernel entry, and DMA transfers to memoryregions that the DMA initiating
driver can legitimately access2.
2To enforce that DMA accesses only authorized memory regions, we must either verify this result for the part
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There are three principle approaches to cope with benign hardware-side effects:
• the benign side effect and its contained information flows can be formalized and subjected
to the same information-flow analysis as the side-effect triggering code;
• the program, which triggers such a benign side effect, can berejected as potentially being
insecure; or
• to checked program (respectively the kernel) can be modifiedto not reveal the information
a benign side effect propagates.
This work advocates the first approach by formalizing hardwae side effects as interleaved-
executingToyprograms, which are checked together with the translated C++ operating-system
code. However, sometimes it is also feasible to follow the last two approaches. For instance,
IA32 processors support a wide range of hardware features that modern microkernels don’t
use. Examples include hardware task switches [Cor09, § 7.3 Vol. 3a] and real-mode kernel
code [Cor09, § 17.1 Vol. 3a]. A sound analysis, which shows that the kernel do s not invoke
these features, relieves us from formalizing this rather complex behavior. For accessed bit
propagation, the two alternatives translate into:
1. rejecting programs that set accessed bits, and
2. modifying the kernel to not return these bits.
However, both alternatives have severe drawbacks:
1. All virtual memory accesses set accessed bits, which means we would have to reject any
program that accesses memory in a secret context; and
2. Without accessed-bit information, page-replacement algorithms would have to emu-
late these bits. However, this emulation comes at a significat performance degrada-
tion [Dra91].
To deal with programs that initiate DMA requests, I propose to treat DMA-accessible memory
as “normal” shared memory. There are however three important poi ts to notice:
1. DMA memory remains accessible even if no driver thread runs;
2. DMA does not adhere to locking schemes unless the driver holds a respective lock until
the DMA transfer completes; and
3. DMA can access memory even if this memory is not accessiblein the address space of
the driver.
4.2.3. Low-Level Language Features in Operating-System Co de
C++ [PC09] combines the high-level features of object-oriented imperative programming lan-
guages such as operator overloading, templates, inheritance, polymorphism, and exceptions
with low-level data-layout and placement controls. Because the last two are inherent for operat-
ing systems [Sha06], it is quite natural that modern operating systems are typically implemented
in a combination of C++, C and Assembler.
of the driver that initiates the DMA transfer [Meh05] or we have to prove the kernel to properly configure the
available hardware DMA-protection units [Kru02, Int06, AJM+06].
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In the development of a sound static information-flow analysis, the low-level language features
of C++, and, in particular, the peculiar ways in which operating-system developers use these
features, pose a challenge. The focus of this work is therefore on the low-level language
features of C and C++ that appear in the low-level operating-system code of microkernel-based
systems. For high-level language features, I refer the interes d reader to published works about
information-flow analyses of high-level language such as Java [ML98, Str03], Caml [PS03],
and Haskell [LZ06].
The challenges for an information-flow analysis of low-level C++ code origin
• from the unsafe typing discipline of C++,
• from pointers and aliases,
• from non-volatile memory accesses, and
• from the non-deterministic evaluation of C++ expressions.
In the following, I shall discuss these challenges in greater detail.
4.2.3.1. Unsafe Typing Discipline
Standard semantics of programming languages (see e.g., Winskel [Win93]) are typically based
on typed memory models. In such a model, variables are formalized as abstract locations, which
map to the stored values. Valid pointers and references can only refer to these locations. Hence,
there is no reason for a location to change its type.
C++ programs [PC09, § 1.7] and likewise C programs run on memory that is comprised of
sequences of contiguous bytes. The same memory address can be accessed through different
paths and possibly also with different types. Hence, the typing discipline for data types in C++
is unsafe. Consider for example the integerint i in struct S { int i ; bool x; } s; . This integer
can be accessed through both, an integer pointert ∗ pi = &s.i; or implicitly through the object
s. In addition, the storage underlyings can be accessed byte wise to copy the value ofs into
another object of typeS or to copys into a character array that is large enough to holds [PC09,
§ 3.9 pt 2,3].
In addition to these standard conform accesses, low-level operating-system code often con-
tains accesses that are not standard conform. For instance,typical programming pattern
involves reinterpreting integer values as pointers to typed objects (e.g., to a hardware-traversed
data structure). However, the involvedreinterpret cast conforms to the C++ standard only if
the integer value is a representation of a safely-derived pointer [PC09, § 3.7.4.3 pt 3]. OS
developers use this case also with other integer values. In our running example in Section4.1,
thereinterpret cast to Syscall Regs ∗ regs is an example of such a cast.
There are three important points to notice:
1. The C++ semantics and hence also the security type system for C++ operating-system
code must be field sensitive. That is, types must be assigned to the individual fields of an
object and not to the compound object as a whole. Otherwise, an an lysis of the above
example would have to regards and in particulars.x as modified whenever values are
assigned to∗pi . In particular,pi would have to identifys, which is not possible without
introducing auxiliary variables to hold this information;
125
CHAPTER 4. STATICALLY CHECKING CONFIDENTIALITY OF LOW-LEVEL
OPERATING-SYSTEM CODE
2. The memory models must support addressing schemes that are byte granular or finer.
Otherwise, copies to and from character arrays could not corre tly be formalized; and
3. Addressing schemes must support all addresses that origin f om reinterpreting integer
values as pointers.
The assignment∗pi = h; supports the first point. It stores ahigh value in s. i but not in s.x .
A field-insensitive information-flow analysis would classify the entire objects ashigh. As a
consequence, such an analysis must reject programs that leak information abouts even if they
read only the boolean variablex.
Fortunately, the C++ standard defines all operations on classes, unions and arrays in terms
of their members [PC09, § 8.5 pt 6,§ 12.8 pt 8,§ 12.4 pt 5]. With the exception ofvtables 3,
there is no need to maintain class objects and arrays as a whole. Instead, it suffices to keep the
individual members of these objects (and thevtable pointer) in the memory model.
Toyinherits all data types from C++. The formalization of thesedata types extends the Robin
data-type formalization [TWV+08] to work with a bit-granular memory model. In this formal-
ization, a value of an interpreted data type appears as an arbitrary but fixed bitwise encoding of
the object representation. The significant bits in the object representation are called thesupport
of this variable. Classes and arrays are not interpreted becaus they are completely defined by
their interpreted members.
4.2.3.2. Pointers and Aliases
In Section2.4.7, we have already seen the benefits of a points-to analysis to determine whether
two pointers refer to the same address. If so, a read through one p inter can return the value
written through the respective other. In general, pointer targets may occupy the same address
region, they may occupy disjoint regions or they may occupy overlapping regions. To rule out
critical side effects due to modifications of hardware-traversed data structures, a particularly
interesting information is whether a pointer target overlaps region, which contains such a data
structure.
In low-level operating-system code, two objects with disjoint virtual addresses can still over-
lap if the processor maps these addresses to the same physical addresses. Following Tews et
al. [TVW09], I call these aliasesvirtual-memory aliases.
The storage of values in their bit-wise object representation already resolves most issues of
aliases: If a value of typet is stored through one alias, the arbitrary but fixed encodingof this
value is stored in the support bits starting at the referenced address. A subsequent read through
another alias interprets bits, which are in the support oft′, as an encoding of a value of typet′.
Hence, if these two supports overlap, the read value dependsonly on the written information.
To detect the information flows through virtual-memory aliases, the control-flow-sensitive
security type system forToy maintains a mapping of virtual addresses to physical addresses.
In this mapping, abstract physical addresses can be used as long as they correctly represent if
virtual addresses are shared. For the analysis, I shall require that this mapping does not change
for the checked code. That is, if the checked code accesses a variable at the virtual addressv
then the mapping ofv to the physical addressp must not change and no further mapping top
must be installed. Note, this restriction does not apply to other addresses, which the checked
code does not access.
3Vtables are used to implement virtual functions and dynamiccasts.
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4.2.3.3. Non-volatile Memory Accesses
C [2105, § 6.2.5 pt 15,§ 5.1.2.3 pt 5] and C++ [PC09, § 3.9.3,§ 1.9 pt 9] distinguish volatile
memory accesses from non-volatile accesses. The former areC++ side effects even if the
volatile object is read and not modified.
The compiler is to a large degree prohibited from optimizingvolatile accesses. Non-volatile
memory accesses can be optimized in various ways. For example, compilers may allocate parts
of non-volatile objects in processor registers, they may combine parts that are known to hold
the same value, or they may omit modifications entirely if thewritten value is not required in
the subsequent code or if this value can be derived without modifying the object.
As a result of these optimizations, the memory representation of a non-volatile object can be-
come out-of-date. If such an out-of-date memory representatio is accessed by a hardware side
effect or by a concurrently executing thread, historic values can be read, which may still store
a secret that has already been removed from the register-allocated part of the non-volatile object.
Admittedly, objects that are affected by hardware side effects or that are located in shared mem-
ory should be declared volatile to prevent the compiler fromoptimizing accesses to these ob-
jects. However in practise, programmers often avoid these dclarations to allow for compiler
optimizations up to the point where the data should be exchanged. At these points, compiler
memory barriers such as
asm volatile (”” :: ”memory”);
are inserted to signal to the compiler that an up-to-date memory representation is required.
In combination with a proper synchronization primitive, compiler memory barriers suffice
to ensure that shared-memory objects are up to date. Our running example of Section4.1
contains such a barrier at the end ofsys add . It ensures that the memory representation of
Syscall Regs ∗ regs is up to date.
The challenges non-volatile objects pose on static information-flow analyses are the information
flows through historic memory representations. To not risk overl oking these potential leaks, I
introduce temporaries in theToy intermediate language, which store intermediate results until
they are explicitly written back to the processor registers, to the stack, or to the non-volatile
object. The choice between these alternative locations is typ cally non-deterministic.
4.2.3.4. Non-deterministic Evaluation of Expressions
In [Nor99], Norrish proves that the constraints on C sequence points cau e C expressions to
evaluate deterministically although the standard-definedevaluation order seems to be non-
deterministic [2105, § 6.5 pt 2, pt3]. The current C++ standard (though not the more rec nt
standard drafts) adopts this definition.
However, in the presence of hardware side effects, a deterministic evaluation order of C and
C++ expressions can no longer be guaranteed. Hardware side effects are not present in the
C / C++ memory model on which Norrish focused in his work. It isherefore quite natural
that Norrish did not consider these effects in his formal result. The following code snippet
demonstrates the non-deterministic evaluation of C and C++expressions in the presence of
hardware side effects.
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1 Pte ∗ pte;
2 unsigned int count = 0;
3 ...
4
5 for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 1024; i++)
6 count = pte[ i ]. accessed + count;
Given a pointerpte to the first entry of a page table, the above code snippet computes how many
pages4 have been accessed in the virtual-memory region that this page table backs. In C++,
the two subexpressionspte[i ]. accessed andcount are unsequenced [PC09, § 1.9 pt 14]. That
is, they are executed in an undefined order. Assume the integer variablecount is located in the
virtual-memory region that is backed by the page-table entry pte[0] . Assume further that the
accessed bit has been cleared prior to executing the above code snippet. Then, in the first round
i == 0, two situations can happen:
1. If pte[i ]. accessed is executed first, the read of the integer variablecount has not yet
occurred. The expressionpte[i ]. accessed + count; evaluates to zero.
2. If, on the other hand, the variablecount is accessed first,pte[i ]. accessed reads one be-
cause, during the address translation ofcount , the MMU sets the accessed bit ofpte[0] .
Declaringpte[i ]. accessed as volatile does not resolve this non-determinism because the hard-
ware side effect ofcount is not part of the C / C++ memory model. For this reason, it is also
quite natural that Norrish’s source-level semantics cannot detect this kind of non-deterministic
behavior. However, to not risk overlooking the informationflows from non-deterministically
evaluated expressions, this non-determinism must be supported in the semantics ofToyand the
involved information flows must be checked with the securitytype system for this language.
4.2.4. Incomplete Knowledge about the Information-Flow Po licy
In [HS06], Hunt and Sands introduce the universal lattice in their security type system formu-
lation of Banerjee and Naumann’s independence analysis [AB04] (see Section2.4.4). Both,
Hunt et al. and Banerjee et al., seek to prove data confidentiality of programs without precise
knowledge of the information-flow policy of the systems on which these programs should run.
In this section, we shall see that Hunt’s universal lattice cannot correctly characterize the
information flows of shared-memory programs and for programs that access a shared kernel
object. To accommodate for these programs, I will thereforeext nd Hunt’s universal lattice
with version numbers for shared-memory variables.
4.2.4.1. A Universal Lattice with Version Numbers
A universal lattice is the single lattice from which all possible typings of a program can be
derived [HS06]. For programs that receive inputs only before they start, the universal lattice
is the powerset of all program variables with subset as the partial order relation:(℘(V ar),⊆).
However, through shared memory and through shared kernel objects programs can also receive
inputs while they are already executing.
4or memory regions if the page table contains also non-leaf entries
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Let us consider the following artificial programp as a representative of more complex shared-
memory programs:
1 tmp a = shm;
2 shm = h;
3 shm = l;
4 tmp b = shm;
5 l = tmp a;
Assume the variableshm is located in memory that is shared with anotherigh-classified pro-
gramq. Assume further thatq interacts only with the above programp and that it has so far only
accessedlow -classified information. Like before,h and l arehigh- respectivelylow -classified
variables.
It is easy to see that the local variabletmp a storeslow -classified information:shm is only
shared withq. At the timeshm is assigned totmp a, q has seen onlylow -classified information.
Hence,tmp a must below .
Less obvious is the dynamic secrecy level of the variabletmp b. If p executes
non-preemptively,q cannot accessshm in betweenshm = h and tmp b = shm . Hence,
tmp b == shm == l . On the other hand, ifq preemptsp immediately aftershm = h (i.e., af-
ter Line 2),q can learn information abouth. If q preemptsp again after Line 3,q can return the
learned information toshm . After tmp b = shm , tmp b could holdhigh-classified information.
An information-flow analysis with the lattice(℘(V ar),⊆), would however assignl , tmp a and
tmp b the secrecy level{shm }. It cannot express thattmp a and tmp b depend on different
versions ofshm . We therefore have to extend the lattice(℘(V ar),⊆).
Definition 16. Universal Lattice for Shared-Memory Programs
LetLV ar ⊆ V ar be the set of local variables,SV ar = V ar \ LV ar the set of shared-
memory variables, and letip ∈ N range over the number of so far executed atomic steps in
the following universal lattice for shared-memory programs:
(℘((LV ar × {0}) ∪ (SV ar × N)),⊆) (4.1)
If we instantiate a control-flow-sensitive security type system with the lattice of Equation4.1
(e.g., by replacing in Figure2.2 on page28≤ with ⊆, ⊔ with ∪, and by lettingl and the co-
domain ofM andM ′ range over secrecy levels of the powerset℘((LV ar × {0}) ∪ (SV ar ×
N)) ), we obtain a new security type system for shared-memory programs. Applied to the
above programp, this security type system setsl andtmp a to {(shm,1) } andtmp b to {(shm,7) }
becauseshm is read in the first respectively in the7th atomic step5 in Line 1 respectively in
Line 4.
As we shall see later in Section4.6, the secrecy level of the informationq may learn from
shm — that is, thelearned secretsof shm — is low until step 4 andhigh afterwards.
4.2.5. A Protection-Parametric Information-Flow Analysi s
Due to the abstractions of security type systems, it is not very h lpful to check the following
system call and similar programs in their entirety.
1 if (cap−>is authorized(opcode)) {
2 cap−>target()−>invoke(opcode);
3 } else {
4 return Insufficient Access;
5 }
5Assignments of the formb = a are assumed to take two steps: one for readinga and one for writingb.
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In such a check, the information flows of all possible opcodesand the information flows of
invoking the system call with both sufficient and insufficient privileges are aggregated into a
single result typing environmentM ′. This aggregated result blurs the fact that certain informa-
tion flows are legitimate only if the program has sufficient privileges. More important, if the
access-control mechanism has authorized a client to invokeonly some opcodes, a conforming
client, which invokes only these opcodes, cannot leak information through the other opcodes.
However, because the value of the parameter opcode remains abstract in the information-flow
analysis, the aggregated result considers also the possible leakages of these other opcodes.
More useful are results that are parametric in the decisionsof the involved access-control mech-
anism. To obtain these results, Banerjee and Naumann [BN03] propose to integrate a specific
access-control mechanism — Java stack inspection — into a security type system. The typing
rules of this type system determine whether the invoking code has sufficient privileges (on its
stack) for the invoked method. However, for microkernel-based systems, this approach is not
immediately applicable:
1. The invoking code, the precise security policy, and hence, the granted access rights are
typically not known at the time of the analysis;
2. The allocation of kernel objects in kernel memory, the concrete distribution of capabili-
ties, and hence, the precise addresses of targeted objects ar typically not known at the
time of the analysis; and
3. The capability lookups and the privilege checks are central parts of the checked system
call and should therefore be subjected to the information-flw analysis.
An immediate consequence of the first point is that the authority check cannot be resolved at
the time of the analysis. An immediate consequence of the second point is that we have to
work with placeholder objects. To avoid blurred results, I propose to fix the access decisions
and the values (or value ranges) of those parameters for which a separate information-flow
result should be established. In situations where the to-be-checked code is invoked with such
a parameter setting, the information-flow result can replace the more general non-parametric
result. In other situations, this non-parametric result must be used or a separate result must be
established for the new parameter setting. After fixing these parameters, the analysis proceeds
in the following 3 steps:
1. The fixed access decisions, values, or value ranges are used as additional semantic infor-
mation [TGC87] to simplify the to-be-checked program;
2. Placeholder objects are created for all parametric capability targets and for the objects
that are related to these targets; and
3. The security type system is used to check the simplified program with these placeholder
objects.
A sender can leak information through a system call or serverfunction if information about
an input parameter can be stored in a kernel or server object or in a related object. A receiver
can learn this information if a system call or server function reveals the stored information
in an output parameter or in the timing of this invocation. Ifplaceholder objects are used
for the analysis, the receiver can learn this information only if the sender accesses the same
object or related object. If we know from our protection-parametric information-flow analysis
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that a system call leaks information into some placeholder object, an actual leakage can only
occur if the access-control mechanism actually grants the sender and the receiver direct or
indirect access to the same object.Confinementcaptures this last property (see Section2.5.2on
page39).
In the next section, I demonstrate with the help of a size aligned virtual-memory read why
contemporary approaches to integrate OS functionality cannot scale to non-trivial amounts of
operating-system code. As we have already seen in Section4.2.3.4, virtual-memory reads in-
volve a hardware side effect, which sets accessed bits during the address translation.
4.3. Typing a Size-Aligned Virtual-Memory Read
Sabelfeld [Sab01a], Mantel et al. [SM02], O Neill et al. [OCsC06] and Russo et al. [RS06]
follow the same principle approach to check programs that invoke a certain functionality of
the underlying operating system. Interactions with the underlying hardware are not considered,
however, the same principle approach could also be applied to hardware side effects. It works
as follows:
1. The semantics of the programming language is extended with a formal model of the OS
functionality to consider;
2. Specialized typing rules are developed to check the information flows that this OS func-
tionality contains; and
3. The specialized typing rules are proven sound against theextended semantics.
In the following, I demonstrate the complexity of this approach with the help of a simple, size-
aligned, virtual-memory read operation.
In a microkernel-based system, programs (and typically also the kernel) run in a paged proces-
sor mode. A read of the variablea therefore involves an address translation of the variable’s
virtual addressva to the physical addresspa. During this address translation, the MMU checks
permission bits in the involved page-table entries and updates the accessed bits of these entries.
To formalize this hardware side effect, we have to model page-t ble entries and their accessed
bits. In addition, we have to propagate accessed bits to all virtual aliases of these page-table
entries. Virtual aliases of page-table entries occur because on many processor architectures the
microkernel can access page tables only if they are mapped tothe kernel address space. Because
the approach extends an existing type system for a programming language, we have to expect
an application-level memory model. In such a memory model, the propagation of accessed
bits results in complex evaluation rules for virtual-memory reads, and likewise, in complex
typing rules. The evaluation rule in Equation4.2 and the typing rule in Equation4.3 are such
rules. They are shown here merely to illustrate the complexity of contemporary approaches.
The remainder of this thesis is intelligible without these rules. Figure4.1 illustrates their basic
operation.
The memory models of the standard semantics for C / C++ [Nor98, Pap98, Wal93] is a map-
ping from (virtual) addresses to bytes:mem : V → Byte or, more precisely, from the virtual
addresses in address blocks of the form[o, o + sizeof < T >) to bytes. The following is
a formalization of a size-aligned virtual-memory read operation for 32-bit paging in IA32
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Figure 4.1.: Propagation of accessed bits to the virtual alises of involved page-table entries.
processors [Cor09, § 4.3 Vol. 3a].
Let Ep denote the set of 4-byte aligned physical addresses at whichvalid page-table entries of
the programp reside. The functionaccessedp : Ep → bool denotes whether the accessed bits
of these page-table entries are set. The partial functionp ep : V × Lvl ⇀ Ep maps each virtual
addressva ∈ V to the page-table entries used in the translation ofva. The partial function
virt to physp : V ⇀ P maintains the mapping from virtual to physical addresses. Iwrite short
v2p for virt to physp. I assume the page-table base register (PDBR) is not changedwhile p
executes. For the functionptep, it holds that
(v, 2) ∈ domain(ptep) ⇒ (v, 1) ∈ domain(ptep)
and that
ptep(v, 1) = ptep(v
′, 1) ⇒ ⌊ v
4MB
⌋ = ⌊ v
′
4MB
⌋
The first property ensures that a second-level page-table entry is used for the translation ofv
only if there is also a first-level page-table entry. The second property ensures that the same
first-level page-table entry is used to translate addresseswithin the same size-aligned 4MB
region. However, for the following discussion, these constrain s are irrelevant.
val = load var(s, va)
s′ = s


accessed(ptep(va, i)) 7→ true
mem 7→ λv′.
{
set bit(5,mem(v′)) if v2p(v′) = ptep(va, i)
mem(v′) otherwise

 .
s
read(a)−→ (s′, val)
(4.2)
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Equation4.2contains the evaluation rule for a memory read access. In thesemantics ofread(a),
we have to update the accessed bits of the page-table entriesptep(va, i), i ∈ {1, 2}. In addition,
we have to propagate this update to all addressesv that alias the updated page-table entries.
Equation4.3 shows a corresponding typing rule for a control-flow-sensitive security type sys-
tem:
lres =
⊔
v
M(v) va ≤ v < va + size
M ′ = M


accessed(ptep(va, i)) 7→ lip
mem 7→ λv′.
{
mem(v′) ⊔ lip if v2p(v′) = ptep(va, i)
mem(v′) otherwise

 .
[lip] ⊢ M
read(a)−→ (M ′, lres)
(4.3)
It returns the secrecy levellres of the read address, updates the secrecy level of the first byte
of the page-table entry, which contains the accessed bit, and it updates the secrecy levels of all
addressesv′ that map to this byte. The secrecy level of the byte, which contains the accessed bit,
is increased by the context secrecy levellip. Because only a single bit is modified, the updates
must be weak to not overlook information flows through the remaining bits of this byte. In
comparison to this, the standard rule for memory reads is:
lres = M(v(a))
M ⊢ read(a) : lres
(4.4)
The complexity of the typing rule in Equation4.3 is immense, although the above typing rule
is only for a simple size-aligned read. Reads that are not size al gned may span multiple pages.
Hence, the accessed bits in two sets of page-table entries must be pdated. In addition, a security
typing rule for a write must propagate the written value to all virtual aliases. The rules for reads
and writes to memory-mapped device registers are even more complex. A projection of this
complexity to the complexity of a security type system, which is prepared to check all the low-
level operating-system code of a microkernel-based system, shows the scalability limits of this
approach.
A method to automatically derive sound security typing rules from a description of operating-
system and hardware functionalities is therefore inevitable. Given an implementation of hard-
ware side effects asToysubprograms, the security type system forT y is such a method.
4.4. Assumptions
Before I introduce the syntax and the semantics ofToy, let me clarify the assumptions on which
the proposed information-flow analysis is based:
1. Because the individual system calls and server functionalities are checked separately, only
small amounts of low-level operating-system code are checked at a time. As a result, more
complex methods remain feasible for such an analysis;
2. The individual system calls and server functions terminate after a small number of atomic
steps. As a consequence, all loops of the checked code terminate a d the number of
non-deterministic choices is bounded;
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3. Due to the limited stack size, the function call depth is limited and, in particular, function
calls are not recursive. When translating C++ toToy, it is therefore feasible to inline all
function calls;
4. As already mentioned in Section2.4.7on page33, I assume a correct points-to analysis
and a correct loop bound analysis;
5. The to-be-checked operating-system code must not contain ull-pointer dereferences (see
e.g., Tlili et al. [TD08] for a static analysis of C memory-safety properties);
6. I assume jumps in the inline assembler statements of low-level operating-system code
to be trivial. By this, I mean that it is trivial to replace thejumps with appropriate if-
statements; and
7. In this thesis, I focus on lock-similar programs only. That is, at any given point in time,
the to-be-checked programp will hold the same locks (see Section4.5.4.2on page144).
4.5. Syntax and Semantics of Toy
Toy is a simple imperative programming language with non-deterministic composition[]. Its
syntax is given by:
Definition 17. Syntax ofToy
Types t
Marker γ
Temporaries nt
Expressions et := ct | vt | ∗ (naddr )t | nt1 ◦ nt2 | • nt | ((t) nt
′
)t
Statements c := e2s(ntr = e
t) | v = nt | ∗ (naddr ) = nt |
if (nbool ) {c1} else {c2} | while(nbool ){c} | skip |
c1; c2 | c1 ‖
γ
c2 | c1[]
γ
c2 | ǫ
A Toy programp is a statementc. Typically, a program consists of substatementsci and
subexpressionset. v denotes the address of a variable,ct abbreviates a constant of typet.
◦ and• stand for the usual unary and binary operators+,−, ∗, /, <<,>>, etc.
I shall write if (nbool ) {c} as syntactic sugar forif (nbool ) {c} else { skip }, c1 ⋄
γ
c2 for
c1; c2 []
γ
c2; c1 andskipi+1 for skip; skipi with skip0 = ǫ.
Toymakes extensive use of an artificial address space of non-allcated temporariesnt. The pri-
mary purpose of non-allocated temporaries is to hold the out-of-thin-air values of those expres-
sions that the compiler decides to optimize away. By executingToyexpressions on temporaries
and by non-deterministically storing these temporaries onthe stack, in processor registers or
not at all, the check of the proposed security type system considers a large class of compiler
optimizations.
Temporaries are part of theToy memory model (see Section4.5.1below). Without loss of
generality, allToyexpressions except the two read expressions:vt and∗(naddr )t, read param-
eters only from non-allocated temporaries. AllToyexpressions write their computed result to
the non-allocated temporary denoted byntr. This temporary address is an explicit parameter
of all Toy expressions. For a better readability, I have excludedntr from all expressions in
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Definition 17. With a slight abuse of notation, I shall writentr = e
t to denote thatet stores
its result inntr. Where necessary, preceding reads and subsequent writes may read parameters
from registers or from memory, or they may store results backto these locations.
Toy expressionset are typed. The typet is the data type of the expression result.Toy imple-
ments the following expressions:ct produces the constantc of type t, vt and∗(naddr )t read a
value of typet from a fixed addressv respectively from a computed addressnaddr . In Toy, addr
is the type for memory and register addresses. The two operators• and◦ stand for the common
unary and binary operators+,−, ∗, /, <<, etc., ((t) nt′)t is a cast operator. The expression
((t) nt
′
)t casts thet′-typed value innt
′
into a t-typed value. As we shall see in Section4.5.2,
values of typet may be the usual values of this type (e.g.,true andfalse for t = bool ), or they
may encode quiet- or signalled not-a-thing values.
Toy implements the following statements:e2s allows any expression to appear as a statement.
v = nt and∗(naddr ) = nt are assignments to a fixed addressv respectively to a computed
addressnaddr . if (nbool ) {c} andif (nbool ) {c1} else {c2} are the usual branching instructions,
while(nbool ){c} is the usual construct for repetition.skip is a no-op statement.Toyimplements
three statements for the composition of substatements: sequential compositionc1; c2, parallel
compositionc1 ‖
γ
c2, and indeterminately sequenced compositionc1 ⋄
γ
c2. These three state-
ments match the three sequenced relations of the C++ standard [PC09, § 1.9 pt 14]:sequenced
before, unsequencedand indeterminately sequenced. In addition,Toy implements the non-
deterministic choice operatorc1[]
γ
c2, which executes eitherc1 or c2. Every non-deterministic
statement is marked with a markerγ. As we shall see later in Section4.5.3.3, the marker is
used to ensure that the same non-deterministic choice is always resolved in the same way. The
statementǫ denotes the empty program.
Toy lacks true while loops and function calls. The former are notrequired for terminating
code but easily added. The only issue that remains is how to limit the number of possible non-
deterministic choices and hence the number of ways in which tese non-deterministic choices
can be resolves (see Section4.7.1below). Adding function calls to the semantics and to the
type system would not be difficult. An open issue though is howto adjust separately established
results for non-inline functions such that they can be reused in call sites where these functions
are inlined. A trivial solution is to recheck the inlined version, which ignores the performance
benefit one obtains from reusing results. Other solutions tothis problem are left for future work.
The formal semantics ofToyconsists of three elements:
• a memory model,
• a data-type model, and
• a small-step semantics.
In the following sections, I describe these elements in greate detail.
4.5.1. Memory Model
Assuming that bytes are the smallest addressable units, most standard semantics for C and
C++ are based on byte-granular memory models. However, manyprocessor architectures offer
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instructions that read, set, clear, or complement bits indiv dually (see e.g., [Cor09, § 3.2 Vol.
2a: BT, BTS, BTR, BTC]6).
In the formal semantics ofToy, and likewise in the formalization of the typing environment
of the security type system7, I use the following bit-granular addressing scheme:
Memory : Type = [Address → Bit ]
Typing Environment : Type = [Address →Secrecy Level]
To uniformly handle register accesses and memory accesses,I utilize the addressing scheme of
the Robin hardware model [TWV+08]:
Address : Type = [# register : Register ID, offset : nat #]
In this type,Register ID denotes the type of the register respectively the memory. Itanges over
the registers of the respective processor architecture. That is, on IA32 processors,Register ID
contains all general-purpose registers (such aseax, ebx , andecx), all special-purpose registers
(such as the page-table base registercr3 and the code segment registercs ), all registers of the
floating-point units, and all registers of processor implemented devices (such as the registers of
the Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller (APIC)). In addition,Register ID contains the
identifierPhys Mem. The address(# register = Phys Mem, offset = i #) refers to the biti in main
memory. InToy, I further extend the typeRegister ID with two artificial register types:
• Prem denotes an artificial register that stores the reason for premature terminations. For
example, when a loop body has exited prematurely,Prem containsbreak or continue to
indicate an exit through a respective statement.return indicates a premature termination
of a function body;
• Temporary(id,t) denotes the set of non-allocated temporaries that are used by the to-be-
checkedToyprogram. Because a translation of a terminating C++ programto Toyrequires
only a finite amount of these temporaries, the set of non-alloc ted temporaries is finite for
all practical purposes. Each temporary register comes witha type t to denote the data
type of the values it may hold.
The functionvalid?(r : Register ID) : finite set [nat] returns the finite set of valid offsets for
each register.
To avoid the complexity of propagating values to virtual aliases, the memory model ofToy
is based on physical addresses. That is, theoffs t field of a memory address is interpreted
as the physical address of the corresponding bit. Except forphysically-addressed hardware
data structures (such as page tables) and except for DMA transfers, whose addresses are not
translated by an IOMMU, physical addresses can represent abstract locations, provided that the
sharing properties of these addresses are preserved.
The microkernel and many multi-level servers leave the virtual- o-(abstract)-physical-address
translation of most accessed variables constant. For theseaddresses, I shall abbreviate the
address translation with the help of the two partial functionsv2p andpte that I have introduced
in Section4.3.
6Actually, only LOCK BTC, LOCK BTR and LOCK BTS modify single bits [Cor09, § 8.1.2.2 Vol. 3a]. The
non-atomic versions of these instructions read the respective byte, modify the bit and write back the result.
Concurrent memory accesses can interleave these operations.
7Tools are of course free to choose a more efficient representatio .
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4.5.2. Data Types
Data types define which operations are available on an objectand how these operations interpret
the memory representation of this object.
C++ comes with a rich set of predefinedfundamental types[PC09, § 3.9] such as bool, int,
and float. In addition,compound typesuch as pointers, enumerations, classes, unions and
arrays allow programmers to define further types. However, bcause accesses to class, union
or array type objects are defined member wise, there is no needto store these objects in their
entirety. It suffices to store the members of these objects. Following Tews et al. [TWV+08], I
call types that must be stored on their owninterpreted data types.
Toy inherits all data types from C and C++. In addition,Toydefines the typesbit , byte ,
word andaddr to encode hardware side effects. In the following formalization, many aspects
of data types are left abstract though.
For an interpreted data typet, the setrange(t) is the set of values that valid objects of this
type may assume. To formalize this function, we need a superty , which contains all possible
values of objects of interpreted data types. I call this superty extended real. It contains real
numbers to represent floating-point types and integers to repres nt integral types and enums.
In addition, it contains special encodings for infinity, true and false, and for the addresses of
the Toy memory model. Hence,extended realis the disjoint union of real, bool, Address,
and a set of special not-a-thing values (NaTs). I distinguish two types of NaTs: quiet NaTs
(qNaT) and signalled NaTs (sNaT). The former encode quiet failures of operations and special
results such as infinity. The latter indicate exceptions. For example, a division by zero triggers
a divide-error exception (#DE). To be able to offload the triggering of this exception into a
subsequently executed hardware side effect, the divide operator/ returns an sNaT value, which
encodes this exception. Remember,/ is one of the binary operators, which I have summarized
with ◦.
Knowing therange of possible values, we can now define the semantics of interpreted data
types. The following functions are left arbitrary but fixed:
Definition 18. Semantics of the Data Typet
The semantics of all data typest are characterized byrange(t) and by the following five
functions:
alignment(t) : N+
size(t) : N+
support t ⊆ {i : N|i < size(t)}
to bits t : range(t) → [support t → Bit ]
from bits t : [support t → Bit ] → range(t)
Definition 18 extends the interpreted data type(pod?[T]) of the Robin data-type
model [TWV+08, pg. 42] to a bit-granular memory model. The functionsalignment(t)
andsize(t) return the alignment respectively the size of the typet. Both values are positive
(i.e.,∈ N+). The setsupport t denotes the set of bits that are relevant to store a value of type
t. C++ allows the value representation of an object to be smaller than its object representation.
That is, C++ objects can also contain holes that store no partof the object value and that are
not necessarily modified. The functionto bits t returns the bit-wise memory representation of
a given value of typet. The functionfrom bits t is the left inverse8 of to bits t. That is, for
8The functionfrom bitst is not necessarily the right inverse ofto bitst. Multiple memory representations can
exist for a single value (e.g., for the qNaT invalid memory representation).
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from bits t and forto bits t the following condition must hold:
∀ d. from bits t(to bits t(d)) = d (4.5)
Because the memory representation of data types and hence the above functions are imple-
mentation defined, a compiler-independent information-flow analysis would try to leave these
functions abstract (of course within some reasonable bounds for the size of data types). How-
ever, unless the data types, with which memory addresses areaccessed, never change, leaving
the size and support of a data type abstract may result in the rejection of many secure programs.
In situations where data of such a type is stored in memory, the information-flow analysis can-
not precisely deduce which bits are modified. Therefore, it has to consider also information that
was previously stored. The security type system would execute all writes as weak updates (see
the 3rd paragraph of Section2.4.7on page33).
To avoid weak updates, I propose to checkToy programs with concrete values forsize(t)
and with a concrete supportsupport t (e.g., as defined by the used compiler). The actual mem-
ory representation of values of this type (i.e., the functions from bit t andto bit t) can thereby
remain arbitrary but fixed. With specific encodings, the program cannot leak any additional
secrets.
4.5.3. Dynamic Semantics
With the memory model and the data-type semantics in place, we can now define the small-step
semantics ofToyprograms. The semantics ofToy is formalized as a state transition system with
statess of typeState and the following three transition relations:
→e : Expression × State × Temporary → State
for Toyexpressions,
→c : Statement × State → Statement × State
for Toystatements, and
→ext(io) : State → State
to characterize the state transitions of concurrently executing threads.
The typeState consists of two elements:
• the state of the memory model:mem : Address → Bit, and
• a counter for atomic steps:ip ∈ N.
4.5.3.1. Expressions
Figure4.2 shows the semantics ofToyexpressions. I use the following simplified notation for
memory reads and memory updates:
• read(t, addr) reads the bits insupport t starting fromaddr . That is, ifi ∈ support t, then
the bitaddr + i is read from the respective register or memory. Here,addr + i stands for
the address that is obtained by increasing the offset ofaddr by i;
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[const:ct]
s →ext(io) s′
(ct, s, ntr) →e s′ [ mem(ntr)
t7→ to bits t(c) ]
[read:vt]
s →ext(io) s′
(vt, s, ntr) →e s′ [ mem(ntr)
t7→ read(t, v)(s′) ]
[read ptr:∗(naddr )t] s →ext(io) s
′ dest = from bitsaddr (read(addr , naddr )(s′))
(∗(naddr )t, s, ntr) →e s′ [ mem(ntr)
t7→ read(t, dest)(s′) ]
[binary op:nt1 ◦ nt2]
s →ext(io) s′
l = from bits t(read(t, nt1)(s
′)) r = from bits t(read(t, nt2)(s
′))
(nt1 ◦ nt2, s, ntr) →e s′ [ mem(ntr)
t7→ to bits t(binary op(◦, t)(l, r)
[unary op:•nt]
s →ext(io) s′
val = from bits t(read(t, nt)(s′))
(•nt, s, ntr) →e s′ [ mem(ntr)
t7→ to bits t(unary op(◦, t)(val)
[cast:((t)nt
′
)t]
s →ext(io) s′
val = from bits t
′
(read(t′, nt
′
)(s′))
( ((t)nt′)t, s, ntr) →e s′ [ mem(ntr)
t7→ to bits t(cast(t′, t)(val)) ]
Figure 4.2.: Small Step Semantics ofToyExpressions.
The notations[mem(addr )
t7→ bf ] is used for memory updates,read(t, addr ) for memory reads. The rela-
tion→ext(io) is the transition relation for concurrently executing threads (see Section4.5.4.3below). In [read:
vt], v stands for the address of a variable;◦ ∈ {+,−, ∗, /, etc.} and• ∈ {−,++,−−, etc.}. The functions
binary op, unary op andcast characterize the behavior of the respective unary (•), binary (◦) and cast opera-
tors.
• s [ mem(addr) t7→ bf ] updates the state of the memory modelmem in s at the support
bits oft. These are those addressesaddr+i wherei ∈ support t holds. The values of these
bits are set to the values of the respective bits of the bit string bf (i.e., s [ mem(addr +
i) 7→ bf(i) ] if i ∈ support t). In situations, where not all bit addresses for the respective
support bits are valid, a special qNaT value is stored in the valid bits to indicate an invalid
memory access.
For better readability, I have omitted the virtual-to-physical address translation withv2p.
The semantics ofToyexpressions is fairly standard:ct returns the constantc, the expressionsvt
and∗(naddr )t perform the expected memory accesses and store the read value inntr. The unary,
binary, and cast expressions invoke the functionsunary op, binary op respectivelycast , which
compute the corresponding operation in the semantic domainof the respective type. For exam-
ple,binary op(+, int) performs integer addition as it is described in the C++ standard [PC09,
§ 5.7]. The types of these functions are:
binary op(◦, t) : range(t)× range(t) → range(t)
unary op(•, t) : range(t) → range(t)
cast(t′, t) : range(t′) → range(t)
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To prove theToy security type system sound against the formal semantics ofToy the precise
computations, whichunary op, binary op andcast perform, are not very interesting because
the security type system abstracts from the concrete operations anyway. The security type
system pessimistically assumes that any information of theparameters of these functions is
encoded in their results. The security type system is therefore sound as long as semantic opera-
tions are total9. That is, they are defined for all possible input parameters.There are two points
to notice about theToyexpression semantics:
1. All parameters and all results are provided in respectively stored to non-allocated tem-
poraries. Therefore,Toy expressions are not recursive. More precisely, all expression
terminate in one step; and
2. In between any two atomic steps of the to-be-checked program, an arbitrary amount of
steps of concurrently executing threads can execute. The relation→ext(io) captures their
behavior.
We shall return to the latter point in Section4.5.4.3.
4.5.3.2. Statements
Figure 4.3 presents the small step semantics ofT y statements. The transition relation→c:
Statement × State → Statement × State evaluates one atomic step of the programc on the
states. Thereby, it produces a new programc′, which contains the remaining steps ofc, and a
new states′, which results from executing the selected step ofc ons. Hence, transitions have the
form (c, s) →c (c′, s′). The semantics is quite standard:e2s(ntr = et) executes the expression
et, skip returns the result of→ext(io), v = nt, and∗(naddr ) = nt updates‘mem as expected.
e2s, skip, v = nt and∗(naddr ) = nt complete in one step. Therefore, they all transition to the
empty statementǫ.
In the semantics ofif(nbool ){c1}else{c2} and in the semantics ofc1[]
γ
c2, the execution of
skipn statements balances the atomic step counts‘ip. Otherwise, the semantics ofif is standard:
dependent on the result ofnbool , either the if-branchc1 or the else-branchc2 remains as the
program to be executed.
For the analysis of shared-memory programs, a balanced atomic step count is helpful to
avoid unwanted correlations of memory accesses after executing if-statements with unbalanced
branches. By balanced, I mean that both branches of an if-statement take the same amount
of atomic steps to execute. With the definition in Section4.5.4.3, it is easy to see that allow-
ing concurrently executing threads to preempt askipn statement multiple times is equivalent
to allowing these threads to preemptskip1 = skip. Essentially,→ext(io) allows concurrently
executing threads to execute non-deterministically for a not further specified amount of time.
Therefore, provided that the to-be-checked program does not do anything, we can always sum-
marize the executions of multiple preemptions into the executions of one single preemption.
The Toy semantics of while-loops is defined by the unfolding rule: execution of a while-
loop is equivalent to executing an if-statement, which checks the condition of the while-loop
and executes the body plus the while-loop if the condition evaluates to true and which finishes
the loop otherwise. However, in our specific setting, only terminating system calls or server
invocations are analyzed. Therefore, we can reap-benefit ofcorrect loop-bound analyses (see
Section2.4.8) to obtain a much simpler semantics for terminating while-loops.
9Pottier and Simonet [PS03] apply the same trick to simplify their semantics of ML.
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[expr: e2s(ntr = e
t)]
(et, ntr, s) →e s′
(e2s(ntr = e
t), s) →c (ǫ, s′)
[skip]
s →ext(io) s′
(skip, s) →c (ǫ, s′)
[write: v = nt]
s →ext(io) s′
(v = nt, s) →c (ǫ, s′ [ mem(v) t7→ read(t, nt)(s′) ])
[write ptr:]
s →ext(io) s′ dest = frombitsaddr (read(addr , naddr )(s′))
(∗(naddr ) = nt, s) →c (ǫ, s′ [ mem(dest) t7→ read(t, nt)(s′) ])
[if (true)]
s →ext(io) s′ from bitsbool (read(bool , nbool )(s′)) = true
(if (nbool ) {c1} else {c2}, s) →c (c1; skipmax(|c2|−|c1|,0), s′)
[if (false)]
s →ext(io) s′ from bitsbool (read(bool , nbool )(s′)) = false
(if (nbool ) {c1} else {c2}, s) →c (c2; skipmax(|c1|−|c2|,0), s′)
[while:]
(while(nbool ){c}, s) →c (if(nbool ){c;while(nbool ){c}}, s)
[seq comp:c1; c2]
(c1, s) →c (c′1, s′)
(c1; c2, s) →c (c′1; c2, s′)
[epsilon comp:ǫ× c2]
× ∈ { ; ‖ }
(ǫ× c2, s) →c (c2, s)
[choice left:c1[]c2]
pick(γ) = true
(c1[]
γ
c2, s) →c (c1; skipmax(|c2|−|c1|,0), s)
[choice right:c1[]c2]
pick(γ) = false
(c1[]
γ
c2, s) →c (c2; skipmax(|c1|−|c2|,0), s)
[parallel left: c1 ‖ c2]
pick(γi) = true (c1, s) →c (c′1, s′)
(c1 ‖
γi
c2, s) →c (c′1 ‖
γi+1
c2, s′′)
[parallel right:c1 ‖ c2]
pick(γi) = false (c2, s) →c (c′2, s′)
(c1 ‖
γi
c2, s) →c (c1 ‖
γi+1
c′2, s
′)
Figure 4.3.: Small Step Semantics ofToyStatements
The notation for memory reads and updates and for→ext(io) are as described for Figure4.2. The oraclepick is
used to resolve the control-flow non-determinism of theToystatements[] and‖ (see Section4.5.3.3).
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Let i = loop bound(s‘ip) be the upper bound on the number of iterations of the while loop
(while(nbool ){c}, s) as returned by the used loop-bound analysis. Then,while(nbool ){c} can
be written aswhilei(nbool ){c} with the following evaluation rules:
[while: while0]
(while0(nbool ){c}, s) →c (skip, s)
[while: whilei]
i > 0
(whilei(nbool ){c}, s) →c (if(nbool ){c;whilei−1(nbool ){c}}, s)
The consequences for theToy security type system are the following. After applying the
rule [while: whilei] i times, the to-be-checkedToy program contains only if-statements (and
while0 = skip) instead ofwhile(nbool ){c}. Hence, the more precise typing rule for if-
statements can be used to check the program for illegal information flows. Although their
addition would be sound, a security type system for low-level op rating-system code does not
necessarily require typing rules for true while loops such as Rule C4 and Rule C4’ in Figure2.2
on page28.
The semantics of the sequence statementc1; c2 is standard. It evaluates firstc1 until no more
atomic steps are left on the left side of; (i.e., until ǫ; c2 remains to be executed). At this time,
the rule [epsilon comp] collapsesǫ; c2 to c2.
4.5.3.3. Control-Flow Non-determinism in Toy
The intuition behind control-flow non-determinism is that it represents under-specification,
which can be resolved by the implementor or by some mechanismat run-time. For exam-
ple, we have seen that the evaluation order of most C++ expressions is non-deterministic. The
compiler resolves this non-determinism by putting the corresponding assembler statements into
the binary in a particular order. The interleaving of hardware side effects with the program con-
trol flow is typically resolved by a run-time mechanism. For example, the interleaving of reads
and writes of the to-be-checked program with DMA memory accesses is resolved at runtime by
the arbitration logic of the memory bus and by the processor caches.
Toy implements two non-deterministic statements:[] and ‖. The statementc1[]
γ
c2 either
resolves toc1 or to c2, the choice of which is non-deterministic. As a consequence, inde-
terminately sequenced compositionc1 ⋄
γ
c2 either executesc1 beforec2 or c2 beforec1 (i.e.,
c1 ⋄
γ
c2 = c1; c2[]
γ
c2; c1). Parallel compositionc1 ‖
γi
c2 produces an arbitrary interleaving ofc1
andc2. For that, eitherc1 is chosen non-deterministically to execute one step orc2 is chosen to
advance by one step. Like if-statements,c1[]
γ
c2 balances the atomic step counts‘ip by executing
skip statements afterc1 respectively afterc2.
To formalize these non-deterministic binary choices, I usean arbitrary but fixed function
pick , which acts as an oracle and which either returnst ue or false. In the definition ofpick ,
it is tempting to chooseState as the domain of this function10. However then, refinements of
pick(s) can depend their decisions on arbitrary secrets ins.
10The monotonic atomic step counts‘ip, which is part of the states, ensures that aToyprogram never returns to
the same state.
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Consider for example the following programp:
1 int a;
2 int l ;
3
4 (a = h) ‖ ( l = 0 [] l = 1)
Intuitively, one would expect this program to be secure because only constants are assigned
to the low -observable variablel . However, if an implementor decides to resolve the non-
deterministic choice such that it favorsl = 0 if, lets say,a < 5 and in favor ofl = 1 otherwise,
information about the value inh can be leaked.
To avoid these complications, Lowe [Low04] introduces a marker scheme, which ensures that
non-deterministic choices are always resolved in the same way. Based on this marker scheme,[]
is marked as a non-deterministic choice that evaluates independently from the non-deterministic
choice that determines the interleaving witha = h. In this work, I adopt the same principle idea
by allowingpick to depend only on markers of the formγ, respectively on markers of the form
γi for parallel composition. Hence,pick is a function of typeMarker → bool .
In the transition rule of‖, the non-determinism cannot be resolved immediately as it is the
case for[] and hence also for⋄. As a consequence, we cannot apply the same simple marker
scheme because transition rules of the form:
[parallel left: c1 ‖ c2]
pick(γ) = true (c1, s) →c (c′1, s′)
(c1 ‖
γ
c2, s) →c (c′1 ‖
γ
c2, s′′)
[parallel right:c1 ‖ c2]
pick(γ) = false (c2, s) →c (c′2, s′)
(c1 ‖
γ
c2, s) →c (c1 ‖
γ
c′2, s
′)
would always pick atomic steps of one of the statementc1 respectively ofc2. To avoid these
complications, I use markers of the formγi, which keep track of the so far executed atomic
steps inc1 ‖ c2. Initially, Toy programs contain only parallel-composition statements ofthe
form c1 ‖
γ0
c2.
For the definition of→ext(io), which completes the formal semantics ofT y, we have to charac-
terize the interactions between concurrently executing threads and the to-be-checked program.
These interactions can be through shared memory or through other shared kernel objects.
4.5.4. Shared Memory
In the information-flow analysis of the microkernel and of its multi-level servers, it is our pri-
mary concern to establish that:
1. the checked programp does not leak internal secrets; and
2. the checked programp does not forward secrets from one client to another client unless
the latter is cleared for this information.
To enforce the second point, we have to characterize the possible information flows between
clients of the checked program and between the checked program and these clients. Let us first
focus on information flows through shared memory.
Clients with read authority to some memory page, which is mapped to the checked program’s
address space, can learn any information about the data thatp stores in this page. This is of
course provided the location is not locked or provided the client accesses the memory location
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without first acquiring the lock. In the latter case, I say thecli nt does not adhere to the locking
discipline for this memory location.
When scheduled, a client may forward any information it can read over any channel that is
available to it. Moreover, it may store the read informationt forward it at a later point in
time. Similar to reading shared memory, a client with write access to a shared page can write
previously learned information in this page. The encoding of this information can thereby be
arbitrary. Apart from that, if a client is authorized to access a page but if it did not yet exercise
this authority to obtain a respective capability, it may first request such a capability and then
access the referred page. In this case, I say the client haspotential accessto the page.
4.5.4.1. A Formal Model of Shared Memory Interactions
To formalize the interactions through shared memory, we have to characterize the propagation
of information in the addresses ofp that are read shared with other threads. This information
can propagate over a chain of communicating threads into write-shared addresses. The threads
in this chain may remember previously read information. Therelationeffectsp formalizes this
propagation of information:
Definition 19. Effects
Letp be the checked program,T the set of threads that directly or indirectly interact withp.
Rpτ is the subset of addressesA of p to whichτ ∈ T has potential read access.W pτ ⊆ A
denotes the set of potentially write-shared addresses withτ . The relationτ can send∗ τ ′
holds ifτ can directly or indirectly send toτ ′. Then, concurrently executing threads can
forward information in the read-shared addressa to the write-shared addressa′ if a and
a′ are related by:
a effectsp a
′ :⇔ ∃ τ, τ ′ ∈ T. a ∈ Rpτ ∧ a′ ∈ W pτ ′ ∧ τ can send∗ τ ′
The relationcan send∗ is the transitive, reflexive closure ofcan send . τ can send τ ′ denotes
thatτ can directly send information toτ ′ without the help of a third thread. For the time being,
this is the case ifτ has write access to some memory to whichτ ′ as read access.
Obviously, an information-flow analysis ofp is only sensible ifp is checked against an en-
vironment that does not already allow security policy violating information flows. Otherwise,
the analysis would rejectp as potentially insecure even ifp is not involved in the leakage of any
information. Definition20 formalizes this requirement:
Definition 20. Proper System Configuration
The set of concurrently executing threadsT is properly configured if it fulfills the following
condition:
∀ τ, τ ′ ∈ T.τ can send∗ τ ′ ⇒ dom(τ) ≤ dom(τ ′)
Like before,dom(τ) is the classification of the threadτ .
4.5.4.2. Locking Shared-Memory Addresses
Provided that concurrently executing threads adhere to thelocking discipline, locks can tem-
porarily protect the data stored in shared-memory addresses. However, at the same time, many
lock implementations reveal when the checked programp holds such a lock. Moreover, shared
memory can reveal whenp holds a lock even if the lock itself hides this fact.
To avoid information leakage due to lock acquisition, a common approach is to classify locks
and to reject programs that acquire locks in secret contexts. For example, Sabelfeld [Sab01a]
144
4.5. SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS OF TOY
rejects programs that acquire locks in any context except the lowest classified context⊥.
Russo et al. [RS09] tolerate acquisitions in higher classified contexts only if the scheduler is
signalled to prevent the interleaved execution of lower classified threads together with higher
classified threads. In our setting, there is a further alternative. In Section3.7, we have seen
two lock implementations that, when used in combination with the proposed information-
flow secure scheduler, do not reveal whether a lock is held by another thread. These locks
can be taken by any thread and in any context. Let us thereforefocus on locks of this latter class.
Even though the lock itself may not reveal when it is taken, shared-memory accesses may
leak this information. Consider for example the following programp with two shared-memory
variablesshm a andshm b and a lockl that protectsshm a:
1 shm a = 0; shm b = 0;
2
3 if (h) {
4 lock( l );
5 shm b = 1;
6 shm b = 2;
7 unlock(l );
8 } else {
9 shm b = 1;
10 shm b = 2;
11 }
12
13 l = shm a;
Intuitively, one would accept this program as secure unlessa concurrently executing thread
τ with potential write access toshm a has access tohigh-classified information. Even
if shm b is only read shared withτ , one would considerp as secure becausep executes
shm b = 1; shm b = 2; independent of the value ofh. However, if the concurrently executing
threadτ executes the programq:
1 old = shm b;
2
3 while (old != shm b) {
4 lock( l );
5 shm a++;
6 unlock(l );
7 old = shm b;
8 }
the value ofh may be leaked tol . If h == false andτ preempts the execution ofp before Line 8,
immediately after Line 9 and again after Line 10,τ detects two modifications ofshm b and
updatesshm a twice. If, on the other hand,h == true andτ preempts the execution ofp before
Line 4 and immediately after Line 5, it detects the change from shm b == 0 to shm b == 1,
however before it can executeold = shm b it has to wait forp to release the lock onshm a.
Similarly, if τ preempts the execution ofp immediately after Line 6, it only detects the change
from shm b == 0 to shm b == 2. Hence, it increaseshm a only once. Ifp would also lock
shm a while executingshm b = 1; shm b = 2; in the else branch, alow -classified observer is no
longer able to distinguish the two branches.
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In this thesis, I will therefore focus onlock-similarprograms.
Definition 21. lock-similar programs
A programp is lock similarif in any two states andt with identical atomic-step counts‘ip,
t‘ip holds the same locks.
LetLp be the set of locks thatp may acquire. The function
locksp : N → ℘(Lp) (4.6)
denotes for each atomic stepi ∈ N the locks held byp. The function
locked addressesp : Lp → ℘(A) (4.7)
defines for each lockl the subset of the addresses inA, which this lock protects. Only those
addressesa are considered as locked addresses that are shared with threads that adhere to the
locking discipline. That is, such an adhering threadτ guarantees not to accessa while the
protecting lockl is held byp.
Certain locks enforce an adherence to the locking discipline even if unchecked and thus
potentially untrustworthy programs attempt to access shared data. For example, the disabling
of preemptions on a uniprocessor systems protects all memory addresses that are not DMA
accessible. A server, which grants access to lock-protected m mory only to the current lock
holder and which guarantees not to access locked pages, implements a similar protection.
Alternatively, programs can be statically checked for correct lock usage. For example,
in [IK08], Iwama and Kobayashi present a type system, which performssuch a check for Java
bytecode.
Because lock-protected addresses can only be accessed byp, the are temporarily only accessi-
ble byp. The functionlocalp combineslocksp andlocked addressesp to denote these addresses.
Definition 22. Local Addresses
The functionlocalp defines for each step, which addresses are protected by a lockthatp
holds. It is defined as:
localp : N → ℘(A)
localp(i) :=
⋃
l∈locksp(i)
locked addressesp(l)
The functionslocksp and locked addressesp are given by Equation4.6and Equation4.7,
respectively. For an address to be inlocked addressesp, it must be shared only with those
threads that adhere to the locking discipline.
4.5.4.3. Input Non-Determinism and Concurrently Executin g Threads
Unless the to-be-checked programp holds a lock for an addressa, all concurrently executing
threadsτ ∈ T , which sharea in a writable fashion, can write an arbitrary value toa. In
particular, they may store ina an arbitrary encoding of information they have learned from
the previous execution ofp or from other threads. They may however also decide to leavea
unchanged.
To formalize these inputs let me introduce a second oracle: the input oracleio. The function
io returns for each write-shared addressa ∈ ⋃
τ∈T
W pτ either a value of typeBit or the special
symbolnil to denote thata is not modified. I assume thatnil is not contained in the set{0, 1}.
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Hence, the type of the co-domain ofio is Address → {0, 1} ∪ nil . Obviously, several threads
may modify an addressa in between two atomic steps of the to-be-checked programp nd each
such thread may modifya several times. Therefore, ifio returns a value of typeBit for a, I
assume that this value reflects the last modification ofa prior top resuming its execution.
The challenge in the definition ofio is to allow for both, arbitrary encodings andl-similar in-
puts, if the information-flow analysis checksp for information leakage tol-classified observers.
We shall return to this last point in Section4.6.3. For now, letio be an arbitrary but fixed func-
tion with the three parametersl, Li ands, wheres is a state,i = s‘ip, l is the observer secrecy
level, andLi is the secrecy level of the learned secrets that can be returned toa. In Section4.6,
I shall introduce learned secrets in greater detail.
The rule for updates of write-shared memory addresses by concurrently executing threads
follows from localp and from the input oracleio:
Definition 23. Shared-Memory Updates by Concurrently Executing Threads
LetT be the set of concurrently executing threads,W pτ the set of write-shared addresses
with such a threadτ ∈ T , and letio be an input oracle. Then, the transition rule for concur-
rently executing threads→ext(io): State → State is defined as follows:
s →ext(io) s′ where
s′ = s









ip 7→ ip(s) + 1
mem 7→ λa.











io(l, L, s)(a) if
io(l, L, s)(a) 6= nil ∧
a /∈ localp(s‘ip) ∧
a ∈ ⋃
τ∈T
W pτ ∧
register(a) = Phys Mem
s′mem(a) otherwise









This completes the definition of theToysemantics except that we have to notice that threads can
exchange information also via other shared kernel or serverobj cts.
4.5.4.4. Other Kernel Objects
In the relationcan send and hence ineffectsp, we have so far only considered information
flows through shared memory. In this section, I extendcan send to also consider information
flows through shared kernel or server objects.
In situations where a concurrently executing threadτ causes the modification of a variable of
a kernel or server object,τ may leak confidential information into this object. Now, if another
concurrently executing threadτ ′ obtains read access to the same variable of the same object,
or if it can otherwise learn about the information in this variable,τ can send information toτ ′.
Thereby, the shared variable can reside in the objects that are targeted directly by the capabilities
with which τ respectivelyτ ′ invoke their system calls or server invocations. Or, the variable
can reside in an object that is related to the targeted object. To detect these information flows,
the respective system calls (or server invocations) can be checked with the security type system
for Toy.
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If these calls are checked with the universal lattice for shaed-memory programs (Definition16),
τ can send toτ ′ if the following two conditions hold11:
1. If the identifier or a variable of a placeholder object appears in a secrecy level of the output
parameters of the callτ ′ invokes,τ ′ can read this parameter. Remember that, in a check
with the universal lattice, a secrecy level is the set of variable identifiers that contribute to
the stored result respectively the set of pairs of variable identifiers and step counts if the
identifier denotes a shared-memory variable.
2. The threadτ may write information to one of these variables if the secrecy l vel of this
variable contains an input parameter of the system call or ofthe server functionτ invokes.
If these two conditions hold, I extend the relationcan send by the pair(τ, τ ′). That is, in the
extended relation it holds thatτ can send τ ′. To give an example of such a leakage, let us
consider IPC betweenτ andτ ′. If τ invokes the IPC-send operation on a suitable communica-
tion channel on whichτ ′ is receiving, the kernel modifies a kernel object that is related to this
communication channel: the message registers in the UTCB ofthe receiverτ ′.
In situations where the checked programp invokes a system call or server function to read or
write a variable in a shared kernel object, I propose to extend he set of read-shared addresses
Rpτ respectively the set of write-shared addressesW
p
τ ′ in a similar way. More precisely, if the
information-flow analysis of this call reveals an information flow from the input parameters into
some shared kernel object, I propose to extend the set of addressesA with the addresses of a
placeholder object that is large enough to hold the input parameters ofp’s invocation. If the
concurrently executing threadτ is able to learn information about such an input parameter, th
address of this parameter in the placeholder object is addedto the setRpτ . This way,effectsp
correctly captures the propagation of this parameter. In the analysis ofp, the actual code of
the system call can thereby be replaced with a simple marshalling operation, which collects all
input parameters and stores them into the placeholder object. The case wherep reads from a
shared kernel or server object works accordingly.
4.5.5. C++ to Toy
With sequential, parallel and indeterminately sequenced composition, the translation of the C++
low-level language constructs toT yis straightforward. Consider for example the simple pointer
programp in Figure4.4. According to the C++ standard, the value computation∗a + b and the
address computation∗c are both sequenced before the side effect∗c = ∗a + b. The value com-
putations∗a + b and∗c are unsequenced [PC09, § 5.17 pt 1]. Similarly,∗a andb are sequenced
before∗a + b but otherwise unsequenced. Assuming that the result of∗a + b can directly be
stored in∗c, the correspondingToyprogram is given by Equation4.8respectively by the depen-
dency graph on the right side in Figure4.4.
p := (((n[b] = b ‖ (n[a] = a ;n[∗a] = ∗(n[a]))) ;n[+] = n[∗a] + n[b]) ‖
(n[c] = c ;n[∗c] = ∗(n[c]))) ;n[∗c] = n[+] (4.8)
For a better readability, I have omitted alle2s conversions, expression typest and markersγ.
The result parameterntr of an expressione
t is denoted byn[e]. For example,n[+] holds the result
of ∗a + b.
11As before, I assume that a suitable timing-leak transformation eliminates all possible timing leaks
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int ∗a;
int ∗c;
int b;
∗c = ∗a + b;
Figure 4.4.: A simple C++ pointer program (left) and itsToytranslation (right). For better read-
ability, theToy program is shown as a dependency graph. The program executes
from top to bottom, where horizontally neighbored instructions execute in an inter-
leaved fashion.
To allow the compiler to optionally allocate the integer result n[∗c] in the general purpose register
eax , we have to adjustp as follows:
p; skip[](eax , 0) = n∗c
If the non-deterministic choice[] evaluates toskip, the result remains only in[∗c]. If it evaluates
to (eax , 0) = n∗c, the integer result in [∗c] is stored to the address(eax , 0), that is, to register
eax at offset0.
Because registers are explicitly contained in the typeAddress of the Toy memory model, the
translation of inline assembler instructions toToyprograms is straightforward as long as jumps
are trivial. GCC explicitly connects asm statements with the surrounding C++ program by spec-
ifying which registers and addresses hold the input and output parameters of asm statements. In
addition, asm statements make explicit which of the non-output registers are potentially mod-
ified. These registers appear in the clobber list of the asm-statement. For example, the inline
assembler statement in
1 bool Atomic::bit test and clear(word & value, unsigned char bit) {
2
3 bool result ;
4
5 asm volatile (” btr %2, %1 ”
6 ” setc %0 ”
7 : /∗ out ∗/ ”=a” ( result ), ”+m” (value)
8 : /∗ in ∗/ ”b” ( bit )
9 : /∗ clobber ∗/ ”cc” );
10
11 return result ;
12 }
translates into
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1 // btr value, bit
2 n[addr ] = &value + (EBX, 0) ;
3 n[c] = ∗(n[addr ])bit ;
4 ( ∗(n[addr ])bit = 0 ||
5 ∗(EFLAGS.c)bit = n[c] ) ;
6
7 // setc result
8 n[c] = ∗(EFLAGS.c) ;
9 (EAX, 0) = n[c]
In Section4.4, I assumed that jumps in the inline assembler statements of the to-be-checked
operating-system code can trivially be replaced with corresponding if-statements or while-
loops.
To translate C++ control-flow statements toToy, we have to realize thatswitch can be expressed
as a sequence of if-statements:
if (c == ’a’) {
switch (c) { /∗ a ∗/
case ’a’ : ...
/∗ a ∗/ /∗ b ∗/
... ...
case ’b’ : = } else {
/∗ b ∗/ if (c == ’b’) {
... /∗ b ∗/
break; ...
default : } else {
/∗ default ∗/ /∗ default ∗/
... ...
}; }
}
In this example, the code of the second case (case ’b’: ) is copied into the first case (case ’a’: ).
This is to reflect that the first case does not terminate with abreak statement. Similarly,do and
for [PC09, § 6.5.3 pt 1] can be expressed aswhile loops:
do { stmt; } while ( cond ); = stmt; while ( cond ) { stmt; }
and
for ( init ; cond ; expr) { stmt; } = init ; while ( cond ) { stmt ; expr }
The C / C++ statementsbreak [PC09, § 6.6.1], continue [PC09, § 6.6.2], andreturn [PC09,
§ 6.6.3] terminate loops respectively functions prematurely. Typically, these statements appear
in the body of an if-statement. As a consequence, subsequentstatements are not executed if
the respective branch is taken. Information about the conditions that have lead to the execution
of this branch can be leaked because premature terminationsprevent the execution of exter-
nally visible side effects in the skipped statements. Unfortunately, subsequent statements are
in general not at the same nesting level as thebreak . Hence, skipped code cannot always be
placed into the else-branch of the if-statement that contains such a premature termination. The
following programp demonstrates this points.
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1 while ( l ) {
2 if ( l ) {
3 if (h) {
4 break ;
5 }
6 l = 5;
7 }
8 l = 7;
9 };
To correctly characterize the information flows due to premature termination, I introduced the
special registerPrem . Whenever a to-be-checked program contains a statement, which termi-
nates parts of the program prematurely, the correspondingToy program updates the register
Prem with the cause of this termination. The translation places all code that follows this prema-
ture termination in the branch of if-statements, which check for the absence of this cause. As a
result of this conversion, programs with premature terminatio s can be checked with a security
type system that has no specific rules for these terminations. The implicit information flow is
thereby characterized by the secrecy level of the cause inPrem . Applied to the above program
p, the transformation produces the following code:
1 while ( l && Prem != break ) {
2 if ( l ) {
3 if (h) {
4 Prem = break ;
5 }
6 if (Prem != break )
7 l = 5;
8 }
9 if (Prem != break )
10 l = 7;
11 };
12 if (Prem == break )
13 Prem = 0;
As mentioned at the beginning of Section4.5, I assume that the translation inlines function calls
and bodies.
4.6. Learned Secrets
Before we can turn into formalizing the security type systemfor Toy, we first have to understand
which information concurrently executing threads can learn from the read-shared addresses and,
consequently, which information they may return to the addresses they share with the to-be-
checked programp in a writable fashion.
4.6.1. Secrets of the Initial State
Initially, before the to-be-checked system call or server invocationp starts, concurrently execu-
tion threadsτ ∈ T can have learned confidential information from each other and placed this
information into the writable addresses they share withp.
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Definition 24. Initially Learned Secrets
LetT , W pτ , can send
∗ be defined as in Section4.5.4.1. Let furtherl0(τ) ≤ dom(τ) be the
least upper bound of the secrecy levels of informationτ has accessed beforep starts. I as-
sumeτ accesses any information in the directly or indirectly read-shared addresses ofp.
Then,L0 denotes the secrecy levels of information that threads inT may have learned prior
to the start ofp and that they may have directly or indirectly written to the write-shared ad-
dresses ofp. It holds that
∀ a ∈
⋃
τ∈T
W pτ .L
0(a) =
⊔
τ∈TW (a)
l0(τ)
whereTW (a) := {τ ∈ T | ∃ τ ′ ∈ T. τ can send∗ τ ′ ∧ a ∈ W pτ ′} is the set of threads
that can potentially write toa. I call L0 the learned secrets of the initial state beforep starts
executing. The learned secrets of non-write-shared addresses are undefined (i.e., the domain
ofLi ranges over the addresses in
⋃
τ∈T
W pτ ).
Based on the definition of the initially learned secrets, we can now define the secrecy levels of
the initial typing environmentM0. It contains the secrecy levels of all addresses beforep starts
executing.
Definition 25. Initial Typing Environment
LetL0 be the initially learned secrets (see Definition24). Let furtherm0 denote the initial
secrecy levels of the addresses ofp. Then, because I assumed threads to have accessed read-
shared information ofp, m0(a) ≤ l0(a′) holds for read-shared addressesa with a effectsp a′
and
∀ a ∈ A.M0(a) =
{
L0(a) if a ∈ ⋃
τ∈T
W pτ
m0(a) otherwise
holds for the typing environment of the initial state beforep starts executing.
4.6.2. Evolution of Learned Secrets
Oncep has started executing, the information at read-shared addresses and hence the learned
secrets may change. Ifp writes confidential data to a non-local read-shared address, informa-
tion about this data may propagate to all threads that have direct or indirect read access to this
address and to all addresses ofp that these threads can directly or indirectly write. To reflect
this change, I maintain a second dynamic mapping of secrecy levels — the learned secretsLi
— in the control-flow-sensitive security type system, whichI shall introduce in Section4.7.
The first dynamic mapping is the typing environmentM i.
Definition 26 contains the update rule for the learned secretsLi+1. It is based on the learned
secrets of the previous stateLi and on the typing environmentM i+1.
152
4.6. LEARNED SECRETS
Definition 26. Update of Learned Secrets
LetLi be the learned secretsLi of the checked programp beforep executes the atomic stepi
and letM i+1 be the typing environment afterp has executes this atomic stepi. Then, it holds
for the learned secretsLi+1 that:
∀ a′ ∈
⋃
τ∈T
W pτ . L
i+1(a′) = Li(a′) ⊔
⊔
a∈REff (a′,i)
M i+1(a)
In this equation,REff (a′, i) := {a ∈
⋃
τ∈T
Rpτ | a /∈ localp(i) ∧ a effectsp a′} is the set
of read-shared addressesa that are not lock protected during the atomic stepi and that can
effect the write-shared addressa′.
After p has executed theith atomic step, a transition of concurrently executing threads follows.
The secrets that these concurrently executing threads may learn fromp is the data at non-local
read-shared addresses. In addition, concurrently executing threads may remember previously
learned secrets. Therefore, the secrecy level of the information these threads may propagate to
a write-shared addressa′ is the least upper bound of the previously learned secretsLi(a′) and
of the new information in read-shared addressesa with a effectsp a
′. This leads to the update
rule for the typing environmentM i, that is, to the typing rule for→ext(io).
Definition 27. Typing Environment Update by Concurrently Executing Threads
LetA be the set of addresses,Li the learned secrets for stepi andM i the typing environ-
ment that contains the secrecy levels of the previous step ofthe to-be-checked programp.
Then, it holds for the typing environmentM
′i that:
∀ a ∈ A. M ′i(a) =
{
M i(a) ⊔ Li(a) if a ∈ ⋃
τ∈T
W pτ ∧ a /∈ localp(i)
M i(a) otherwise
M
′i reflects the secrecy levels of information concurrently executing threads could have
stored into write-shared variables. It is the input typing environment of the atomic stepi+1.
Given the typing environmentM
′i, the typing rules of the security type system forT y, which
I shall present in Section4.7, produce the typing environmentM i+1. Notice that the typing
environment update rule for concurrently executing threads update the secrecy levels of non-
local write-shared addresses in a weak fashion. That is, theupdate is with the least upper
bound of both the old secrecy levelM i(a) and the learned secretLi(a). This is to reflect that
concurrently execution threads may also decide not to modify a in between theith and thei+1st
atomic step of the to-be-checked programp.
Because local addresses can only be accessed byp, no secrets can be learned from local read-
shared addresses and no learned secrets can be propagated into local write-shared addresses.
4.6.3. Constraining the Input Oracle to Produce l-Similar Inputs
To prove a security type system sound, we have to show for any observer that if the type system
accepts a programp, then this program is non-interference secure. For the lattr, we have to
show that executingp on any twol-similar initial statess0 and t0 producesl-similar states
provided that inputs arel-similar as well. The challenge here is that the learned secrets and
thereby the decision whether two inputs arel-similar changes during the execution ofp.
In [Völ08a], I characterized the inputs of concurrently executing threads with the help of three
traces: two value traces, which contain arbitrary but fixed values; and one secrecy-level trace,
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Figure 4.5.: Stepwise-interleaved evaluation ofLi, M i, si andti.
which contains an upper bound on the secrecy levels of these valu s. If the secrecy level of an
address at the positioni in the trace is lower than or equal tol, the values for this address ati is
set to be the same in the two value traces. I assumed the secrecy lev l ofa at i to be lower than
the learned secretLi(a). However, a formal connection was not given.
To formally connect input values with learned secrets, I execut , in this work,p with two input
oraclesio andio′ on the twol-similar initial statess0 respectivelyt0. In the definition of shared-
memory updates by concurrently executing threads (Definition 23), I have mentioned an input
oracle, which is a function from observer secrecy levell, learned secretLi and statesi to a
mappingAddress → Bit ∪nil . Having formally defined learned secrets, we can now complete
this definition. io andio′ are two functions of the above type, which are passed as parameters
to →ext(io) whenp executes ons0 respectively ont0. The two functionsio andio′ are arbitrary
but fixed except that they fulfil the following property:
Definition 28. l-similar Input Oracles
LetM0 be the initial typing environment and lets0 ∼l,M0 t0 indicate that the two initial
statess0 andt0 are l-similar. Then the two input oraclesio andio′ must fulfil the following
property:
∀ i ∈ N, a ∈ ⋃
τ∈T
W pτ , s
i, ti.
s0
p
→ic si ∧ t0
p
→ic ti ∧ Li(a) ≤ l ⇒ io(l, Li, si)(a) = io′(l, Li, ti)(a)
In the above equation,l is the secrecy level of the observer andLi(a) is the learned secrets
for the atomic stepi.
Definition 28 ensures that the two input oraclesio andio′ produce the same inputs whenever
the learned secrets for a write-shared addressa are lower than or equal to the observer secrecy
level l.
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The use ofLi in the above definition demands for a stepwise-interleaved eolution ofLi, M i,
si, andti. However, becausesi andti and hence the above evolution are required only for the
soundness proof of the security type system, no overheads are imposed on an analysis with this
type system.
Figure4.5 illustrates this stepwise-interleaved evolution. Starting fromL0(a) = M0(a) for
write-shared addressesa and from twol-similar initial statess0 ∼l,M0 t0, the evolution ofLi
proceeds in the following four steps:
• First, the typing environmentM ′i is computed fromM i and fromLi using the typing
environment update rule for concurrently executing threads (Definition27);
• Then, the modifications of concurrently executing threads are propagated to the statessi
andti to produces
′i andt
′i based onLi (Definition23);
• After that, the typing rule for the atomic stepi advancesM ′i to M i+1 and the semantics
rule for this atomic step advancess
′i to si+1 respectivelyt
′i to ti+1 with the input oracles
io andio′, which in turn depend onLi; and,
• Finally,Li is advanced toLi+1 usingM i+1 (Definition 26).
Although the formalization of the concrete semantics ofT y relies on results from the security
type system, it is well formed because the statess
′i andt
′i and hence alsosi+1 andti+1 rely
only on results about the previous states:Li, M i, si, andti.
4.6.4. Example
To exemplify the use of learned secrets, let us return to the simple shared memory programp of
Section4.2.4.1whereshm is read-write shared with ahigh-classified programq, which so far
has accessed onlylow -classified information:
1 tmp a = shm;
2 shm = h;
3 shm = l;
4 tmp b = shm;
5 l = tmp a;
Is p secure with regards to alow -classified observer? Becauseq has so far only accessedlow -
classified information, the initially learned secrets ofshm L0(shm) are low unlessp would
also shareh with q in a read-shared fashion. Therefore, if we investigate the execution ofp
from two l-similar initial statess0 andt0 with s0‘mem(h) 6= t0‘mem(h), M2(tmp a) = low
ands0‘mem(tmp a) = t0‘mem(tmp a) due to the constraint on the input oraclesio andio′.
Now, if p assignsh to shm in Step 4 (Line 2),M4(shm) = high. As a result, the learned
secretsL4(shm) are updated to high as described in the update rule in Definition26. Although
p resetsshm to thelow value of l in Step 6,L6(shm) remainshigh to reflect thatq may have
remembered the previously assigned value ofh. Hence,M
′7(shm) = high to reflect thatq
may have returned information abouth beforep executes Step 7 in Line 4. The final typing
environmentM10 contains the following secrecy levels:
M10(tmp a) = low
M10(l) = low
M10(shm) = high
M10(tmp b) = high
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Hence,p is secure with regards to alow -classified observer becauseM i(l) ≤ low for all 0 ≤
i ≤ 10. However, if we would have assignedtmp b to l instead oftmp a, p would have to be
rejected due to the possible leakage ofh to tmp b.
4.7. Security Type System for Toy
This section presents the control-flow-sensitive securitytype system for the deterministic core
of Toyand its PVS-based soundness proof.
There are two principle approaches to cope with the non-determinism inToy:
• We may extend the security type system for the deterministiccore with the standard
typing rules for non-deterministic composition [Sab01b, pg. 45]; or,
• We may check all possible ways in which the control-flow non-determinism in the to-be-
checked program can be resolved, one way at a time.
In the next section, I shall elaborate on these alternatives. S ction4.7.2presents the typing rules
of the control-flow-sensitive security type system forT y. In Section4.7.3, I prove these rules
sound against the formal semantics ofT y, which I have introduced in the previous section.
4.7.1. Control-Flow Non-Determinism
Obviously, the choice between checking control-flow non-determinism with the standard rules
(e.g., Rule [ndet. choice] below) and checking all possibleresolutions of this non-determinism
involves a performance-precision tradeoff. To understandhis tradeoff let us consider the fol-
lowing programp with a non-deterministic choice in Line 4.
1 int a = h;
2 int b = h;
3
4 int ∗ c = (b = 0, &a) [] (a = 0, &b);
5
6 ∗c = 0;
7
8 l = a;
It sets botha andb to 0 independent of how the non-determinism in Line 4 is resolved. Hence,
l reveals no secret information afterl = a. p is secure with regards tol w -classified observers.
Control-flow-sensitive security type systems typically include the following standard
rule [Sab01b, pg. 45] to check non-deterministic choices of the formc1[]c2:
[ndet. choice]
[lip] ⊢ M {ci}M ′i i ∈ {1, 2} M ′ = M1 ⊔M2
[lip] ⊢ M {c1[]c2}M ′
Applying this rule to the above programp, the results of typing(b = 0, &a) and (a = 0, &b)
are merged into a single typing environment. As a consequence, the analysis of the remaining
program∗c = 0; l = a; needs to be carried out only once. It is much quicker than if wewould
check the two resolutions of the control-flow non-determinism in Line 4 separately. However,
in the typing environmentM1 (for (b = 0, &a)), the secrecy level ofa is high and the secrecy
level of b is low whereas inM2 (for (a = 0, &b)), a is low andb is high. Hence, in the merged
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typing environmentM ′, the secrecy levels of botha andb arehigh. The leads to the rejection
of p because∗c = 0 in Line 6 cannot reduceM ′(a) to low . Because a correct points-to analysis
cannot return more specific pointer targets than∗c ∈ {a, b}, the typing rule for∗c = 0 must
perform a weak update onM ′(a) andM ′(b). Therefore, the secrecy level ofa is high for the
check ofl = a.
The two ways in which the non-deterministic choice in Line 4 of the above programp can be
resolved leads to the following two programs:
• p1 := c = (b = 0, &a); ∗c = 0; l = a; and
• p2 := c = (a = 0, &b); ∗c = 0; l = a; .
For the following two reasons, a separate information-flow analysis of these programs estab-
lishes the security ofp. p is secure because
1. only one of the variablesa andb assumes the secrecy levelhigh in the respective typing
environment for the pointer assignmentc = (...) ; and because
2. in both programs, the target ofc can be determined precisely.
The costs of this precision double because two programs haveto be checked instead of one.
4.7.1.1. Checking all Resolutions of Control-Flow Non-Det erminism
Toyclearly separates control-flow non-determinism and input non-determinism. The former is
introduced in the threeToystatementsc1[]c2, c1 ⋄ c2 andc1 ‖ c2 and resolved by the oraclepick ;
the latter is resolved by the oracleio, which we have already discussed above.
The oraclepick takes a markerγ and returns eithert ue or false. The semantics ofc1[]
γ
c2, c1⋄
γ
c2
andc1 ‖
γ0
c2 makes use of this decision to either favor the left statementc1 or the right statement
c2. For a concrete instance of the oraclepick we can therefore simplify the to-be-checkedToy
program to a program that contains no control-flow non-determinism.c1[]
γ
c2 simplifies either to
c1 or to c2, c1 ⋄
γ
c2 simplifies either toc1; c2 or to c2; c1, andc1 ‖
γ0
c2 simplifies to one concrete
interleaving of the atomic steps inc1 andc2.
A sound analysis must check all resolutions of the non-determinism in these statements. For
example, if the program containsc1 ⋄
γ
c2, both programs must be checked: the one containing
c1; c2 and the one containingc2; c1.
In some situations, a checked programp can be accepted as secure even if the check for some
resolutions of the non-determinism inp fails. For example, assumec1; c2 succeeds for a pro-
gram, which containsc1 ⋄
γ
c2, whereas the simplified version ofp, which containsc2; c1, is
rejected as potentially being insecure. If this situation occurs in the translated C++ operating-
system code, compilers that avoid such an unsafe resolutioncan still produce an information-
flow secure binary fromp. If this situation occurs in a hardware side effect, architectures that
avoid such an unsafe resolution can still run the binary ofp in an information-flow secure
way. Because the translation from C++ toT y typically introduces non-determinism to allow
for subsequent compiler optimizations, a failure to check all possible resolutions of this non-
determinism typically only prevents the corresponding optimization. In hardware side effects
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on the other hand, control-flow non-determinism is typically introduced to describe a hardware
behavior whose implementation is typically not precisely known. A failure to check all possible
resolutions of non-determinism in hardware side effects isherefore more critical.
4.7.1.2. Practicality
For the above example, the analysis worked because of the atomic steps thatp executes, only
one step involved a non-deterministic choice. In general, aprogram contains much more non-
deterministic steps, which raises the question whether it is a all practical to check all possible
resolutions of control-flow non-determinism.
In general, for an analysis of large programs with possibly non-terminating while-loops, the
clear answer is “no”. However, in our setting, we seek to check only terminating system calls
and server invocations, which contain no true while-loops.Hence, the number of atomic steps
is bounded and small and so is the number of atomic steps that affec the control flow of the
to-be-checked program in a non-deterministic way.
Also, it is straightforward to extend the security type system forToywith the standard rule for
non-deterministic choice [Sab01b, pg. 45], which would allow us to apply the above approach
only to selected non-deterministic steps. The developmentof heuristics for when to apply the
standard rules and when to check all possible resolutions ofa non-deterministic statement, is
left for future work.
4.7.2. Typing Rules for the Deterministic Core of Toy
The typing judgements ofToystatementsc (and likewise ofToyexpressions) have the form:
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i {c} M i+k, Li+k−1, i+ k
Given a context secrecy levellip and the clearancesMc of potential observers of addresses
a ∈ A, a statementc, which takesk atomic steps to execute, can be typed as follows. Starting
from the typing environmentM i and the learned secrets12 Li−1, which correspond to theith
atomic step of the to-be-checked programp (before the learned secrets have been updated with
M i), c can be typed if it modifies the addressesA such that their secrecy levels are those in
M i+k and the learned secrets areLi+k−1. The security type system establishes that the program
p can be typed as[lip, Mc] ⊢ M0, L−1, 0 {p}M |p|, L|p|−1, |p| whereL−1 = L0, then p is
non-interference secure.
The typing rules of the control-flow sensitive type system for T yhave the following form:
(M i+k, Li+k−1) = AI(c)(M i, Li−1, i) M i+k ≤i+k Mc
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i {c} M i+k, Li+k−1, i+ k
They consist of an abstract-interpretation partAI, which describes the update of the dynamic
secrecy levels in the typing environmentM i and in the learned secretsLi, and a clearance
checkM i+k ≤i+k Mc, which checks whether all secrecy levels of non-local addresses in
the resulting typing environmentM i+k are dominated by the clearance secrecy levelsMc of
potential observers of these addresses. Notice that a clearance check is contained in all typing
12The index reduction by 1 is a technicality, which is requiredto combine the update rule for learned secrets
(Definition 26) and the update rule for the typing environment (Definition27) into the same typing rule. See
Figure4.5.
158
4.7. SECURITY TYPE SYSTEM FORTOY
rules. We shall return to this point in the machine-checked soundness proof in Section4.7.3.3.
The definition of≤i+k is given below.
Similar to Definition25, it must hold that:
Definition 29. Clearance of Read-Shared Variables
Like before, letT be the set of concurrently executing threads, letRpτ be the set of ad-
dresses that the to-be-checked programp shares in a readable fashion withτ ∈ T , and let
τ can send∗τ ′ hold if τ can directly or indirectly send toτ ′. Then, for the clearanceMc(a)
of read shared addressesa, the following condition must hold:
∀ a ∈
⋃
τ∈T
Rpτ . Mc(a) = ⊓
τ∈TR(a)
dom(τ)
In this definition,TR(a) := {τ ∈ T | ∃τ ′ ∈ T.τ ′ can send∗ τ ∧ a ∈ Rpτ ′} describes the set
of threads that can directly or indirectly read the read-shared addressa.
The constraint in Definition29 ensures that the clearanceMc(a) of a read-shared variablea is
at most as high as the smallest secrecy level to which threadswith direct or indirect read access
to a are cleared. Clearly, the secrecy levels of initially-stored information must be dominated
by the clearanceMc. That is,M0(a) ≤ Mc(a) must hold for all addressesa.
Unlessp holds a protecting lock, concurrently executing threads may observe read-shared ad-
dresses after any atomic step ofp. Hence, we have to check every intermediate typing environ-
mentM i to obey the clearance of non-local read-shared addresses [JPW05]. I write M i ≤i Mc
to abbreviate:
M i ≤i Mc := ∀ a ∈ A. a /∈ local(i) ∧ a ∈
⋃
τ∈T
Rpτ ⇒ M i(a) ≤ Mc(a) (4.9)
Figure4.6 shows the typing rules forToy expressions, the typing rules forToy statements are
shown in Figure4.7.
The typing rule[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { exp } M ′i, Li, i + 1 combines the update rule
for learned secrets (Definition26), the update rule of write-shared addresses (Definition27). In
addition, it advances the atomic step count by 1. It is definedas follows:
Definition 30. Typing Rule for Concurrently Executing Threads
[ext]
Li = λa′ ∈ ⋃
τ∈T
W pτ . L
i−1(a′) ⊔ ⊔
a∈REff (a′,i)
M i(a)
M
′i = λa ∈ A.
{
M i(a) ⊔ Li(a) if a ∈ ⋃
τ∈T
W pτ ∧ a /∈ localp(i)
M i(a) otherwise
[lip,Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i{ ext } M ′i, Li, i+ 1
In this typing rule,REff (a′, i) := {a ∈
⋃
τ∈T
Rpτ | a /∈ localp(i) ∧ a effectsp a′} is the set of
read-shared addressesa that are not lock protected during the atomic stepi and that can ef-
fect the write-shared addressa′ (see Definition26), W pτ andR
p
τ denote the read respectively
the write-shared addresses withτ .
Similar to the formal semantics ofToy, I useM i [ (a)
t7→ l ] and read(t, a)(M i) to denote
updates respectively reads of the typing environmentM i: M i [ (a)
t7→ l ] updatesM i at
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[const]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ext } M ′i, Li, i+ 1
M i+1 = M
′i [ (ntr)
t7→ lip ] M i+1 ≤i+1 Mc
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ct(ntr) }M i+1, Li, i+ 1
[read]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ext } M ′i, Li, i+ 1
M i+1 = M
′i [ (ntr)
t7→ read(t, v)(M ′i) ⊔ lip ] M i+1 ≤i+1 Mc
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { vt(ntr) } M i+1, Li, i+ 1
[read ptr]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ext } M ′i, Li, i+ 1 M i+1 ≤i+1 Mc
S = pta(i, naddr )
M i+1 = M
′i [ (ntr)
t7→ ⊔
v∈S
read(t, v)(M
′i) ⊔ read(addr , naddr )(M ′i) ⊔ lip ]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ∗(naddr )t } M i+1, Li, i+ 1
[binary op]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ext } M ′i, Li, i+ 1 M i+1 ≤i+1 Mc
M i+1 = M
′i [ (ntr)
t7→ read(t, nt1)(M
′i) ⊔ read(t, nt2)(M
′i) ⊔ lip ]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { nt1 ◦ nt2(ntr) } M i+1, Li, i+ 1
[unary op]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ext } M ′i, Li, i+ 1 M i+1 ≤i+1 Mc
M i+1 = M
′i [ (ntr)
t7→ read(t, nt)(M ′i) ⊔ lip ]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { •nt(ntr) }M i+1, Li, i+ 1
[cast op]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ext } M ′i, Li, i+ 1 M i+1 ≤i+1 Mc
M i+1 = M
′i [ (ntr)
t7→ read(t′, nt′)(M ′i) ⊔ lip ]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { (t)nt′(ntr) } M i+1, Li, i+ 1
Figure 4.6.: Typing Rules forToyExpressions
The typing rule forext , which characterizes the dynamic secrecy level updates by concurrently executing threads,
follows in Definition30. Like in the transition rules of theToysemantics, I useM i [ (a)
t7→ l ] to denote updates
of the typing environmentM i andread(t, a)(M i) to read the secrecy levels inM i that are stored in the support
bits of the typet. The relation≤i checks whether secrecy levels are point-wise cleared (see Equation4.9).
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[e2s]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { e t(n tr ) } M i+1, Li, i+ 1
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { e2s(ntr = et) } M i+1, Li, i+ 1
[skip]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ext }M ′i, Li, i+ 1 M i+1 = M ′i M i+1 ≤i+1 Mc
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { skip } M i+1, Li, i+ 1
[write]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ext } M ′i, Li, i+ 1 M i+1 ≤i+1 Mc
M i+1 = M
′i [ (v)
t7→ ⊔ read(t, nt)(M ′i) ⊔ lip ]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { v = nt } M i+1, Li, i+ 1
[write str]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ext } M ′i, Li, i+ 1 M i+1 ≤i+1 Mc
S = pta(i, naddr ) v ∈ S |S| = 1
M i+1 = M
′i [ (v)
t7→ read(t, nt)(M ′i) ⊔ read(addr , naddr )(M ′i) ⊔ lip ]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ∗(naddr ) = nt } M i+1, Li, i+ 1
[write wk]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ext } M ′i, Li, i+ 1 M i+1 ≤i+1 Mc
S = pta(i, naddr ) |S| > 1
M i+1 = λa.



read(addr , naddr )(M
′i)⊔
read(t, nt)(M
′i) ⊔ lip ⊔M ′i(a)
if ∃ v ∈ S. a− v ∈ support t
M ′(a) otherwise
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { ∗(naddr ) = nt } M i+1, Li, i+ 1
[seq]
[lip,Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i {c1}M j , Lj−1, j
[lip,Mc] ⊢ M j , Lj−1, j {c2}Mk, Lk−1, k M
k ≤k Mc
[lip,Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { c1; c2} Mk, Lk−1, k
[if]
[lip, Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i { skip } M i+1, Li, i+ 1
[l′ip,Mc] ⊢ M i+1, Li, i+ 1{ c1; skipk−|c1| }M i+k+11 , Li+k1 , i+ k + 1
[l′ip,Mc] ⊢ M i+1, Li, i+ 1{ c2; skipk−|c2| }M i+k+12 , Li+k2 , i+ k + 1
k = max(|c1|, |c2|) l′ip = lip ⊔ read(bool , nbool )(M i+1)
M i+k+1 = M i+k+11 ⊔M i+k+12 Li+k = Li+k1 ⊔ Li+k2 M i+1 ≤i+1 Mc
[lip,Mc] ⊢ M i, Li−1, i{ if(nbool ){c1}else{c2} }M i+k+1, Li+k, i+ k + 1
Figure 4.7.: Typing Rules for the deterministicToyStatements
The typing rule forext and the notions for typing environment updates and reads areas d scribed in Figure4.6.
Equation4.9defines the relation≤i.
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a + k wherek ∈ support t with the secrecy levell; read(t, a)(M i) reads all secrecy levels
M i(a + k) wherek ∈ support t and returns the least upper bound of these secrecy levels (i.e.,
read(t, a)(M i) =
⊔
k∈support t
M i(a+ k)).
Except that they require a typing ofext and except that all rules contain clearance checks, the
typing rules forToyexpressions are standard. Notice, however, the write to thenon-allocated
temporaryntr and, in particular, the secrecy levellip that is considered for this write. Remember,
lip is the secrecy level of the context in which the write is execut d. The typing rule [read ptr]
reaps benefit of the result of the correct points-to analysisto obtain the setS of possible targets
for the pointer innaddr . It reads the secrecy levels of all these addresses and returns the least
upper bound of these secrecy levels, of the pointer, and oflip. The returned secrecy level is
stored in the non-allocated temporaryntr.
With the exception of [write str], [write wk] and [if], the typing rules for statements are also
standard. [write str] is the rule for writes through pointers, where the points-to analysis is able
to precisely determine which addressv the pointer targets. In this case, a strong update can
replace the secrecy levels of the addressesv + i wherei ∈ support t. The typet is the type of
the written value.
[write wk] is the corresponding rule for writing though pointers whose target address the
points-to-analysis cannot precisely determine. Because Iassume the points-to analysis to
be correct, the write modifies at most addresses in the setS, which the points-to analy-
sis returns. Because we do not know which precise addressv ∈ S is modified, we must
pessimistically assume that any such address keeps informati n about its old value. There-
fore, [write wk] performs a weak update of the secrecy levels, which correspond to the sup-
port bits of any such addressv ∈ S. That is, M i+1(v + i) = l ⊔ M ′i(v + u) where
l = read(t, nt)(M
′i) ⊔ read(addr , naddr )(M ′i) ⊔ lip is the least upper bound of the secrecy
levels of the stored information, of the pointer and of the context.
The rule [if] first skips one step to allow for preemptions after evaluating the conditionbool
and before the branches. After that, it requires that both branches are typed with a context
secrecy level′ip, which is the least upper bound oflip and of the secrecy level of the condition.
Note that the typing rules for the branches check the clearance for all typing environments
Mx1 andM
x
2 , x ∈ {i + 1, . . . , i + k + 1}. However, actuallyMx1 ⊔ Mx2 ≤x Mc must hold.
Fortunately, for a lattice(L,≤) it holds thata ≤ c ∧ b ≤ c ⇔ a ⊔ b ≤ c for a, b, c ∈ L.
Therefore,Mx1 ⊔Mx2 ≤x Mc follows from the clearance checks of the respective branches.
Notice the lack of a typing rule for while. Although rules such as Rule C4 or Rule C4’ of
the control-flow-sensitive security type system in Figure2.2on page28 are sound, such a typ-
ing rule is not required because all while-loops are assumedto terminate and becausewhilei
collapses to a sequence of if-statements.
The lack of a subsumption rule is intentional, although it isstraightforward to show that such
a rule (e.g., Rule S of Figure2.2) is sound. As long as programs can interact with each other
through shared memory, I don’t expect much benefit of a subsumption because an application
of this rule would only overestimate the possible information flows. Because all typing rules
take two different typing environments and because the clearanceMc is provided in addition, a
subsumption rule is not required.
In the accompanying PVS sources [Völ10], I slightly deviate from the formalization pre-
sented in Figure4.6 and in Figure4.7. Instead, I formalize the abstract-interpretation part of
these typing rules in such a way that the individual typing enviro mentsM i are returned for all
atomic stepsi ∈ {0, . . . , |p|} of the to-be-checked programp. This way, the clearance check
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can be separated form the computation of the corresponding typing environments. In particular,
we can deduce the latter without requiring thatp can be typed.
4.7.3. Soundness
This section presents the machine-checked soundness proofof the security type system for the
deterministic core ofToy. Hence, I assume that all possible resolutions of non-deterministic
choices are checked, however, only one at a time. It should bestraightforward to also establish
soundness for the standard typing rules for[] and for‖. Following Warnier et al. [JPW05], I
split the soundness proof of the proposed security type systm into two parts:
• First, I show that the abstract-interpretation part of the security type system isgood in
the sense that if the program executes onl-similar initial states the resulting states are
l-similar with respect to the dynamic typing environmentM i.
• Then, I show that goodness and the point-wise clearanceM i ≤i Mc (for all i) imply the
desired non-interference property.
The non-interference property, which I will show, is termination and timing insensitive. That
is, all checked system calls and server invocations must terminate to not leak information and a
subsequent timing-leak transformation must be able to eliminate all remaining internal timing
leaks.
4.7.3.1. Goodness
To prove the proposed security type system sound, I have to relate the formal semantics of
Toystatements and expressions and the typing rules for these statements and expressions such
that if aToyprogram can be typed, it is non-interference secure. For that, each expression and
statement must fulfil the following two properties:
1. Execution preservesl-similarity over dynamic types; and
2. If the checked programp modifies an addressa, then the dynamic secrecy level of this
address is at least as large as the context secrecy levellip.
More formally, let∼L×[A→L]⊆ State ×State be thel-similarity relation over concrete program
states.l-similarity relates two states if their memories are observationally indistinguishable by
anl-classified observer and if their atomic step counts match:
Definition 31. l-similarity over dynamic types
Two statess andt with s‘ip = t‘ip are l-similar with regards to the dynamic secrecy levels
in the typing environmentM if they are related by the following relation over states:
s ∼l,M t :⇔ ∀a ∈ A. M(a) ≤ l ⇒ s‘mem(a) = t‘mem(a)
The intuition behind this definition is that values may only differ if their dynamic secrecy level
M(a) is higher than or incomparable withl. In situation wherel-similarity is only required for
a subsetB ⊆ A, I write s ∼l,M |B t to mean
∀a ∈ B.M(a) ≤ l ⇒ s‘mem(a) = t‘mem(a)
Definition32 formally defines the first property: Execution preservesl-similarity over dynamic
types.
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Definition 32. Execution preservesl-similarity
Assume the statementp is executed starting with stepi from the two statesi andti. Assume
further thatM i is the typing environment that is provided to the typing rulefor p and that
Mk (i ≤ k ≤ i+ |p|) is a typing environment that is produced by the abstract interpretation
partAI(p) during the typing ofp (if p can be typed, such anMk exists which appears on the
right hand side of a typing judgement of a sub-statement or sub-expression ofp). Then, the
execution ofp preservesl-similarity over dynamic types if the following condition holds:
∀sk, tk. si ∼l,M i ti ∧ si
p→c
k−i
sk ∧ ti p→c
k−i
tk ⇒ sk ∼l,Mk tk
In this conditionio andio′ are twol-similar input oracles, which are used by
p→c to execute
p on si respectively onti. See Definition28 for the definition ofl-similar input oracles. In
the above condition,
p→c
n
stands for the evaluation of the firstn atomic steps ofp.
It reads as follows: Given two statessi andti that arel-similar with respect to the secrecy levels
in the typing environmentM i, executing the statementp from these states up to the atomic step
k produces two new statessk andtk that arel-similar as well with respect to the typing environ-
mentMk that appeared during the derivation ofp. Notice that because I requirel-similar input
oraclesio andio′ for the transition ofp from si respectively fromti, inputs top are alsol-similar.
In the formalization of the second property — ifp modifies an addressa, its secrecy levelMk(a)
is at least as large aslip — it is tempting to check inequality with the starting statesi (see for
example Warnier et al. [JPW05]):
∀si, sk. si
p
→k−i sk ∧ si‘mem(a) 6= sk‘mem(a) ⇒ lip ≤ Mk(a) (4.10)
However, becausep shares memory and other objects with concurrently executing threads, it
can happen that these concurrently executing threads update sk‘mem(a) to the same value as
si‘mem(a). Obviously, in this caselip ≤ Mk(a) needs not to hold. To tolerate inputs of
concurrently executing threads, I adjust Equation4.10to check inequality with the stateskskip
that is obtained by executing onlyskip statements onsi. In skskip, only concurrently executing
threads have modified memory addresses.
Definition 33. If p modifies an addressa, Mk(a) dominateslip
Assumek, l, lip, M i, si, andMk are as described in Definition32 above. Then, the state-
mentp fulfills the second property — ifp modifiesa, Mk(a) dominateslip — if it holds that:
∀sk, skskip, a. si
p→c
k−i
sk ∧ si
skip|p|→c
k−i
skskip ∧ sk‘mem(a) 6= skskip ‘mem(a) ⇒ lip ≤ Mk(a)
The primary purpose of the property in Definition33 is to ensure that the typing rules correctly
detect implicit information flows.
Definition 34. Goodness
A Toy programp is good if it fulfils the properties of Definition32 and of Definition33:
good(p) :⇔ ∀k, l, lip,M i,Mk, Li−1, Lk−1, si, ti, sk, tk, skskip, a.
(Mk, Lk−1) = AI(p)(M i, Li−1)k−i ∧ si p→c
k−i
sk ∧ ti p→c
k−i
tk ∧ si
skip|p|→c
k−i
skskip ∧
(si ∼l,M i ti ⇒ sk ∼l,Mk tk) ∧
(sk‘mem(a) 6= skskip ‘mem(a) ⇒ lip ≤ Mk(a))
In this definition,AI(p)(...) denotes the abstract-interpretation part of the typing rules forp.
AI(p)(...)n stands for an abstract interpretation of the firstn atomic steps ofp.
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The proof that allToy programs aregood is by structural induction over the expressions and
statements ofToy. See Section4.7.3.4below.
4.7.3.2. Point-Wise Clearance
If a programp can be typed, it is easy to see that the following property holds for all typing
environments that appear on the right hand side of the typingjudgements for the sub-expressions
and sub-statements ofp (see Section4.7.3.4below).
Definition 35. Point-Wise Clearance
AssumeM i ranges over the typing environments that appear on the right-hand side of the
typing judgements for the sub-expressions and sub-statemen s ofp. Then, givenM0, Mc,
L−1, andlip as described before, the typing ofp produces point-wise cleared secrecy levels if
the following condition holds:
clearance(p, lip,M
0, L−1,Mc) :=
∀i,M i, Li−1. (M i, Li−1) = AI(p)(M0, L−1)i ⇒ M i ≤i Mc
Remember, forM i ≤i Mc to hold it suffices that the secrecy levels of all non-local addressesa
are dominated byMc(a) (see Equation4.9).
4.7.3.3. Noninterference
A program p is non-interference secure with regard to anl-classified observer if this ob-
server cannot distinguish any two runs of the program on any two states that vary in higher
or incomparably-classified secrets or that receive varyingh gher or incomparably-classified in-
puts. Whenever a thread, which executes on behalf of such an observer can preempt, it is able
to directly or indirectly learn all information that is stored at read-shared non-local addressesa
to which this threadτ is cleared (i.e.,Mc(a) ≤ dom(τ) ≤ l).
Hence, a programp is non-interference secure ifp starts from any twol-similar initial states
and if after any atomic step ofp the resulting states arel-similar in the read-shared non-local
addresses withMc(a) ≤ l. Definition36 formalizes this property.
Definition 36. Confidential
Given an initial typing environmentM0 and the clearanceMc, the to-be-checked programp
is non-interference secure if the following property holdsfor p:
confidential(p,M0,Mc) :⇔ ∀i, l, s0, t0, si, ti.
0 ≤ i ≤ |p| ∧ M0 ≤ Mc ∧ s0 ∼l, M0 t0 ∧ s0
p→c
i
si ∧ t0 p→i ti ⇒ si ∼l,Mc|RLi ti
In this definition,RLi := {a ∈ A| a ∈ ⋃
τ∈T
Rpτ ∧ a /∈ local(i)} denotes the set of non-
local read-shared addresses. Like before,T is the set of concurrently executing threads,Rpτ
is the set of read-shared addresses withτ ∈ T andlocal is as defined in Definition22 on
page146.
Relation to Noninfluence: confidential is a simplified form of Noninfluence (see
page 24): Let me first focus on the right-hand side of Definition6: ∃tj ∈ S. t0 β⇁
tj ∧ output(l, si) = output(l, tj). Because the security type system forToy is only for
the deterministic core, the checked programp evaluates afteri steps to precisely one state (i.e.,
si whenp is executed ons respectivelyti when executed ont). Because we assume thatp
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terminates, we can use a termination-insensitive form of non-i terference. In these properties,
ti appears as an universally quantified parameter. A proof of the existence of a suitableti is not
required.
Assuming that hardware-centric covert channels have been mitigated,l-classified observers
may learn information aboutp’s execution only from concurrently-execution threads. The
mapping of kernel- or server-object invocations to shared-memory addresses (Section4.5.4.4)
ensures that these threads can only learn information aboutp’s execution from non-local
read-shared addressesRLi. Hence,output(l, si) = output(l, ti) in Definition 6 becomes
si ∼l,Mc|RLi t
i.
The second precondition —s0
sources(α,l)≈ t0 — on the left-hand side of Definition6 simplifies
to s0 ∼l, M0 t0. The constraint on the input oraclesio and io′ (Definition 28) replaces the
first precondition:ipurge(α, l) = ipurge(β, l). The fundamental difference is that the learned
secrets evolve dynamically with the execution ofp. Remember, for transitive information-flow
policies(L,≤, dom), sources(α, l) := {w|dom(a) = w ∧ w ≤ l}.
4.7.3.4. Soundness Proof
To prove the security type system forToysound, I have to show for all programsp that if p can
be typed,p is confidential:
Theorem 1. Soundness
The type system is sound. More precisely, for allp, M0, L−1 = L0, Mc, lip, l, constrained as
described above, if[lip,Mc] ⊢ M0, L−1, 0{p}M |p|, L|p|−1, |p| can be derived for a suitable
M |p| andL|p|−1 with the typing rules of theToy security type system, then
confidential(p,M0,Mc)
holds.
Proof: The proof of Theorem1 follows from the following Theorem and from Proposition2,
which states that if[lip,Mc] ⊢ M0, L−1, 0{p}M |p|, L|p|−1, |p| can be derived, it follows that
clearance(p, lip,M
0, L0,Mc) holds.q.e.d.
Theorem 2. Main Theorem
∀p, lip,M0, L0,Mc. good(p) ∧ clearance(p, lip,M0, L0,Mc) ⇒ confidential(p,M0,Mc)
Proof: Choose,M0, L0, Mc, l, lip, s0 andt0 such that
1. observers are cleared to the initially stored secrets:M0 ≤ Mc,
2. s0 andt0 arel-similar (i.e.,s0 ∼l,M0 t0; see Definition31), and
3. in some stepi beforep terminates13 si‘mem(a) 6= ti‘mem(a) for some read-shared non-
local addressa (i.e.,a ∈ RLi of Definition36) wheres0 p→c
i
si, t0
p→c
i
ti.
13Remember, we implicitly assumed thatp erminates eventually.
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Then, we have to show thatMc(a)  l in order to satisfysi ∼l,Mc ti and hence confidentiality.
Goodness (Lemma1) gives us thatM i(a)  l becausesi ∼l,M i ti would otherwise imply that
si‘mem(a) = ti‘mem(a). From the clearance checklearance(p, lip,M0, L0,Mc) we know
thatM i(a) ≤ Mc(a) becauseM i ≤i Mc and botha ∈
⋃
τ∈T
Rpτ anda /∈ local(i). But then, the
transitivity of≤ leads to the desired result:
M i(a) ≤ Mc(a) ∧M i(a)  l ⇒ Mc(a)  l ⇔ M i(a) ≤ Mc(a) ∧Mc(a) ≤ l ⇒ M i(a) ≤ l
q.e.d.
Proposition 2.p Obeys the Clearance of Addresses
If [lip,Mc] ⊢ M0, L−1, 0{p}M |p|, L|p|−1, |p| can be derived for a suitableM |p| andL|p|−1
with the typing rules of theToy security type system, then
clearance(p, lip,M
0, L0,Mc)
holds.
Proof: The proof follows trivially by realizing that all typing rules except [if] contain a clear-
ance checkM i+1 ≤i+1 Mc for their respective result typing environmentM i+1. The typing
rule [if] checks clearance of theskip step, which is used to allow for preemptions between the
check and the branches. Letk range over the atomic steps of the branches. The typing rulesfor
the branches perform clearance checks for all typing enviromentsMk1 ≤k Mc (if-branch) and
for all typing environmentsMk2 ≤k Mc (else-branch). The clearance check forMk = Mk1 ⊔Mk2
follows from the well known result about lattices thata ≤ u ∧ b ≤ u ⇔ a ⊔ b ≤ u. q.e.d.
Lemma 1. All Statements are Good
∀p. good(p)
Proof: The proof proceeds by structural induction overp. The second clause ofgood(p) —
if p modifiesa, lip ≤ Mk(a) (see Definition33) — follows trivially by realizing that whenever
the transition rule for statements→c modify an address, the corresponding typing rule updates
the secrecy level of the same address with a secrecy level, which is at least as large aslip.
The first clause ofgood(p) — execution preservesl-similarity (see Definition32) — follows
straightforwardly if we realize that whenever→c modifies an address, the corresponding typing
rule updates the secrecy level of this address with a secrecylevel that combines all secrecy levels
of the parameters that contributed to the stored result. Theproof of the individual statements is
by case distinction.
Let us here focus only on the most interesting case: an if-statement with a higher-classified
conditional. Because the conditionalnbool is higher-classified (e.g., ath) than the observer
secrecy levell, we cannot deduce fromsi ∼l,M i ti that the if-statement executes the same branch
in si and inti. To prevent the observer from deducing information about the conditional, we
must then show that the secrecy level of any address that is modified in either branch is greater
thanl. From the first condition ofgood , we know thatlip ≤ Mk(a) holds for all addressesa
that have been modified byp. But since the branches are typed with a context secrecy level that
is at least as high ash, it holds thatMk(a)  l, which leads to the desiredl-similarity result
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sk ∼l,Mk tk. The case where anl-classified observer is cleared to see the conditional, follows
trivially from the induction hypothesis if we realize that the same branch is executed.q.e.d.
For more details about this proof, the interested reader is referred to the published PVS
sources [Völ10].
This concludes the soundness proof of the security type system for the deterministic core of
Toy. I have machine-checked the above proofs with the help of thetheorem prover PVS. The
PVS sources are publicly available [Völ10].
4.8. Summary
In this chapter, I have identified several challenges that have to be addresses by security type sys-
tems for the low-level operating-system code of microkernel-based systems. These challenges
origin from the peculiar ways in which the microkernel and the necessarily-trusted multi-level
servers interact with their clients, with the underlying kernel and with the underlying hardware
platform. To address these challenges, I have introduced thnon-deterministic intermediate
programming languageToy. The non-deterministic constructs of this language make iteasy to
translate the low-level C++ operating-system code into aT yprogram and to describe the side
effects from these peculiar interactions as interleaved-executing subprograms.
To prove data confidentiality of low-level operating-system code, I have introduced a control-
flow-sensitive security type system for the deterministic core of Toy. The use of a universal
lattice for shared-memory programs allows programs to be analyzed whose information-flow
policy is not completely known at the time of the analysis. The analysis is protection parametric
in the sense that certain invocations can be checked separatly and with placeholder objects to
compensate for unknown capability targets. In the special setting of low-level operating-system
code, it is practicable to check, one at a time, all possible resolutions of the control-flow non-
determinism in the correspondingToyprogram.
I have used the theorem prover PVS to formalize the semanticsof Toyand the typing rules
of theToysecurity type system and to machine check the soundness proof of this security type
system.
In the next chapter, I demonstrate the applicability of the proposed information-flow analysis
with the help of three case studies. In addition, I demonstrate he effectiveness of a countermea-
sure against AES cache side-channel attacks.
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In this chapter, I demonstrate the information-flow analysis of Chapter4 with three case studies:
a virtual-memory access (Section5.1), the IPC-send operation of an L4-family microkernel
(Section5.2), and a supposedly secure buffer-cache implementation (Section 5.3). In the first
two case studies, I exemplify the analysis of hardware side effects (Section4.2.2) respectively
the protection-parametric analysis (Section4.2.5) of a system call. The buffer-cache case study
combines these results with the results of Chapter3 about information-flow secure scheduling
and synchronization.
In addition to these three case studies, I prove correctnessof Osvik’s countermeasure for
AES. That is, this countermeasure effectively protects thekey, the plaintext and the intermediate
encryption results against cache side-channel attacks (Section5.4). To my best knowledge, this
is the first security-type-system-based proof of such a countermeasure. For want of a type-
checking tool forToy, I have crafted this proof by hand.
5.1. Page-Table Walk
In Section4.3, we have already seen that virtual-memory reads contain implicit information
flows into the accessed bits of used page-table entries. In this section, I demonstrate with
the help of the following programp how theToy security type system checks this hardware
side effect to identify these information flows. Given a concrete information-flow policy, the
produced results can be used to prove this side effect and thetrigg ring program termination-
and timing-insensitive non-interference secure.
1 register int h asm (”eax”);
2
3 int l attribute ((aligned(sizeof <int>)));
4
5 if (h == 0) {
6 h = l ;
7 }
In this case study, I assume thatp executes on an IA32 processor with 32-bit paging [Cor09,
§ 4.3 Vol. 3a], 4KB and 4MB pages and flat segments (i.e., segments span the entire address
space). I further assume that all accesses ofp are to physical-memory regions with no hardware
side effects. That is, the reads and writes ofp target DMA-inaccessible RAM. In particular,
they do not target memory-mapped device registers.
The storage-class specifierregister and theasm declaration in Line 1 are hints to the C++
compiler of the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) to allocateh in the general-purpose register
EAX [SC08b, § 6.42]. Let us assume that GCC follows this hint.
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Based on these assumptions, the C++ toToy translation results in the program:
1 (( nh = (EAX , 0)
int ‖ n0 = 0int );n== = nh == n0);
2 if (n== ) {
3 nl = ∗(naddrphys(l))int ; (EAX , 0) = nl
4 } else {
5 skip
6 }
The temporarynh holds the value ofh, which is read from(EAX , 0). nl holds the value read
fromnphys(l), the physical address ofl . To obtain this address,p has to invoke the hardware side
effectpte walk(l) . Figure5.1shows theToycode for this hardware side effect1.
In pte walk(l) , let a.x denote an access to the fieldx of the bitfielda. I write a[31..12] for the bit
field of a that is stored in the bits31 . . . 12. The operator◦ stands for the bit-wise concatenation
of two bitfields. For example,nphys(l) = npde [31 ..22 ] ◦ virt(l)[21..0] concatenates the upper 10
bits ofnpde with the lower 22 bits ofvirt(l) to form the physical addressnphys(l). The statement
if (exp) ... abbreviatesnif = exp; if (nif) ... .
The hardware side effectp e walk(l) starts in Line 4 with the extraction of the current privilege
level CS.hidden dpl from the hidden part of the code-segment registerCS. For user-mode ac-
cesses this privilege level is 3. The address of the page directory (i.e., the first-level page table)
is stored in the page-table base registerCR3. The page-directory entry that is relevant for trans-
lating the virtual addressvirt(l) can be obtained by indexing into this page directory with the
10 upper-most bits of this address. Because each page-tableentry is 4 bytes large, the address
of the page-directory entry that is used for the translationis: CR3[31..12] ◦ (virt(l)[31..22] << 2).
Notice, the evaluation order of this address computation and of the CS access is undefined.
If the page-directory entry is present and if it conveys sufficient privileges for the access, the
analysis proceeds by checking the page-size flag to distinguish a page-directory entry for a
4MB page from a page-directory entry that refers to a second-level page table. A page-directory
(or page-table) entry conveys sufficient privileges for a user-mode read access if the present
and the user flag of this entry are set. For kernel-mode read accesses only the first flag must be
set. If any of the checks in Line 9 or in Line 21 fail, the hardware side effect raises a page-fault
exception. To simplify the above code snippet, I make use of asignalled NaT to propagate the
exception that has to be triggered after writing the fault information to the control registerCR2.
This allows the fault to be handled in a second hardware side effect. If the page-directory entry
refers to a second-level page table, the translation proceeds in a similar way with the next lower
10 bits of the virtual addressvirt(l). Once a page-table entry is found that refers to a page, the
translation stops by concatenating the page base address inthe page-table entry with the lower
part ofvirt(l) to obtain the physical address.
Becausep readsl only if h == 0 and because the translation result must be present beforel is
read,pte walk(l) must be inserted before Line 3 in the aboveToyprogram ofp. If p would have
computed the address ofh or if p would have executed another expression before Line 3 that
does not depend onl , the page-table walk would be unsequenced to these computations.
1If the operating-system kernel fails to properly invalidate the translation lookaside buffer and the paging-
structure caches after page-table modifications, the translation of the MMU can deviate from the information
in the page-table entries. For reasons of simplicity I omit these inconsistencies in the followingToyprogram
pte walk .
170
5.1. PAGE-TABLE WALK
1 pte walk(l ) {
2
3 ( // read current privilege level
4 nuser = (CS.hidden dpl == 3) ||
5
6 // read cr3
7 npde = ∗(CR3[31..12] o (virt(l)[31..22] << 2))) ;
8
9 if (npde .present ∧ (nuser ⇒ npde .U/S)) {
10
11 if (! npde .accessed) { npde .accessed = 1 } ||
12
13 if (npde .ps) {
14
15 nphys(l) = npde [31..22] o virt(l)[21..0]
16
17 } else {
18
19 npte = ∗(npde [31..12] o (virt(l)[21..12] << 2)) ;
20
21 if (npte .present ∧ (nuser ⇒ npte .U/S)) {
22
23 if (! npte .accessed) { npte .accessed = 1 } ||
24
25 nphys(l) = npte [31..12] o virt(l)[11..0]
26
27 } else {
28 // signal page fault by returning an SNAT
29 CR2 = set fault address and bits(virt(l), 0 /∗ read ∗/ , npte .present, CS.hidden dpl != 3) ;
30 nphys(l) = SNAT(#PF)
31 }
32 }
33 } else {
34 // signal page fault by returning an SNAT
35 CR2 = set fault address and bits(virt(l), 0 /∗ read ∗/ , npte .present, CS.hidden dpl != 3) ;
36 nphys(l) = SNAT(#PF)
37 }
38 }
39 // check SNAT
40 if ( is SNAT(nphys(l)) {
41 // trigger page−fault exception
42 ...
43 }
Figure 5.1.:Toyprogram of the IA32 page-table walk hardware side effect.
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An application of theToytype-checking rules [read ptr], [write ptr] and [if] reveals the implicit
flow of h into the accessed bits:pte walk(l) is executed in a branch of an if-statement with
high conditional. The context secrecy levellip of the write tonpde .accessed is at leasthigh.
npde .accessed = 1 constitutes a write through the pointer innpde . Hence,M ′(npde .accessed ) =
M(npde)⊔lip⊔⊥. holds for the secrecy level of the accessed bit in the resulttyping environment
M ′. Becauselip is at leasthigh, the secrecy level of this accessed bit is also at leasthigh.
In addition to this implicit flow, the analysis reveals also the variables that contribute to the
secrecy level of the translation result and to the secrecy level of the set accessed bit. These are,
the current privilege levelCS.hidden dpl , the present and user flags of the page-table entries and
the pointers to the next page-table level respectively to the page-base address. The accessed bits
and other information in the page-table entries have no influe ce on the translation result and
hence on the read access.
For an analysis of the remaining steps ofp, the abstract physical addressnphys can either be
obtained from a points-to analysis, which evaluates the pointers in the page-table entries, or
from the functionv2p, which abbreviates this translation.
Having identified this information flow as a possible leak, the obvious question is how to avoid
it. Several approaches are imaginable including the following:
1. Disable the setting of accessed bits in the hardware side effect by initializing all page
tables with set accessed and dirty bits;
2. Avoid a leakage of accessed bits outside the kernel; or
3. Equip memory capabilities with an additional access right that authorizes the retrieval of
accessed and dirty bits.
5.2. IPC
In this section, I demonstrate how the proposed information-fl w analysis can be applied
to identify potentially-harmful information flows in the IPC send operation of an L4-family
microkernel. Because the system-call invoking user-levelprogram is not known at the time of
the analysis, the analysis must be parametric. Instead of a cncrete information-flow policy
(L,≤, dom), we use the universal lattice for shared-memory programs (see Section4.2.4.1).
A later instantiation of this lattice with the secrecy levels in L reveals whether the identified
information flows are benign or whether they violate this policy.
The C++ source code in Figure5.2 and in Figure5.3 is a slightly-modified excerpt of the IPC
path of the Nova Microhypervisor [Ste09b] by Udo Steinberg2. For a better readability, I
will not translate this code into a correspondingToyprogram or consider hardware side effects
during this analysis. Figure5.2 shows the kernel entry, kernel exit, and system-call dispatch
code. Whenever a user-level program invokes a Nova system call with the IA32 SYSENTER in-
struction, the processor activatesentry sysenter with the kernel stack pointer set to the variable
Tss:run.sp0 . The kernel entry obtains the addresses ofentry sysenter and ofTss:run.sp0 from
the model specific registersIA32 SYSENTER EIP andIA32 SYSENTER ESP. These registers are
two of the special-purpose registers contained in the typeRegister ID.
2The Nova source code and hence this excerpt are released under the t rms of the GNU General Public License
Version 2 [Fou91].
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1 entry sysenter: pop %esp
2 lea −44(%esp), %esp
3 pusha
4 mov KERNEL STACK END, %esp
5 jmp syscall handler
6
7 void Thread::syscall handler (uint8 number) attribute (( regparm(1)));
8
9 void Thread::syscall handler (uint8 number)
10 {
11 if (EXPECT TRUE (number == Sys regs::MSG CALL))
12 sys ipc call ();
13 if (EXPECT TRUE (number == Sys regs::MSG REPLY))
14 sys ipc reply ();
15 ...
16
17 sys finish (&current−>regs, Sys regs::BAD SYS);
18 }
19
20
21 void Thread::sys finish (Sys regs ∗param, Sys regs::Status status)
22 {
23 param−>set status (status);
24
25 ret user sysexit ();
26 }
27
28 void Thread::ret user sysexit ()
29 {
30 asm volatile (”lea %0, %%esp;”
31 ”popa;”
32 ” sti ; ”
33 ”sysexit ”
34 : : ”m” (current−>regs) : ”memory”);
35 UNREACHED;
36 }
Figure 5.2.: Kernel entry and exit path for system calls of the Nova Microhypervisor
The variableTSS:run.sp0 of the task-state segment stores a pointer that refers to theaddress
immediately following the register safe area of the currentthread. The first five assembler
instructions ofentry sysenter safe the user registers in this area, activate the kernel stack, and
invoke the C++ functionsyscall handler . The first register parameter of this function is located
in the EAX register (REGPARM(1)). The lower-most eight bits of this parameter encode the
hypercall number (i.e., the opcode of the invoked system call).
When activated, the functionsyscall handler checks this opcode and invokes the respective
C++ function for the system call. Invalid system-call numbers cause an immediate return with
BAD SYS as status code. The functionsys finish respectivelyret user sysexit complete the
system call. The latter restores the registers of the user-lev l program from the register safe area
and exits the kernel with theIA32 SYSEXIT instruction.
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Because SYSEXIT returns to user level, it prematurely terminates the system call. Hence,
the UNREACHED statement inret user sysexit and any code that follows this statement in the
calling functions will not be reached. To check the implicitnformation flows that occur when
SYSEXIT is invoked in a branch of an if-statement,SYSEXIT must be treated like a return
statement, which returns to the end ofsyscall handler . Unlike the C++ statementreturn , and
unlike exceptions, a premature termination throughSYSEXIT does not execute the destructors of
objects with automatic storage durations [PC09, § 12.4 pt 8,§ 15.3 pt 11]. The corresponding
Toy translation must therefore reset this premature terminatio in PREM only at the end of
syscall handler after skipping over all these destructors. Like the other prmature terminations,
SYSEXIT leaks information about the invoking context to all subsequent statements.
An analysis of Nova system calls for potentially harmful information flows requires at least
three placeholder objects:
• the kernel stack;
• the thread control block of the system-call invoking thread, which includes the register
safe area of this thread; and
• the CPU-local variablecurrent , which refers to this thread.
In Nova, CPU-local variables have the same virtual addresses on all CPUs. However, the virtual-
to-physical mappings of these addresses differ on different CPUs. Further placeholder objects
for the analysis are therefore those parts of the per-CPU page tables that are used to translate
the accessed CPU-local and global addresses.
As we have seen in Section4.2.5, analyses ofsyscall handler , which are not parametric in
the system-call opcode, are not very interesting: an application-level program will never invoke
all system calls at once. By checking all system calls individually in a parametric analysis, the
analysis reveals the information flows of every system call in isolation. The results of such
an analysis can then be used for example to check the invokingapplication-level program.
To check system calls individually, we have to regardnumber as a parameter of the analysis.
Obviously, the default case needs only to be checked once. Animmediate consequence of
turning number into a fixed parameter is thatsyscall handler simplifies to the invocation of a
single C++ function. Still, becausenumber is a user-provided parameter in the conditional of
the if-statement, which selects the C++ function, its secrecy l vel contributes to the context
secrecy levellip.
Figure5.3shows the functionsys ipc call , which is invoked bysyscall handler if the invoking
thread has set the hypercall number inEAX to Sys regs::MSG CALL . In Nova, IPC call and IPC
send share the same code. The only difference is that IPC sendterminates the receive phase
(recv ipc msg ) prematurely.
Let us here focus on a send operation with send timeout zero and no capability transfers.
That is, the bitsSys ipc send::TIMEOUT ZERO andSys ipc send::SEND ONLY in the parameter
flags and the number of typed items (→ mtd().typed() ) are further parameters of the analysis.
These parameters are located in the message-transfer descriptor s→ mtd() . For the above send
operation, the two flags have to be set and no typed items must be specified.
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1 void Thread::sys ipc call () {
2
3 Sys ipc send ∗s = static cast<Sys ipc send ∗>(&current−>regs);
4
5 Capability cap = reinterpret cast<Capability ∗>(OBJSP SADDR)[s−>pt() % max caps];
6
7 Kobject ∗obj = cap.obj ();
8 if (EXPECT FALSE (obj−>type() != Kobject::PT))
9 sys finish (s, Sys regs::BAD CAP);
10
11 Portal ∗portal = static cast<Portal ∗>(obj);
12 Thread ∗receiver = portal−>receiver;
13
14 if (EXPECT FALSE (current−>cpu != receiver−>cpu))
15 sys finish (s, Sys regs::BAD CPU);
16
17 if (EXPECT FALSE (!Atomic::bit test and clear(receiver−>wait, 0))) {
18 if (EXPECT FALSE (s−>flags() & Sys ipc send::TIMEOUT ZERO))
19 sys finish (s, Sys regs::TIMEOUT);
20 // receiver is not yet ready to receive; switch to receive
21 ...
22 }
23
24 // transfer message
25 receiver−>utcb−>mtd = Message Transfer Descriptor (s−>mtd().untyped());
26
27 for (unsigned long i = 0; i < s−>mtd().untyped(); i++)
28 receiver−>utcb−>mr[i] = mr[i];
29
30 if (EXPECT FALSE (s−>mtd().typed()))
31 // transfer capabilities
32 ...
33
34 current−>continuation = ret user sysexit;
35
36 receiver−>utcb−>portal id = portal−>node.base;
37
38 // receive message
39 receiver−>recv ipc msg (portal−>ip, s−>flags());
40 }
41
42 void Thread::recv ipc msg (mword ip, unsigned flags)
43 {
44 Sys ipc recv ∗r = static cast<Sys ipc recv ∗>(&regs);
45
46 r−>set ip (ip );
47
48 if (EXPECT FALSE (flags & Sys ipc send::SEND ONLY)) {
49 ready enqueue();
50 ret user sysexit ();
51 }
52
53 ...
54 }
Figure 5.3.: Source code of the IPC call operation of the NovaMicrohypervisor
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L4-IPC send proceeds in four phases:
1. parameter extraction and capability lookup (Lines 1 – 16),
2. rendezvous (Lines 17 – 23),
3. message transfer (Lines 24 – 33), and
4. preparation of output parameters and system-call exit (Lines 34 – 50).
The static cast of the register safe areags to a variable of typeclass Sys ipc send (Line 3)
provides a convenient interface to access the register-passed parameters of the IPC system call.
These are the capability selector for the portal capabilitys→ pt() , the hypercall flags→ flags() ,
and the message-transfer descriptors→ mtd() . The latter contains the number of untyped mes-
sage wordss→ mtd().untyped() . If the IPC is successful, the kernel copies these untyped mes-
sage words from the sender UTCB to the receiver UTCB. The messag -transfer descriptor con-
tains also the number of typed items, which we assume to be zero.
Nova keeps the capabilities of the invoker in a kernel-only-accessible array in the invoking
thread’s address space. It is located at the virtual addressOBJSP SADDR and stores at most
max caps capabilities. Line 5 extracts the capability at the indexs→ pt() from this array. If this
capability does not refer to a portal, Nova returns prematurely with theBAD CAP error code.
Otherwise, Nova extracts the portal from the capability andthe related receiver thread from
the portal. The check in Line 14 validates that this receiverexecutes on the same CPU as the
sender. For the information-flow analysis of this phase, three further placeholder objects are
required: the portal capability, the portal and the thread control block of the receiver. There are
five important points to notice:
1. Because the receiver is obtained by dereferencing two pointers (the capability target
cap.obj() and the receiver pointer in the portal), any receiver accessd pends on the con-
text in which these pointers are set (Rule [readptr]). The first pointer is set during the
capability transfer when the invoking thread receives the portal capability. The second
pointer is set at portal creation time by the creator of the portal. The analysis reveals
these flows because the pointer rules update the secrecy levels of r ceiver accesses with
the identifiers of these two pointers. An immediate consequence of these implicit flows
is that neither the portal nor the worker thread of a server must be created in a context to
which potential invokers of the portal capability are not cleared. A check of the create
system call for portals respectively for threads reveals this leakage. The initial value of
lip denotes the secrecy level of the invoker context. In a protecti n-parametric analysis,
this secrecy level remains an abstract parameter;
2. Because the check in Line 8 returnsBAD CAP for non-portal capabilities, the invoking
thread can probe which of its capabilities are portal capabilities. Hence, anticipating
that other system calls perform similar checks, the type of acapability is revealed to all
threads, which execute in the address space that holds this capability;
3. The check in Line 14 reveals whether the sender and the receiver are on the same CPU;
4. So far, no parameters are read that can be affected by the receiver. Hence, with the
exception of the above information flows, no data is leaked from the receiver to the sender;
and
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5. So far, only the status parameter of the invoker is modifiedf L4-IPC terminates prema-
turely with sys finish . Hence, the only kernel object that is modified is the sender thr ad.
Because the three if-statements in the Lines 8, 14 and 17 terminate prematurely, the context se-
crecy levellip for the subsequent Lines is at least as high as the secrecy level of the conditionals
of these statements (see Section4.5.5).
The atomicbit test and clear operation of the second phase invalidates the last two points. I
the course of its receive operation, the receiver sets the wait flag. By executing Line 17, the
first sender, which finds this flag set, clears it and thereby signals to successive senders that the
thread is currently unavailable. The timeout error code, which is returned if send is invoked
with Sys ipc send::TIMEOUT ZERO, returns this information. An immediate though expected
consequence, is that multi-level servers have to provide atleas one thread for each differently-
classified client. No matter how many portals refer to a single server thread, the information
flows in IPC prevent a safe processing of the requests of differently-classified clients in a single
thread.
The proposed information-flow analysis is able to detect these information flows: The
variable identifierreceiver →wait appears in the secrecy level of the output parameterstatus
because it is written by both IPC send and IPC receive operations.
The third phase contains two information flows from the sender to the receiver: the message
and the number of untyped words that are transferred. Becausme sage registers are located
in the UTCB, the actually transferred information is the data that is located in these registers at
the time of the copy. Although Line 18 denotes a word-granular copy, it is interesting to split
this word-wise copy into a bit-wise copy for the purpose of the analysis. This way, only the
identifier of the source message bit and identifiers from implicit information flows appear in
the secrecy level of the respective receiver-side message bit. The message itself is not altered
during the copy3.
In the fourth phase, setting the continuation of the sender to ret user sysexit has no effect
because the sender returns in Line 50 before the scheduler regains control. Lines 36 and
46 modify theportal id field in the receiver’s UTCB respectively the instruction pointer in
the receiver-side register safe area. When the scheduler selects the receiver to run after the
sender has enqueued this thread into the ready queue, the receiver will therefore continue at the
instruction that is specified in the portal. Because both theportal id and the instruction pointer
are typically configured by the receiver, no additional information is revealed in these values.
To conclude this case study, we have demonstrated a protection-parametric analysis of the send
operation of the Nova IPC system call. Although the actual information-flow analysis is only
described at an abstract level, it has revealed all information flows that are not encoded in the
timing behavior of IPC and that are not hardware centric. Theidentified information flows are
bidirectional and inherent for synchronous, reliable IPC designs [Sha03]. In this sense, the
identified information flows are as expected.
3Actually, the bit-wise copy reveals only that the secrecy leve s of the message are only affected by the identifiers
from implicit flows. A secret stored at bit offseti is transferred to bit offseti in the message registers of the
receiver.
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Figure 5.4.: Buffer Cache
5.3. Buffer Cache
A buffer cache is a cache, which stores the data of recently accessed file blocks (see e.g., [BC05,
Chapter 15]). In L4-based systems, an implementation of a buffer cache as a buffer-cache
server [GJP+00] suggests itself.
Given a memory pool, a buffer-cache server multiplexes the memory pages in this pool to
cache recently accessed file data, file meta data, and meta data that the buffer cache requires
for its operation. Towards their clients, buffer-cache servers typically act as dataspace man-
agers [ADE+01]. As such, they wrap the underlying multi-level file system4. Let us assume
that the translation of file names into file capabilities is not implemented in the buffer-cache
server (this functionality can, e.g., be provided by a name or directory server). As a dataspace
manager, a buffer cache typically implements interfaces that allow files to be opened and views
of open files to be attached to virtual-memory regions. The buffer-cache functionget page is
invoked by the client-side region mapper to resolve page faults in the attached view. Let us here
focus on synchronous accesses to file data blocks. A file access such asget page is synchronous
if the accessing client thread blocks until the data is availble5. Figure5.4illustrates this setup.
The buffer cache performs three operations on a memory pool:
1. When a cached file block is accessed, the buffer-cache servr has to find the buffer in
which this block is cached and map this buffer to the requesting client;
2. When a file block is accessed that is not cached, the buffer cache has to allocate a free
buffer for this block; and
4Although hardware-centric covert channels are out of the scope of this thesis, I have to assume that both the
underlying file system and the disk driver are free of covert channels. Otherwise, a request of a server thread for
higher-classified clients could leak information through the file system or through the underlying disk [KC91].
5In most aspects, asynchronous accesses work similarly. Theclient-server communication protocols for asyn-
chronous requests are however more complicated.
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3. When no free buffers are available it has to find a block to replace.
To implement these operations, the buffer cache maintains for each buffer in the memory pool a
descriptor, which denotes whether the buffer is free, when tbuffer will be replaced, and, if the
buffer holds file data, in which file and at which offset this data is stored. The latter is required
to write back dirty buffers to the underlying file system. Thedata structures for finding the
buffer that belongs to a certain offset of a given file are typically highly optimized and difficult
to free from covert channels. For example, Linux [Tho] implements a per-file address-space
object with a radix search tree to map file offsets to buffer descriptors. Similar effort is typically
put into the buffer-replacement and file-system read-aheadstr tegies to mitigate blocking due
to long disk latencies as much as possible. A modification of these strategies to eliminate covert
channels in a buffer cache with a single memory pool will therefore likely come at the cost of a
significant performance degradation.
One alternative solution would be to re-instantiate a buffer-cache server for each differently-
classified client. However, this re-instantiation precludes a safe sharing of memory pools. In
the envisaged buffer-cache server, memory pools are therefor re-instantiated but not the server
itself. In Section5.2, we have seen that the bidirectional information flows in L4-IPC prevent
a safe sharing of a single thread to handle the requests of differently-classified clients. The
proposed buffer-cache server therefore creates at least one thread for each such group of clients
plus a set of portals whose labels refer to the file address-space objects. In addition, it maintains
a set of links to the respective file address-space objects ofthose server threads that operate on
behalf of lower-classified clients. Whenever the server thread of a higher-classified client finds
that the requested file block is not in the memory pool for thisclient, it can therefore lookup
file address-space objects of lower-classified clients to deermine whether the block is already
cached in their pools. If so it maps the respective block as a response to thehigh client’s
get page request. Allocation and replacement decisions are howeverlimited to the own buffer
cache. In particular, the buffers of write-accessible filesare always allocated in the own buffer
cache. Notice that write accesses to a file, which a lower-classified client can read, are already
in violation of the information-flow policy.
To prove this buffer-cache server non-interference secure, we have to combine several results
from the previous chapters:
Peripheral Access Control (Section1.1)
Clients must hold only those file capabilities to which they are uthorized. In particular,
ahigh-classified client must not have write authority to a file thata lower classified client
can read;
Secure Synchronization (Section3.7)
File address-space objects are concurrently accessed by server threads that operate on
behalf of differently classified threads. Hence, a synchronization of these accesses must
not leak information about the accesses from higher classified clients to lower or incom-
parably classified clients. The non-interference secure locks in Section3.7prevent these
leakages.
Information-Flow Analysis of Multi-Level Servers (Section4.7)
The proposed information-flow analysis must check all server invocations for possible
information leakages to the invoking clients or to other servers object that are used by
other worker threads. In this analysis, a worker thread assume the secrecy level of its
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invoking client as its context secrecy level. If, for example, such a worker thread would
modify the radix search tree of a file address-space object that belongs to another worker
thread, then clients could cause the worker to leak information, which the lower classified
clients of the other worker thread are able to extract. The proposed information-flow
analysis is able to detect these information flows.
Timing-Leak Transformations (Section2.4.6)
With the help of the proposed information-flow analysis, only a timing-insensitive non-
interference property is established. In Section4.7.3, I therefore assume that a suitable
timing-leak transformation eliminates the remaining inter al timing channels. Applied to
the buffer cache, this means that low-allocated buffers canbe reused by higher classified
clients only if the replacement of such a buffer introduces no internal timing leaks [PN92].
That is, the time required to replace a buffer must be independent of the time required to
revoke access to this buffer from all higher classified clients that directly or indirectly
have received a memory capability to this buffer. Unfortunaely, there is no timing leak
transformation that is able to establish this property for the present interface and imple-
mentations of the mapping database. Although our analysis concludes correctly that the
buffer cache is timing-insensitive secure, it cannot securly be used on existing L4-family
microkernels. In Section6, I shall return to this point by sketching a modification of the
mapping database, which allows for a secure implementationof the proposed buffer-cache
server.
Protection-Parametric Analysis of Microkernel System Cal ls (Sections4.7and5.2)
The bidirectional information flows of L4-IPC already prevent d a single-threaded im-
plementation of the buffer cache. However, other system calls must also be checked. In
particular, as we have seen in the last paragraph, L4-unmap must be checked not to cause
an un-transformable timing leak.
To conclude, the buffer cache verification succeeds to establi h a timing-insensitive non-
interference property for the proposed buffer-cache server. However, the subsequent timing-leak
transformation fails on the mapping database. Hence, the buff r cache is not timing-sensitive
non-interference secure.
5.4. AES
This section complements the three case studies with the first security-type-system-based
proof of the effectiveness of Osvik’s countermeasure against AES cache side-channel at-
tacks [OST05]. For want of a type-checking tool forToy, I have crafted this proof by hand.
More precisely, I show that no information about the key, about the secret message or about
intermediate encryption results can be leaked through the processor caches.
AES [DR99] is a round-based block cipher with 128 bit block sizes and varying key lengths.
Although the AES encryption algorithm is completely definedby algebraic operations, many
performance-oriented implementations use lookup tables to speed up the AES operations:
SHIFTROWS, M IX COLUMNS and SUBBYTES. In the 128 bit key version of AES, there are
eight lookup tablesT0, . . . , T3 andT
(10)
0 , . . . , T
(10)
3 with 256 4-byte words each. The cipher
is computed in 10 rounds. In the first nine rounds AES accessesT0, . . . , T3, in the 10th
roundT (10)0 , . . . , T
(10)
3 to accommodate for the absence of MIX COLUMNS. Given a 16-byte
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(128-bit) keyk = (k0, . . . , k15), the encryption algorithm starts by expanding this key to 10
round keysK(r), r = 1, . . . , 10, which in turn are divided into four 4-byte chunks each:
K(r) = (K
(r)
0 , K
(r)
1 , K
(r)
2 , K
(r)
3 ). For the following discussion, the construction of the above
tables and the precise key expansion algorithm are of no importance6. Given a 16-byte plain-
text p = (p0, . . . , p15), each round computes an intermediate statex(r) = (x
(r)
0 , . . . , x
(r)
15 ) from
the previous intermediate state. The initial statex0i is computed as thexor of the expanded key
and the plaintext asx0i = pi ⊕ ki, i = 1, . . . , 10. Equation5.1 defines how the intermediate
states for the first 9 rounds (r = 0, . . . , 8) are computed:
(x
(r+1)
0 , x
(r+1)
1 , x
(r+1)
2 , x
(r+1)
3 ) = T0[x
(r)
0 ] ⊕ T1[x(r)5 ] ⊕ T2[x(r)10 ] ⊕ T3[x(r)15 ] ⊕ K(r+1)0
(x
(r+1)
4 , x
(r+1)
5 , x
(r+1)
6 , x
(r+1)
7 ) = T0[x
(r)
4 ] ⊕ T1[x(r)9 ] ⊕ T2[x(r)14 ] ⊕ T3[x(r)3 ] ⊕ K(r+1)1
(x
(r+1)
8 , x
(r+1)
9 , x
(r+1)
10 , x
(r+1)
11 ) = T0[x
(r)
8 ] ⊕ T1[x(r)13 ] ⊕ T2[x(r)2 ] ⊕ T3[x(r)7 ] ⊕ K(r+1)2
(x
(r+1)
12 , x
(r+1)
13 , x
(r+1)
14 , x
(r+1)
15 ) = T0[x
(r)
12 ] ⊕ T1[x(r)1 ] ⊕ T2[x(r)6 ] ⊕ T3[x(r)11 ] ⊕ K(r+1)3
(5.1)
For the last round (r = 9), Ti is replaced byT
(10)
i . The resultx
(10) is the ciphertext.
Osvik, Shamir and Tromer [OST05] describe several software side-channel attacks based on the
inspection of CPU memory cycles. They also describe corresponding countermeasures to these
attacks.
An adversary may deduce the encryption key by observing which cells of the above tables
the AES encryption algorithm accesses in each turn. One possibility to learn about these cells
is to prepare the cache by accessing data that maps to the samesets in the cache as these tables.
Because cacheline replacement occurs only between the cachlines of the same set, a table
access can be detected by measuring the time required to access the preparation data. A long
access time indicates a replacement of this data and hence a corresponding table access by AES.
To prevent adversaries from deducing this information, Osvik et al. propose to access the
encryption tables with cacheline stride after executing the actual encryption round. This way,
an adversary will always observe that the entire table was accessed.
With the help of the proposed security type system, it is possible to prove that Osvik’s coun-
termeasure avoids leakage of the key bits, of the secret messag or of intermediate encryption
results through the cache. To do so, we first have to describe the cacheline replacement strategy
with the help of a suitable hardware side effect. Given aToy implementation of this hardware
side effect, the proposed security type system can then check Osvik’s countermeasure together
with this interleaved executing side effect for security policy violating information flows.
Adversary threads detect cache information leaks by observing the timing of preparation-data
accesses. For example, a level 1 (L1) cache miss that hits in the L2 cache takes typically between
7 and 10 times longer than L1 hits. Nevertheless, a timing-insensitive analysis can reveal this
leakage because the timing of memory accesses is directly correlated with the distance of the
cache in which the accessed data is allocated.
To formalize the cache hardware side effect, I add for each caei a special registerRiCache ,
which contains one bit for each set of this cache. Initially these bits are clear to indicate that
6The interested reader is referred to Daemen and Rijmen [DR99].
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Figure 5.5.: Illustration of Osvik’s countermeasure and ofthe hardware side effectse . Black
fields inRCache denote set set-bits; white fields denote clear set-bits.
the adversary has prepared the corresponding sets. If the to-b -checked program accesses a
memory addressa, the hardware side effectse(a) sets the bit of the corresponding set in all
caches wherea gets allocated. A set set-bit indicates the replacement of some of the preparation
data. By allowing adversary threads to read the bits inRiCache , we have made available to
these threads essentially the same information that they could have obtained from evaluating
the timing of preparation-data memory accesses. For reasons of simplicity, let us here focus
only on physically-tagged physically-indexed caches and oa single cache level. The proof
extends straightforwardly to other cache architectures. For ann-way set associative cache, the
set into whicha gets stored iset(a) := a
n|cacheline|
%|sets|, where|sets| is the number of sets in
this cache and|cacheline| is the size of a cacheline in bits.
Figure5.5 illustrates the use of the additional registersRiCache , the side effectcse(a) and the
effect of the countermeasure (lower figure).
Figure5.6shows the C++ pseudo codep of an encryption round of AES with Osvik’s counter-
measure. I writex[a .. a + 3] = y as an abbreviation for∗(static cast<long ∗>(&x[a])) = y . The
cacheline size is 32 bytes. The Lines 13 – 26 contain the source code of the adjusted encryption
round, the Lines 28 – 31 contain the source code of Osvik’s countermeasure.cse(a) is the cache
hardware side effect. It is defined as:
cse(a) :=
RCache [a] = 1
In the analysis ofp, the typing rules for Lines 14 – 22 set the secrecy levels of all cacheline bits
in RCache to which the tableT maps tohigh.
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1 char round;
2
3 char x[16]; // high
4 char y[16];
5 long K[10][4];
6
7 long T[4][256];
8 bool RCache [|sets |]; // shared with adversary threads
9
10
11 atomic { // begin non−preemptive execution
12
13 // encryption round
14 (cse(&y[0 .. 3]) ||
15 y[0 .. 3] = (cse(&T[0][x [0]]) || T[0][ x [0]]) ˆ
16 (cse(&T[1][x [5]]) || T[1][ x [5]]) ˆ ... ˆ cse(&K[round][0]) || K[round ][0]);
17 (cse(&y[4 .. 7]) ||
18 y[4 .. 7] = ... );
19 (cse(&y[8 .. 11]) ||
20 y[8 .. 11] = ... );
21 (cse(&y[12 .. 15]) ||
22 y[12 .. 15] = ... );
23
24 (cse(&x[0 .. 15]) ||
25 cse(&y[0 .. 15]) ||
26 x = y );
27
28 // countermeasure
29 for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 4; i++)
30 for (unsigned int j = 0; j < 256; j+=32)
31 (cse(&T[i ][ j ]) || T[ i ][ j ]);
32
33 } // end non−preemptive execution
Figure 5.6.: AES encryption algorithm and the countermeasure against cache side-channel at-
tacks complemented with cache-allocation information.
The reasons for this setting are twofold:
1. Because the points-to analysis does not break the cipher,it has to overestimate the ele-
ments ofT [i] that are accessed. Because this overestimation cannot exclud entries, all
cells of the tableT [i] are in the set of potentially referred addresses; and
2. The table accesses ofT [i] and hence the accessed cachelines depend on the value of the
high-classified key. Writes toRCache therefore depend onhigh pointers. The targeted
set-bits assume this secrecy level.
If p would allow other threads to observe the cache content at this point in time, information
about the secret key could be leaked. The non-preemptive execution (Lines 11 – 33) avoids
these observations.
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The countermeasure in the Lines 28ff accessesT with cacheline stride. Because these stride
accesses are independent of thehigh key and because the points-to analysis is able to identify
the accessed cells precisely, the secrecy levels of all set-bits ofT in RCache are reset tolow . A
possible breach of confidentiality is avoided by removing the temporarily stored secrets before
other threads can read these secrets. This concludes the prove that Osvik’s countermeasure pre-
vents leakage of the encryption table through the cache. To see that neither the key bits nor the
intermediate encryption results are leaked, we have to realize thatx, y andK are never accessed
with high indices. Hence, no secrets are leaked by accessing these arrays. This concludes the
proof of Osvik’s countermeasure.
The implementation of the hardware side effectcse(a) was trivial. After that, the proof fol-
lows immediately by application of theToytyping rules.
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6. Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter concludes my thesis and gives directions for futu e work. The two central contri-
butions of this thesis are:
1. a non-interference-secure budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler, and
2. a sound control-flow-sensitive security type system for low- evel operating-system code.
The developed solutions are a first step towards a cost-efficient provable protection of confiden-
tial data in open microkernel-based systems.
Noninterference Secure Scheduling (Section3.3)
Two practically-feasible modifications allow a budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler
to avoid all scheduling-related covert timing channels, even if the scheduled threads have
access to precise clocks:
1. the scheduler treats possibly leaking blocked threads asif they were ready and runs
higher classified ready threads to consume the budgets of these blocked threads; and
2. the scheduler defers the resumption of higher prioritized threads in situations
where a lower prioritized thread could possibly leak information by executing non-
preemptively.
The characterization of the budget consumption as a blocking term allows for the reuse of
a large class of existing admission tests for the proposed scheduler. These tests determine
whether a given set of real-time threads will meet their deadlines. Compared to the state-
of-the-art schedulers for timely isolated systems — time-partitioning schedulers — the
proposed non-interference secure scheduler can admit significantly more threads.
A machine-checked non-interference proof of an abstract PVS model of this scheduler
substantiates that the proposed budget-enforcing fixed-priority scheduler eliminates ex-
ternal timing channels. The realization of this result in the eorem prover PVS proved
to be valuable because a failed proof of a previous version ofthe scheduler revealed a
flaw, which I would have likely overlooked: the two corner case situations where non-
preemptively executing threads are able to leak to lower prioritized threads.
Security Type Checking Low-Level Operating-System Code (Section4.7)
The peculiar ways in which the microkernel and the necessarily trusted multi-level servers
interact with their environment pose a significant challenge to information-flow analyses
for low-level operating-system code. The proposed information-flow analysis masters
this challenge by first translating the to-be-checked C++ operating-system code into the
non-deterministic intermediate programming languageToy.
The resultingToy program and the interleaved executing hardware side effects are then
checked with the help of a sound security type system forToy. A universal lattice for
shared-memory programs allows the protection-parametricanalysis to cope with partially
unknown or dynamic information-flow policies.
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We have seen that for the special setting of low-level operating-system code, it is practi-
cally feasible and significantly more precise to repeat the analysis for all possible ways in
which the control-flow non-determinism in the to-be-checked program could be resolved.
I have machine-checked the soundness proof for the securitytype system for the deter-
ministic core ofToy.
To demonstrate the practicality of the proposed information-fl w analysis, I have conducted
three case studies. Chapter5 presents the results of these case studies and the first security-type-
system-based proof on the effectiveness of a countermeasure gainst AES cache side-channel
attacks.
Future Work
This thesis opens up various directions for future work:
Tool Support: In the present work, my focus was on sound information-flow analyses for
the low-level operating-system code of open microkernel-based systems. Although it
is in principle well understood how these results translatein o efficient type-checking
tools [Mye99, Sim03, FTA02, HL09], a complete automation of the proposed protection-
parametric analysis requires further work on heuristics and related static analyses. In
particular, we need heuristics for the decision where to apply the standard rules for non-
deterministic choice and parallel compositions and where we should check all possible
resolutions of the control-flow non-determinism in these statements.
Construction Guidelines for Non-Interference-Secure Mul tilevel Servers: In the
IPC case study in Section5.2 and in Section5.3, I have identified a few points where
information flows in IPC affect the construction of non-interference secure multi-level
servers in L4-family microkernel-based systems. A systemaic investigation of these
points and the development of a construction guide for provably secure multi-level
servers would be interesting follow ups.
Language Support: I designedToy for the specific needs of the low-level operating-system
code of microkernel-based systems. For a more comprising applic tion, additional lan-
guage support is required, most notably function calls.
The two primary challenges to incorporate functions into a sound analysis of low-level
operating-system code are:
1. Language support to express the conditions under which a previously checked func-
tion does not leak certain information and a corresponding mechanism to enforce
that these conditions are met by the invoking code. The charaterization of system-
call information flows with the help of placeholder objects (see Section4.5.4.4) is a
first step in this direction; and,
2. A way to extend the results of a previously checked functioto call sites where this
function will be inlined.
Confinement: With the exception of Lowe et al. [ML09], confinement proofs [Boy09,
EKE08, Sha00] require a-priori knowledge about all information flows that may occur
in a system. On the other hand, confinement is a prerequisite to d termine whether a
given subsystem can obtain the authority to execute certainsystem calls. It is therefore
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interesting to combine the results of this thesis with a formal confinement result. One
direction how such a combination could improve the information-flow analysis of multi-
level servers would be to statically check the potential access clients may obtain if a server
maps certain capabilities to these clients.
Also an integration with Lowe’s work on object capability patterns [ML09] would be
valuable. Lowe exploits the FDR2 model checker [For05] to automatically check non-
interference properties of CSP programs that exchange capabilities. I expect that the
integration of a static, security type system based analysis with a model-checking-based
analysis is the key to efficiently automate protection-parametric information-flow analy-
ses.
Noninterference-Secure Synchronization of Multi-Exempl ar Resources: In Sec-
tion 3.7, I have discussed the information-flow properties of single-unit resource-access
protocols. Extensions to multi-unit protocols and to multi-processor resource-access
protocols are therefore obvious directions for future work.
Information-Flow-Secure Capability Revocation and Secur e Timeslice Donation:
The current implementation of two functionalities of L4-family microkernels have to
receive further attention to eliminate potentially harmful information flows: L4-unmap
and the current implementation of timeslice donation [Ste04].
As we have seen in Section5.3, the frame locks in the current implementation of L4-
unmap and the inability to bound the number of directly or indirectly mapped capabilities
cause information flows that preclude a safe sharing of kernel obj cts between differently-
classified clients. These information flows can occur even ifthe kernel object itself can
only be accessed in a read-only fashion.
Similarly, in some corner cases, the implementation of timeslic donation, which is de-
scribed in [Ste04], traverses a list of threads non-preemptively that is not bounded in its
size except by the number of threads in the system.
Neither of these limitations are inherent:
• For example, a mapping quota per capability limits the size of the mapping database
subtree that L4-unmap has to traverse to revoke access right. T e map operation
forwards the specified quota together with the capability. It thereby consumes this
quota at a rate of one for each additional direct mapping and,to compensate for un-
maps which include the own capability, at a rate of two for thefirst direct mapping;
• A node-granular lock for concurrent unmaps, which allows unmapping threads to
take over the unmap lock from threads that directly or indirectly received the re-
voked capability from a thread in the unmapping thread’s address space, avoids
information flows due to lock contention; and, finally,
• Keeping blocked threads in the ready list, traversing the list of donating threads pre-
emptively and maintaining a volatile list of current donators avoids the potentially
harmful information flows in the current implementations ofd wnward donation.
An elaborative discussion of the above points would go beyond the scope of this thesis.
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A. Avoiding the Deactivation of
Nonpreemptively Executing
Threads
This section presents the source code of the check to avoid the abortion of non-preemptive
critical sections when the execution budget of a thread deplet s or when a deadline passes (see
Section3.3.5.1on page71). The source code of the check is the following.
1 inline
2 Time rdtsc() {
3 Time ret;
4 asm volatile (” rdtsc \n\t” : ”=a”(ret ) :: ”edx”);
5 return ret ;
6 }
7
8 inline
9 void touch write(void ∗ dest) {
10 asm volatile (”lock ; orl \$0,%0 \n\t”::”m” (dest ):);
11 }
12
13 inline
14 void touch read(void ∗ dest) {
15 Word dummy;
16 asm volatile (”movl %0,%1 \n\t” : ”=R” (dummy) : ”m” (dest) :);
17 }
18 ...
19
20 class Utcb {
21
22 public :
23 Time last switch , wcet remaining;
24 Time last release, deadline;
25
26 volatile bool dp;
27 volatile bool pending;
28 ...
29
30 inline
31 bool check remaining(Time needed) {
32 Time current = rdtsc ();
33
34 return (wcet remaining − current + last switch > needed) &&
35 ( last release + deadline − current > needed);
36 }
37 ...
38 };
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APPENDIX A. AVOIDING THE DEACTIVATION OF NONPREEMPTIVELY
EXECUTING THREADS
The source code of an atomic list-enqueue operation, which relies on this check, is:
1 retry :
2 utcb−>dp = true ;
3
4 if ( likely (utcb−>check remaining(wcet needed))) {
5
6 /∗ touch data structures to avoid pagefaults during delayed preemption ∗/
7 touch write(head);
8 touch write(head−> next);
9
10 if ( unlikely (utcb−>pending)) {
11 /∗ page fault may occur during enqueue ∗/
12
13 // switch to kernel
14 goto retry;
15 }
16
17 /∗ modify list ∗/
18 next = head−> next;
19 prev = head;
20 head−> next−> prev = this ;
21 head = this ;
22
23 } else {
24 /∗ insufficient time to execute critical section without job−deactivating preemption
25
26 // switch to kernel
27 goto retry ;
28 }
29
30 utcb−>dp = false;
31
32 if ( unlikely (utcb−>pending))
33 // switch to kernel
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Peter van Rossum. Nova micro-hypervisor verification. Robin deliverable d.13,
Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands, April 2008.
206
Bibliography
[VEK+07] Steve Vandebogart, Petros Efstathopoulos, Eddie Kohler, Maxwell Krohn, Cliff
Frey, David Ziegler, Frans Kaashoek, Robert Morris, and David Mazières. La-
bels and event processes in the asbestos operating system.ACM Trans. Comput.
Syst., 25(4):11, 2007.
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[Völ08a] Marcus Völp. Statically checking confidentiality of shared-memory programs
with dynamic labels. In3rd International Conference on Availability, Reliability
and Security (ARES), Barcelona, Spain, March 2008. IEEE.
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